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ABSTRACT 
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF 
ATM SECURITY ISSUES MAINTAINED BY 
BANK OFFICIALS WITHIN THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
FEBRUARY 1989 
MARIE A. WRIGHT, B.S.’, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
M.B.A., CLARKSON UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Van Court Hare, Jr. 
During the past decade, automated teller machine 
(ATM) systems have matured. According to the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, the value of ATM transactions rose 
from an estimated $35 billion in 1980 to approximately 
$291 billion in- 1984. By 1990, ATM transaction volume is 
expected to reach $524 billion. 
However, as technology proliferates, so does the 
potential for criminal activity. In 1983, the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics conservatively estimated the total 
annual nationwide bank loss due to ATM fraud to be 
between $70 million and $100 million. Yet, despite the 
concern about ATM crime expressed by the banking 
community, there is a dearth of data concerning the 
nature and extent of ATM criminal activities. 
The research reported in this dissertation documents 
a pilot effort to assess the perceptions of the nature, 
frequency of occurrence, and projected trends of ATM 
crime. Interviews were conducted with bank officials 
within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and a 
questionnaire was administered to each bank officer. The 
data were analyzed in order to determine the respondents' 
perceptions of: (1) the most frequently occurring ATM 
problems; (2) the average percentage of fraud associated 
with these problems; (3) the average reported dollar 
losses associated with these problems; (4) the most 
frequent sites at which ATM fraud problems occur; (5) 
the countermeasures considered to be the most effective 
in reducing the incidence of ATM fraud; (6) the cost of 
these countermeasures; (7) the projected change in the 
number of fraudulent ATM incidents in the next five 
years; and (8) the single most important ATM problem 
confronting the state-wide banking industry in the next 
five years. 
Since the respondents' perceptions were subjective, 
the theoretical possibility was recognized that different 
categories of respondents might have perceived certain 
ATM security issues differently. In order to determine 
• • • 
vm 
the degree to which these perceptions differed, and to 
provide a more descriptive profile of the respondents, 
the bank officials were categorized by gender, managerial 
level, and size of corresponding financial institution, 
and the responses were compared within each category. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
r 
The information age has fostered dramatic 
modifications in the financial industry's operations. 
Commerce as it is known today could not exist without the 
speed and efficiency of electronic fund transfer (EFT) 
systems ["Electronic Funds Transfer Fraud", 1987]. One 
of the more visible elements in the evolution of banking 
from a paper-based operation to an electronic operation 
is the automated teller machine (ATM) [Ballard, 1984a]. 
Today, more than 140 million card holders perform over 
325 million ATM transactions per month [Burchfield, 
1987]. 
But the information age has also introduced a new 
level of data security concerns. The value of the 
information, and the number of transactions which occur 
on-line at virtually every financial institution, have 
increased at an exponential rate during the past several 
years [Bungum, 1985]. According to the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, the value of automated teller machine (ATM) 
transactions rose from an estimated $35 billion in 1980 
to $240 billion in 1982 [Tafoya, 1987]. In 1983, the 
nationwide usage of ATMs accounted for approximately 2.7 
billion transactions (i.e., deposits and withdrawals) 
totaling $262 billion [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. By 
1 
1984, these estimates had increased to approximately 3 
billion transactions totaling $291 billion [Tien, Rich, 
and Cahn, 1986]. The volume of ATM transactions is 
expected to reach $524 billion annually by 1990 
[Brantley, 1987]. 
ATM fraud is considered to be a type of computer 
crime. Based upon the extensive public and media 
attention that this topic has received during the past 
several years, computer crime has increased concomitant 
with the proliferation of computer use [Tien, Rich, and 
Cahn, 1986; Shea, 1984; Perry and Wallich, 1984; 
Clarke, 1983; SRI International, 1982; Bernhard, 1982]. 
While there is no consensus about the numbers involved, 
there is agreement that computer crime is frequently 
undetected and underreported [Perry and Wallich, 1984]. 
A special report on electronic fund transfer fraud 
prepared by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 1983 
conservatively estimated the total annual nationwide bank 
loss duo to automated toller machine fraud to be between 
$70 million and $100 million [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 
1986]. This is more than twice the amount lost due to 
conventional bank robberies; recent estimates of loss re¬ 
sult inq from bank robberies vary between $25 million and 
$47 million per year [U.S. Department of Justice, 1984]. 
To date, vory little research has been undertaken to 
examine the nature and extent of ATM crime. The research 
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reported in this dissertation documents a pilot effort to 
assess the perceptions of ATM security issues maintained 
by various bank officials within the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. This chapter will describe the underlying 
technology of ATM systems, the types of ATM criminal 
activities, and the controls necessary to reduce the 
incidence of ATM crime. Section 1.1 provides an overview 
of ATM technology, and section 1.2 presents a framework 
for the analysis of ATM crime. Section 1.3 describes the 
categories of controls necessary to minimize these 
losses. The chapter concludes with a description of the 
organization of the dissertation. 
1.1 ATM Technology 
ATMs are remote terminals linked to a financial 
institution's mainframe computer which allow individuals 
to make a variety of financial transactions (i.e., 
deposits, withdrawals, account transfers, and account 
balance inquiries). The machine is activated through the 
use of a magnetically-encoded plastic card and a personal 
identification number (PIN).’ Depending upon the 
financial institution's policies, the PIN may be either 
numeric or alphanumeric, and is either chosen by the 
customer or assigned by the banking institution. 
ATMs may be either "free-standing" or "through-the- 
wall" [Colton, Tien, Davis, Dunn, and Barnett, 1982]. 
Free-standing ATMs are situated away from the main office 
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or branch offices of the banking institution, and are 
located in areas which are easily accessible to large 
numbers of people (i.e., shopping centers, supermarkets, 
transportation terminals, office building lobbies, and 
residential neighborhoods). Through-the-wall ATMs are 
physically located at the main office or branch offices 
of the banking institution, but are situated where bank 
customers can use them after regular banking hours 
[Colton, Tien, Davis, Dunn, and Barnett, 1982]. 
Advances in technology in the last ten years have 
brought about a proliferation of local, regional, and 
national ATM networks, allowing an account holder to use 
any ATM owned by a financial institution which belongs to 
the same network to which his/her financial institution 
belongs [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. Several factors 
have provided impetus for a banking institution to join 
an ATM network. These include reducing the operating 
costs associated with providing ATM services, providing 
more convenient customer services, and avoiding 
prohibitions against interstate banking [Tien, Rich, and 
Cahn, 1986; Rutledge and Hoffman, 1986; Kauffman and 
Kriebel, 1988; Davidson and White, 1983]. 
ATMs may be either on-line or off-line with the 
bank's mainframe computer [Colton, Tien, Davis, Dunn, and 
Barnett, 1982]. If the ATMs operate in an on-line, real- 
time environment, all account holder transactions are 
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FIGURE 1.1 
Principal Components of an ATM System 
Source: Tien, J. M., Rich, T. F., and Cahn, M. F. 
Computer crime: Electronic fund transfer 
systems fraud. NCJ-100461. Rockville, MD: 
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 1986. 
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holder's banking institution. When the individual 
inserts his/her card into the ATM, the data encoded on 
the card's magnetic strip is read. The ATM switch behind 
the ATM recognizes that the card belongs to an account 
holder of the bank which operates the ATM, and routes the 
information to the banking institution's mainframe 
computer. (In the presence of a local or proprietary ATM 
network, a direct communication line automatically routes 
the information between the ATM and the bank's computer, 
thus eliminating the need for an ATM switch). The ATM 
verifies that the card is valid, and then instructs the 
user to input his/her PIN. Once the correct PIN is 
input, (the account holder is typically allowed three to 
five attempts to enter the correct PIN), the ATM displays 
a menu of options, from which the user selects the type 
of transaction desired. (In this example, a cash 
withdrawal is indicated). The desired amount of the 
withdrawal is then entered (i.e., $50). The ATM asks the 
bank's computer if the account holder is allowed to make 
this transaction (i.e., Is the account holder's balance 
greater than $50?). If the computer authorizes the 
withdrawal, the transaction is performed: the $50 is 
dispensed; the user's account is debited $50; the 
transaction is recorded on a transaction log; a 
7 
transaction receipt is printed for the user; and, if the 
ATM is camera-equipped, a photograph is taken of the 
user. 
With the introduction of regional and national 
networks, an account holder is no longer limited to using 
ATMs owned by the banking institution at which he/she has 
an account. Instead, the account holder may perform 
transactions on any ATM owned by a financial institution 
which is a member of the same network to which the 
account holder's financial institution belongs. 
Modifying the example described above, suppose the 
account holder wishes to withdraw $50 from his/her 
account using an ATM which is not operated by the account 
holder's banking institution. When the user inserts 
his/her card into the ATM, the ATM switch recognizes that 
the card belongs to an account holder of a network 
affiliate. The ATM switch routes the card information to 
the network switch, which in turn routes the information 
to the computer within user's financial institution. The 
transaction then is processed in the manner described 
above. 
Given the number of components involved in an ATM 
system, the potential sources of criminal activity are 
manifold [Luchsinger, 1988; Burchfield, 1987; Lane, 
1987]. However, the nature of ATM crime is vague, and 
categorizing activities as fraudulent is often difficult. 
8 
1.2 Framework for the Analysis of ATM Crime 
There is no commonly accepted definition of the term 
"ATM crime"; yet the ability to differentiate crimes 
which may be attributed to the operation of an ATM system 
from others that occur in financial institutions is a 
prerequisite for analyzing ATM crime [Tien, Rich, and 
Cahn, 1986]. While certain incidents may be clearly 
labeled as ATM crimes (i.e., cash withdrawals which are 
made through the use of a stolen ATM card), other 
incidents are less easily classified. For example, if a 
customer is accosted while using an ATM, should the 
incident be considered an ATM-related crime or a robbery? 
In this dissertation, the definition advanced by 
Colton et al. [1982] will be adopted in slightly modified 
form: any crime - whether or not prosecuted under 
special computer, EFT, or traditional laws - that would 
not have occurred without the presence of an ATM system, 
is considered to be an ATM crime. Under this definition, 
the incident described in the previous paragraph would be 
considered an ATM-related crime. Interestingly, the 
Federal Reserve Board has ruled that if an individual is 
forced by a robber to withdraw cash from an ATM, then the 
robber's actions are equivalent to his/her use of a stol¬ 
en card [Electronic Funds Transfer Association, 1985]. 
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1.2.1 ATM Vulnerabilities 
ATM systems are particularly vulnerable to criminal 
activities involving account holders. A common type of 
fraud concerns the unauthorized use of an individual's 
ATM card. An account holder may lose his/her card, or it 
may be stolen, allowing others the opportunity to 
illegally withdraw funds from the account. The card may 
also be taken, without the account holder's knowledge, by 
a family member, friend, or acquaintance. Although both 
the ATM card and the PIN are required to gain account 
access, obtaining an account holder's PIN is often as 
easy as obtaining his/her card. In many cases, the PIN 
is written either on the back of the card or on a 
separate piece of paper which is stored with the card. 
PINs have also been verbally revealed by unsuspecting 
account holders during surreptitious confidence schemes 
["Court drops bank fraud case in 1st ruling under 1986 
statute", 1988; "Confidence schemes: What security 
officers should know", 1987; "Citibank will pay for ATM 
fraud: $500,000 settlement is first under fund transfer 
act", 1982]. 
ATM crimes may also be deliberately committed by 
account holders. A customer can misrepresent ATM 
transactions by claiming that his/her card was stolen - 
when it fact it was not - or, even if the card was not 
missing, disclaiming any knowledge of one or more 
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withdrawals [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. False reports 
may also be filed claiming that an ATM dispensed the 
incorrect amount of cash. Empty envelopes or worthless 
checks may be deposited, followed by cash withdrawals 
which result in overdrafts ["Tennessee court upholds 
sentence in.check fraud case", 1986]. As discussed in 
section 1.1, when financial institutions operate their 
ATMs in an off-line mode, current account balances cannot 
be verified, and account holders are able to overdraw 
their accounts. 
ATM systems are also vulnerable to criminal 
activities perpetrated by individuals other than account 
holders. Card counterfeiting operations, which have 
plagued the credit card industry for years, are beginning 
to pose a threat to the security of ATM operations 
[Stamps, 1987; Polis, 1987; Hyman, 1985; "Card 
technology on the right track", 1983; "New fraud- 
resistant Visa card offers global cash access, speeds 
authorization at retail", 1982]. ATMs may contain a 
large amount of cash (i.e., $40,000 or more), and are 
frequently targets for robberies and vandalism [Matthews, 
1983]. The replenishment cash may be stolen by bank 
employees or service team crews, or these individuals may 
themselves be assaulted and robbed ["How to prevent 
attacks against ATM repair teams", 1987; "An ATM robbery 
vulnerability", 1986; Barentine, Caci, Imrie, Krueger, 
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Loeb, McDonough, Nolte, O'Brien, Parks, Pritchett, 
Rafferty, Regan, Richardson, Rossi, Waterstreet, 1985b], 
Other types of crimes are less likely to occur, but 
are potentially more serious in terms of their resultant 
financial loss. Data communication lines may be 
electronically attacked, permitting the unauthorized 
access of transmitted data. Perhaps even more serious is 
the manipulation of ATM software by bank employees, 
causing fraudulent accounts to be established, deposits 
to be credited to the wrong accpunts, or withdrawals to 
be improperly debited. It is not surprising that the 
largest potential losses may be caused by bank employees. 
Studies have shown that the greatest security risks come 
from organizational employees, not from outsiders 
["Information security and privacy", 1986; Kusserow, 
1986; Rosenstein, 1986a; Bungum, 1985; American Bar 
Association, 1984; IBM Corporation, 1983]. 
1.2.2 Legislation 
As previously mentioned, ATM fraud is considered to 
be a type of computer crime. Unfortunately, the law is 
reactive by nature, so existing computer crime laws have 
lagged behind ethical standards, technological advances, 
and procedural safeguards [Nycum, 1984]. While computer 
crime legislation is still evolving at both the state and 
12 
federal government levels, so far it is neither uniform 
nor consistent [Baldridge, 1988; BloomBecker, 1987; 
Richards, 1987; Jawrocki, 1987]. 
Current legal practices have made banking 
institutions liable for their customers' losses, even if 
those losses were the result of account holder 
negligence. According to the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act (the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation E), account 
holder liability is limited to $50 if the card is 
reported missing within two days of discovery, or $500 if 
the card is reported missing more than two days after 
discovery [U.S. Department of Justice, 1985; Ellis and 
Greguras, 1983]. However, this liability provision 
allows an account holder to claim that discovery of the 
missing card occurred within two days, whether it 
actually did or not, thereby avoiding any liability in 
excess of $50 [Colton, Tien, Davis, Dunn, and Barnett, 
1982]. Furthermore, whenever there is a disputed 
transfer of funds from a customer's account, the banking 
institution must prove that the funds transfer was 
authorized. Since this proof is very difficult to 
supply, evidence exists that financial institutions are 
paying for some account holder negligence [Tien, Rich, 
and Cahn, 1986]. 
Concern has also been expressed by the banking 
community that further fraud losses will be incurred 
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after the Expedited Funds Availability Act (the Federal 
Reserve Board's Regulation CC) is implemented in 
September, 1988 [Ellis, 1988]. According to this law, 
certain deposits (i.e., cash, electronic payments, 
treasury checks, and state and local government checks) 
must be made available for withdrawal on the next 
business day. In addition, checks which are drawn on 
non-local (U.S.) banks must be credited within three 
business days. Many bank officials feel that this is 
insufficient time to process checks, particularly those 
drawn on banks located in distant geographic areas of the 
country. 
Other laws applicable to ATM crime include the wire 
fraud and mail fraud provisions of the Criminal Code, and 
the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1984 [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. Certain 
ATM criminal acts may also be prosecuted as violations of 
federal statutes relating to bank fraud and embezzlement, 
bank larceny, or interstate transportation of stolen 
property [Clarke, 1983]. To date there have been very 
few indictments - and even fewer convictions - of ATM 
fraud perpetrators under any of these laws [Tien, Rich, 
and Cahn, 1986]. 
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Since ATM crime is so difficult to prosecute, bank 
officials have concentrated their efforts on preventing 
and controlling the occurrence of these activities 
[Lipman, 1984; Kennish, 1984]. 
1.3 Controls 
Levels of control have traditionally been examined 
in a variety of contexts. Controls have been analyzed by 
security topic (i.e., physical, computer, and 
administrative security measures) [Rutledge and Hoffman, 
1986], area of responsibility (i.e., computer users, 
audit management, and legal counsel) [SRI International, 
1982; Thompson, 1988; McClure, 1980], area of control 
environment (i.e., normal operations, and backup and 
recovery procedures) [SRI International, 1982], and mode 
of control implementation (i.e., security kernels, access 
control mechanisms, and encryption) [Abrams and Jeng, 
1987; Newman, Omura, and Pickholtz, 1987; Heilman, 
1987; Nessett, 1983, 1987; Denning, 1987; Campbell, 
1985; Horgan, 1985; Roberts, 1985; Uzenda, 1985; 
Anderson, 1985; Walker, 1985; Department of Defense 
Computer Security Center, 1985; Summers, 1984; Manuel, 
1984; Downs, 1984; Butterworth, 1984; Landwehr, 1983; 
Voydock and Kent, 1983; Rushby and Randell, 1983; 
Schell, 1983; Ames, Gasser, and Schell, 1983; Kak, 
1983; Bernhard, 1982; Denning, 1982; Gait, 1981; 
Turn, 1980; Diffie and Heilman, 1979]. However, the 
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controls needed to reduce the incidence of ATM crime are 
perhaps best analyzed with respect to their security 
objectives. Gilhooley [1980] outlined four categories of 
controls which may be implemented to act upon particular 
sources of risk; each is described below. 
Deterrent controls are designed to discourage people 
(i.e., customers) from engaging in unauthorized activity, 
whether accidental or intentional [Gilhooley, 1980; 
Parker, 1984]. Account holders are freguently advised to 
protect their ATM cards and PINs in order to deter 
unauthorized access to their accounts. Some bank 
officials have even unethically (i.e., in contravention 
of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act) warned their 
account holders that they are liable for losses resulting 
from unauthorized transactions when they disclose their 
PINs [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. 
Preventive controls minimize the occurrence of 
unauthorized activity. These controls represent the 
banking industry's main line of defense against the 
perpetrators of ATM crime, and they are comprised of both 
human and technological security measures. The human 
controls include meetings to perpetuate the importance of 
security awareness among bank employees. When employees- 
are responsible for transporting currency from a 
financial institution to a detached ATM facility, a 
policy of dual control is frequently implemented. This 
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policy suggests that both bank employees be separated by 
a distance of thirty to fifty feet when approaching the 
machine (so that one employee may act as a material 
witness in the event of the robbery of the other) ["An 
ATM robbery vulnerability", 1986]. In addition, both 
bank employees are required to verify the contents of the 
ATM. Policies have been implemented which prohibit bank 
employees who have custody of the ATM cards from also 
having custody of the PINs ["A checklist for ATM fraud 
control", 1987]. Organized fraud schemes are often 
shared between banking institutions in order to minimize 
the industry's financial losses [Ellis, 1988]. In order 
to prevent the theft of cash from the machines, ATMs are 
physically secured according to the guidelines 
established by the Bank Protection Act of 1968 (i.e., the 
machines are encased in at least six inches of concrete, 
their doors are designed to meet the requirements of 
Underwriters Laboratories, and they are equipped with 
alarm systems) ["Inspecting, testing and servicing 
alarms", 1987; Barentine, Caci, Imrie, Krueger, Loeb, 
McDonough, Nolte, O'Brien, Parks., Pritchett, Rafferty, 
Regan, Richardson, Rossi, Waterstreet, 1985a]. The 
technological security measures include the enforcement 
of a maximum daily withdrawal limit, a restriction of the 
number of daily transactions allowed, and the ability to 
retain an ATM card (i.e., after it has been reported lost 
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or stolen, or after the PIN has been repeatedly 
misentered). The most effective preventive control 
against ATM fraud is believed to be the equipping of ATMs 
with cameras (i.e., static film cameras - which are 
activated either when a card is inserted into the 
machine, or when something comes within a certain 
distance of the ATM - or closed circuit televisions and 
videotape) [Gruber, 1987; Gist, 1985; George, 1984; 
"ATM cameras help cut 'family' fraud", 1983; "Cameras, 
careful mailouts curb ATM fraud", 1982; "Dayton bank's 
ATM cameras prove effective in cutting fraud", 1981]. 
Research is continuing in the areas of biometric 
technology (i.e., fingerprint recognition) and smart card 
technology (i.e., credit card-sized plastic devices with 
imbedded computer chips) [Gagliano, 1988; Kutler, 1986a, 
1986b]. However, these technological advances are not 
yet economically feasible, particularly since their 
implementation will require the banking industry to spend 
hundreds of millions of dollars in order to retool their 
retail banking operations [Kutler, 1986b]. 
Detective controls are intended to identify the 
existence of unauthorized activities so that the 
resultant financial loss is minimized. Periodic audits 
are typically performed in order to assess the level of 
adherence to established security procedures [London and 
Brandon, 1988], and to identify threats to data accuracy 
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(i.e., modifications to the data caused by sources 
external to the equipment or software) [Walsh, 1988; 
Rosenstein, 1986b; Kinnon and Davis, 1986]. 
Corrective controls are necessary to recover from a 
loss situation [Gilhooley, 1980] and to reduce the risk 
of a similar type of loss from happening again [Parker, 
1984]. As mentioned in section 1.2.2, legislation is 
evolving at both the state and federal government levels 
for the stricter prosecution of fraud perpetrators. 
Additionally, in order to reduce the number of mechanical 
errors, ATM technology has become more sophisticated over 
the past few years. New safeguards have been introduced 
(i.e., providing increased diagnostics which allow an ATM 
to automatically reverse its motors in order to clear a 
jammed bill path), and in-house servicing operations have 
been adopted in order to correct mechanical problems 
expeditiously [Luchsinger, 1988]. 
The controls described above have been most 
effective in reducing the banking industry's ATM losses: 
current financial losses are estimated to be less than 
one percent of the total volume of ATM transactions 
[Brantley, 1987]. 
1.4 Organization of Dissertation 
In order to provide a systematic presentation of 
this research study, a common understanding of the 
underlying technology, types of ATM crimes, and 
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categories of controls were established in this chapter. 
The following chapter discusses the relationship between 
anonymity and criminal activity, and reviews the existing 
literature. Chapter 3 identifies the research questions 
addressed and establishes the research methodology 
employed in this dissertation. The results of the 
research study are presented in detail in Chapter 4, and 
a discussion of these results is provided in Chapter 5. 
Finally, Chapter 6 evaluates the research study, and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter defines the interrelationship between 
anonymity and criminal activity, and discusses the 
existing sources of data on ATM-related crime. Section 
2.1 presents a review of the sociological and social 
psychological literature with respect to its relevance to 
criminal activity. Section 2.2 discusses prior attempts 
to collect ATM fraud data, and offers several reasons for 
the scarcity of such data. 
2.1 Anonymity and Criminal Activity 
For more than 100 years, researchers attempted to 
understand the nature of criminal activity by deriving 
general theories of criminal behavior from the statistics 
maintained by criminal justice agencies [Hindelang, 
Hirschi, and Weis, 1979]. However, in the 1940s, 
literature began to appear which criticized the validity 
of existing criminal and juvenile delinquency statistics. 
One of the most serious limitations leveled against these 
statistics concerned the fact that they dealt only with 
those individuals who became involved in the legal- 
reactive process [Erickson, 1972]. Evidence of 
widespread crime by persons who were never involved with 
the legal system began to be published [Erickson, 1972], 
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and numerous studies were undertaken which indicated that 
many individuals committed offenses for which they could 
have been convicted if caught [Doeren, 1977]. 
Sutherland [1940, 1945] and Tappan [1947] observed 
that there had been extensive lawbreaking among business 
and professional groups. Fraud, bribery, violations of 
trust, misrepresentation in advertising, and restraint of 
trade had become arbitrary by-products of business 
activities, and had changed only in their level of 
sophistication from those of the "robber barons" of the 
last half of the nineteenth century. (Sutherland [1940] 
wrote that the attitudes of the "robber barons" could be 
illustrated by Colonel Vanderbilt's question, "You don't 
suppose you can run a railroad in accordance with the 
statutes, do you?", and A. B. Stickney's statement to 
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sixteen railroad presidents, "I have the utmost respect 
for you gentlemen, individually, but as railroad 
presidents I wouldn't trust you with my watch out of my 
sight.") 
Porterfield [1943] compared the delinquencies of 
college students with those of children in the juvenile 
court. Through the use of questionnaires which were 
completed anonymously by 337 college students, 
Porterfield found that all of the college students in his 
sample had committed offenses comparable to those for 
which others had been brought to court. In fact, two of 
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the students, who were also members of the clergy, 
individually admitted to committing more than twenty-five 
delinquent offenses without subsequent legal retribution. 
In another study, Porterfield found that the violations 
anonymously admitted by college males exceeded in number 
and in seriousness those for which others had been 
legally charged [Porterfield, 1946]. 
Other studies also suggested that there were vastly 
more delinquent individuals at any moment than official 
statistics indicated [Erickson, 1972]. Murphy, Shirley, 
and Witmer [1946] studied the case histories of 114 boys 
involved in a counseling program. Although more than 100 
boys were found to have been guilty of various legal 
violations, only forty of them had ever been to court. 
Erickson and Empey [1963] found that almost 90% of the 
juvenile legal violations remained undetected by anyone 
in authority. Wallerstein and Wyle [1947] found that 91% 
of their sample of New York adults anonymously admitted 
having committed felonies and misdemeanors. 
The studies described above demonstrated the 
futility of measuring crime according to an 
institutionalized - non-institutionalized dichotomy [Nye 
and Short, 1957; Dentler and Monroe, 1961]. Recognizing 
the questionable relationship between official statistics 
and actual delinquent behavior, Short and Nye [1957-58] 
advocated a self-report method.of measuring delinquent 
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behavior via anonymous questionnaires. Emphasis was 
placed upon anonymity, particularly within the non- 
institutionalized population, so that the respondents 
would believe that they had nothing to lose by disclosing 
certain information. A spate of research ensued, 
designed to investigate the impact of anonymity on self- 
reported behaviors and the validity of the obtained data. 
Gold [1966] advocated an interview method designed 
to measure delinquent behavior directly from the 
confidential confessions of 522 teen-agers. In an 
attempt to determine the extent to which certain offenses 
might have been concealed during the interview process, a 
validation study was described in which the information 
obtained from these confidential confessions was compared 
with the information obtained from a group of informants 
(i.e., teen-agers who had information about the 
delinquency of their peers). 
Clark and Tifft [1966] described a study which was 
designed to experimentally test the accuracy of anonymous 
questionnaire responses. Forty-five male college 
students were asked to anonymously record the frequency 
with which they had committed certain delinquent acts. 
Although the students believed that they were responding 
anonymously, their identities were recorded by means of a 
number identification system on the questionnaires. 
Polygraph examinations were subsequently administered, 
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and the responses were compared with those obtained from 
the questionnaires. Both sets of responses were found to 
be highly associated, and Clark and Tifft [1966] 
concluded that the data obtained from the anonymous 
questionnaires were valid. However, the researchers were 
subsequently criticized for their apparent confusion of 
the meaning of the terms "validity" and "reliability" 
[DeFleur, 1967]. 
Hardt and Peterson-Hardt [1977] conducted an 
experiment designed to examine the quality and accuracy 
of the self-report method of measuring delinquent 
behavior. Questionnaires were administered to 914 male 
juvenile offenders of junior high school age. Although 
the responses were confidential (i.e., the respondents 
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were instructed not to put their names on the 
questionnaires), individual identities were established 
from biographical data obtained from the questionnaires. 
The responses were examined with respect to four quality 
appraisal checks: (1) self-reports were compared with 
the official data on the arrest histories of these 
individuals; (2) questionnaire responses were compared 
with those obtained from a "known group" who had high 
self-reported violation responses; (3) self-reports were 
compared with pre-established values from a "lie scale" 
in order to ascertain the respondents' tendencies to give 
socially desirable answers; and (4) internal consistency 
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was measured through the use of interlocking 
guestionnaire items. Hardt and Peterson-Hardt [1977] 
found that the anonymous self-report technique yielded 
valid data for most respondents. 
Kulik, Stein, and Sarbin [1968] undertook a study in 
order to determine whether anonymity was a necessary 
condition for candid self-reports of delinquent behavior. 
A checklist of antisocial behaviors was completed both 
anonymously and non-anonymously by 245 male high school 
students and 137 male institutionalized delinquents. The 
results of the study indicated that the high school and 
institutionalized subjects became more guarded in 
admitting misbehaviors when they were not protected by 
anonymity [Kulik, Stein, and Sarbin, 1968; Farrington, 
1973] . 
To date, the question concerning the validity of the 
data obtained from the self-report method of measuring 
delinquent behavior has not yet been answered in the 
sociological literature [Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis, 
1979; Malvin and Moskowitz, 1983]. However, researchers 
have concurred that the use of anonymous questionnaires 
are most likely to provide candid responses [Malvin and 
Moskowitz, 1983]. 
Within the social psychological literature, 
substantial research has suggested that as the anonymity 
of a situation increases, so does the incidence of 
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criminal activity. In a Halloween study conducted by 
Diener, Fraser, Beaman, and Kelem [1976], 1,352 trick-or- 
treating children were given an opportunity to steal 
candy and money under varying conditions of anonymity and 
group presence. Significantly more stealing was observed 
under conditions of anonymity and in the presence of a 
group. 
A similar study was designed by Miller and Rowold 
[1979], in which a costume manipulation of anonymity 
(i.e., mask vs. no mask) was examined. Masked children 
were found to steal candy more frequently than unmasked 
children, and it was concluded that anonymity led to 
lowered restraints on the behavior of young children. 
Solomon, Neigher, and Solomon [1978] assessed the 
relationship between anonymity and antinormative behavior 
in a field study using adult subjects. Individuals 
attending a regional psychological association convention 
in New York were given an opportunity to take convention 
program books from a table either with or without a 
convention aide sitting nearby. Significantly less 
stealing was found to occur under the surveillance 
condition. 
Sadalla [1978] theorized that criminal activity was 
fostered in large cities because such contexts promoted 
the formation of organized groups, and provided a greater 
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degree of individual anonymity. This theory was 
supported by an experiment conducted by Zimbardo [1969]. 
Zimbardo and an associate purchased two cars and left 
them on public streets with the license plates removed 
and the hoods opened. One car was left across from the 
Bronx campus of New York University, and the other was 
left near the Stanford University campus in Palo Alto, 
California. Within ten minutes, the car in New York 
began to be vandalized. In less than three days, this 
car was reduced to a battered, useless hulk of metal: 
the result of twenty-three incidents of destructive 
contact. In contrast, no acts of vandalism occurred 
against the car in Palo Alto. In fact, one passerby even 
lowered the hood of this car during a rainstorm so that 
the engine would not get wet! From this study, Zimbardo 
[1969] concluded that the social anonymity present in 
large cities encouraged vandalism of public and private 
property. 
The interrelationship between anonymity and crime 
has also been acknowledged by the banking industry, 
although in a much less publicized way. Bank officials 
have long known that a criminal's best defense is 
anonymity [Baumer and Carrington, 1986; George, 1984], 
and many of the controls mandated by the Bank Protection 
Act of 1968 (i.e., security guards and alarm systems) 
have effectively reduced the level of anonymity afforded 
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to traditional bank robbers. However, advances in EFT 
technology have altered the nature and scope of criminal 
activities committed against financial institutions. 
Employee crimes have been modified from those involving 
the physical theft of money to those involving the 
clandestine manipulation of accounts (i.e., shifting 
figures from one account to another) [Solarz, 1987]. 
ATMs have allowed customers to conduct their banking 
transactions in an anonymous manner. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, ATM systems are particularly vulnerable to 
criminal activities involving account holders. It was 
also previously mentioned that the use of surveillance 
systems at ATM sites are believed to be the most 
effective preventive control against ATM fraud; 
photographs are generated which document all 
transactions, thus reducing the users' level of 
anonymity. 
It is not surprising that the interrelationship 
between anonymity and crime is not well documented in the 
literature pertaining to the banking industry. Bank 
officials are particularly reluctant to disclose the 
extent of criminal activity within their financial 
institutions. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
very little research has been undertaken to examine the 
nature and extent of any EFT-related crime. 
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2.2 Sources of Data on ATM Crime 
Unlike the general criminal justice field for which 
the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports serves as the primary 
source of data on reported crime, the field of ATM crime 
does not have a comparable single source [Colton, Tien, 
Davis, Dunn, and Barnett, 1982]. Therefore, in order to 
begin to identify the relevant data sources, two on-line 
literature searches were conducted at the University of 
Massachusetts/Amherst. The first search accessed the 
relevant bibliographic and information databases from 
1970 through 1988 using the BRS Information Technologies 
service, and the second search accessed the American 
Banker Full Text database from 1981 through 1988 using 
the DIALOG Information Retrieval service. Although there 
was a considerable amount of general literature on ATMs, 
and the literature related to criminal activity was 
extensive, the literature pertaining to both ATMs and 
criminal activity was sparse. Furthermore, none of the 
identified documents contained specific data concerning 
the magnitude of ATM crime. 
In the hopes that a recognized law enforcement 
agency would have compiled some statistics on ATM crime, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, DC was 
contacted. According to an FBI agent in the Uniform 
Crime Reports Division, banking institutions were 
supposed to report incidents of fraud and resultant 
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financial losses to the FBI. However, their information 
in this area was incomplete and subject to error due to 
the difficulty involved in obtaining such data from 
financial institutions. 
Next, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency in 
Boston was contacted. According to a senior-level 
employee, nationally-chartered commercial financial 
institutions are required to report the number and dollar 
amounts of their internal (i.e., employee) fraud losses 
to the Office of the Comptroller of Currency. However, 
their data were confidential and could not be disclosed. 
Finally, a request was made to the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics for all publicly-accessible data germane to 
ATM crime. Publications of two research studies were 
forwarded; both were funded by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and both 
investigated the incidence of EFT crime [Colton, Tien, 
Davis, Dunn, and Barnett, 1982; Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 
1986]. In both studies, thorough literature searches had 
been undertaken in order to identify those sources which 
could provide reliable information on the nature and 
extent of EFT crime. Since ATM crime is a subset of EFT 
crime, the results of these literature searches were 
considered to be applicable to this dissertation. Both 
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studies identified the same four sources; each source is 
described below according to the information provided in 
Colton et al. [1982] and Tien et al. [1986]. 
The SRI Computer Abuse File was identified as the 
first potential source of information on EFT crime. This 
file originated in the early 1970s as the focus of a 
study which sought to identify and measure the extent of 
computer crime. The SRI file - initially sponsored by 
the National Science Foundation and now supported by the 
U.S. Department of Justice - consists of a compilation of 
more than 1,000 computer abuse cases identified through 
individual contacts and a newspaper clipping service. 
Although this file is perhaps the most well-known record 
of computer crime, it does not rely upon any systematic 
or scientific data collection technique? only those cases 
which are reported by the media or uncovered by the 
researchers are included. While large losses or unique 
crimes are often brought to the attention of the 
researchers, this does not provide a random sample of 
information. Furthermore, since the file focuses on 
computer abuse in general, any information pertaining to 
ATM-related crimes is obtained as a by-product of the 
collection effort. Although the file is a useful 
collection of cases for computer security and legal 
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research, it cannot be considered a statistically valid 
sample, and meaningful conclusions as to the nature and 
extent of ATM crime cannot be drawn from the data. 
Federal regulatory agencies of financial 
institutions were also identified as a potential source 
of information on EFT-related crime. Until 1981, most 
financial institutions were required to report internal 
crimes (i.e., employee frauds) and external crimes (i.e., 
non-employee larcenies) to the appropriate federal 
regulatory agencies: the Comptroller of Currency (for 
national banks), the Federal Reserve Board (for state- 
chartered Federal Reserve Board members), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (for insured, non-Federal 
Reserve Board members), the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(for savings and loan institutions), and the National 
Credit Union Administration (for credit unions). 
However, in October 1981, as a result of the paper- 
reduction emphasis in the federal government, the federal 
regulatory agencies eliminated the requirement mandating 
financial institutions to report their external crimes. 
Now, banking institutions are required to report only 
their internal crimes, and to maintain informal, in-house 
records of their external crimes. As a result, 
consistent information on external crimes is no longer 
available in aggregate form. Furthermore, since the 
information on internal crimes collected by each federal 
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regulatory agency is used for specific and limited 
purposes (i.e., to provide cross-checks of prospective 
members who may have been involved in prior criminal 
activities), the data are not maintained in a manner 
which would facilitate measuring the nature and extent of 
ATM crime. Rather, the data are compiled by geographic 
occurrence, and classified according to traditional legal 
definitions, within each regulatory agency. None of the 
federal regulatory agencies use identical reporting 
procedures, so the data collected are not likely to be 
consistent. The data are also not likely to be released 
outside of their respective regulatory agencies, since 
data pertaining to bank crimes are considered to be 
sensitive. Finally, it should be remembered that the 
federal regulatory agencies are primarily interested in 
monitoring the financial health of the nation's banking 
system; they are not interested in measuring certain 
types of criminal activities. Unless new reporting forms 
for internal and external crimes are designed and 
implemented, and existing policies and procedures are 
changed, relevant data on ATM-related crime cannot be 
obtained from these agencies. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation was identified 
as another potential source of information of EFT crime. 
The FBI investigates most cases of bank fraud, and 
maintains case records on federal offenses. Financial 
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crimes are considered federal offenses if the banking 
institution is federally-chartered, or if bank assets 
cross state lines in the course of a criminal act. 
Although information on almost every aspect of a case is 
recorded for historical and investigative purposes, the 
FBI does not identify the use of an EFT-related 
technology in a case, since it has no special bearing on 
prosecution efforts. (EFT-related crimes are typically 
investigated as frauds or embezzlements). Although the 
FBI investigates the majority of financial crimes, many 
of the small bank crimes are reviewed at the local, 
rather than the national, level. Information pertaining 
to these crimes are maintained at the local level if the 
crime is not considered to be a federal offense. As a 
result, information concerning many ATM crimes (i.e., 
vandalism, robbery of customers, and certain unauthorized 
withdrawals and fraudulent deposits) are maintained at 
the local FBI office. Although records for specific 
cases could be legally obtained from the local and 
national levels according to the Freedom of Information 
Act, the FBI has a policy against providing case 
information on a regular basis. Finally, according to 
the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1984, the FBI is responsible for 
investigating all EFT-related crimes. However, the 
section of the Act which applies to ATM fraud makes it a 
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federal offense only if $1,000 or more were obtained 
during a twelve-month period. Even if it was possible to 
obtain such information from the FBI, it would not 
constitute a representative sample of ATM frauds. 
A study conducted by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants [1984] was identified as the 
fourth potential source of information on EFT-related 
crime. In 1979, the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants attempted to examine the extent of 
computer fraud within the banking industry. A task force 
was established, and, in cooperation with the Bank 
Administration Institute, 9,000 commercial banks were 
selected which represented a geographic sample of the 
industry. All of the major financial institutions were 
included in the sample. The survey instrument, however, 
did not focus on the extent of computer fraud within the 
banking sector. Instead, each institution was asked to 
describe one of its cases of computer fraud on the 
provided questionnaire. A large majority of the 
respondents indicated that no computer fraud problems had 
occurred. In fact, from the 5,000 responses which were 
received, only 85 cases were ultimately classified as 
computer crimes. Despite the fact that the study 
provided a good description of the nature of some EFT 
crimes, the data cannot be used to measure the extent of 
ATM crime; the survey instrument was not designed to 
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examine the level of such criminal activity, and the 
sample was primarily comprised of large banking 
institutions. 
None of the four potential sources of EFT crime 
information - described above according to the research 
provided by Colton et al. [1982] and Tien et al. [1986] - 
provided the statistically valid data required to measure 
the nature and extent of ATM crime. However, it is not 
surprising that there is a lack of such data. ATM 
systems are considered proprietary in nature, and bank 
officials are concerned that the release of operational 
data could create potential competitive disadvantages 
[Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. There are also wide 
variations in the definitions, procedures, and categories 
used by financial institutions to record transactions, 
fraud events, and charge-offs for sustained losses [Tien, 
Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
practical difficulties exist in identifying the 
occurrence of an ATM fraud, either while it is in 
progress, or after the incident has occurred [Tien, Rich, 
and Cahn, 1986]. In addition, there is uncertainty about 
the legal status of certain actions which may or may not 
constitute a crime within a given jurisdiction [Tien, 
Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. It is also common practice for 
banking institutions to handle ATM crimes by in-house 
security or personnel procedures rather than by the 
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standard criminal justice system [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 
1986]. Furthermore, as described above, there is neither 
a comprehensive data source for capturing ATM data, nor a 
standardized data base against which ATM losses may be 
measured on a continual basis [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 
1986]. Finally, the scarcity of ATM crime data is 
compounded by the fact that bank officials are extremely 
reluctant to share specific information concerning their 
institutions' financial losses. The risk of 
embarrassment, the risk of other employees learning of 
the ease with which a crime was committed, or the risk of 
losing customers due to bad publicity are strong 
deterrents to the reporting of ATM crime losses 
["Information security and privacy", 1986]. 
The dearth of ATM crime data necessitated that this 
dissertation study be exploratory. The following chapter 
describes the research questions and research design 
employed in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter identifies the research questions 
addressed and establishes the research methodology 
employed in this dissertation. As previously indicated, 
the primary purpose of this study was to investigate the 
perceptions of ATM security issues held by various bank 
officials within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The 
specific questions designed to achieve this purpose are 
listed in section 3.1, and the research design is 
discussed in section 3.2. 
3.1 Research Questions 
To date, the available information on ATM crime has 
been primarily limited to newspaper accounts of 
celebrated incidents, or analyses of questionnaire 
surveys with low returns [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. 
As previously discussed, banking institutions - whose 
business depends upon their reputations of 
trustworthiness - are unlikely to publicize losses 
resulting from ATM criminal activities [Perry and 
Wallich, 1984]. As a result, estimates of the extent of 
ATM crime have been based upon preliminary extrapolations 
of limited data. So little is known about this area that 
the formulation of research hypotheses would have been 
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groundless. Instead, a series of research questions were 
designed in order to investigate the nature, frequency of 
occurrence, and projected trends of ATM crime. These 
questions are listed below. 
1. What are the most frequently occurring ATM 
problems? 
2. What percentage of fraud is attributable to 
these problems? 
3. For each of the identified ATM problems, what 
is the average reported dollar loss sustained by a bank 
within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts during the year 
1987? 
4. For each of the identified ATM problems, what 
is the average reported dollar loss per ATM within the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts during the year 1987? 
5. Are incidents of ATM fraud more likely to occur 
in certain types of locations? 
6. Which countermeasures are considered to be the 
most effective in reducing the incidence of ATM fraud? 
7. Which countermeasures are considered to be the 
most costly in terms of their implementation and 
maintenance? 
8. What is the correlation between the 
effectiveness and the cost of the countermeasures? 
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9. Is the number of fraudulent ATM incidents 
expected to increase in the next five years? By what 
percent? 
10. If the number of fraudulent ATM incidents is 
expected to increase, will there be a corresponding 
increase in the amount of money spent on ATM security 
measures? 
11. Which is the more conducive for a bank employee 
to establish an account with the intent to defraud: a 
computerized system or a manual system? 
12. What is perceived to be the single most 
important ATM problem confronting the state-wide banking 
industry in the next five years? 
13. Is there a significant difference in the 
rankings of the various ATM problems? 
14. Is there a significant difference in the 
rankings of the various countermeasures? 
15. Is there a significant difference in the 
rankings of the various locations? 
16. Do male and female respondents differ in their 
rankings of the most frequently occurring ATM problems? 
17. Do male and female respondents differ in their 
rankings of countermeasure effectiveness? 
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18. Do senior, middle, and lower managers differ in 
their rankings of the most frequently occurring ATM 
problems? 
19. Do senior, middle, and lower managers differ in 
their rankings of countermeasure effectiveness? 
20. Do bank officials from small-, medium-, and 
large-sized banks differ in their rankings of the most 
frequently occurring ATM problems? 
21. Do bank officials from small-, medium-, and 
large-sized banks differ in their rankings of 
countermeasure effectiveness? 
22. Do bank officials from small-, medium-, and 
large-sized banks differ in their responses concerning 
the location of ATM fraud incidents? 
3.2 Research Design 
As described in Chapter 2, the lack of statistically 
valid ATM fraud data necessitated that this research be 
exploratory in nature. This study was based upon a 
series of interviews with bank officials from forty 
different financial institutions within the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts. Given the sensitive nature of the 
topic of this research, neither respondent names nor the 
names of the financial institutions represented in this 
study will be disclosed. 
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3.2.1 Respondent Qualifications 
The individuals who participated in this study, and 
their respective financial institutions, were qualified 
on the following factors: 
1. All respondents were bank officials who were 
knowledgeable in the areas of bank security and ATM 
security. 
2. All respondents were voluntary participants who 
received no compensation for their efforts in behalf of 
this research. 
3. The financial institutions at which the 
respondents were employed were entities independent of 
each other. 
4. Each financial institution represented in the 
study provided automated teller machine services to its 
customers in the year 1987. 
3.2.2 Preliminary Interviews 
The underlying implication to this study was the 
assumption that ATMs posed a security concern to banking 
institutions. The necessary starting point was, 
therefore, the identification of bank security issufes in 
general, leading into the identification of ATM security 
problems in particular. In order to determine the 
magnitude of importance of this type of fraud, it was 
concluded that preliminary information must be obtained 
through meetings with three senior level bank officials. 
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Each of the three bank officials who participated in 
the pilot study was independently recommended by 
academic, public service, or banking sources on the basis 
of expertise in the area of bank security. The interview 
appointments were established through telephone 
communication with each of these individuals, and the 
interviews were conducted between September 29, 1987 and 
November 6, 1987 at financial institutions located in 
three different geographic areas within the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts. Appendix A contains the list of open- 
ended questions which formed the framework for these 
structured interviews. Following each interview, a brief 
letter of thanks was sent to each bank official. An 
example of such a letter is shown in Appendix B. 
The general information obtained from these 
preliminary interviews was supplemented by the apparent 
interest and enthusiasm of the bank officials to learn 
more about the extent of ATM fraud within the state-wide 
banking industry. Given the clandestine atmosphere which 
surrounds the revelation of fraud data, and the 
competitive nature of the banking industry, these bank 
officials were aware of the extent of ATM fraud only 
within the realm of their own banking institutions. 
Fraud losses sustained by financial institutions other 
than their own were largely left to speculation. As a 
result, the information obtained from the pilot study 
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clearly indicated that research concerning the magnitude 
of importance of ATM crime would not be feasible if the 
study required the acquisition of confidential ATM fraud 
loss data. Instead, it was believed that an 
investigation of the perceptions of ATM security issues 
held by various bank officials would provide insight into 
the nature, frequency of occurrence, and projected trends 
of ATM criminal activities within certain Massachusetts 
financial institutions. 
3.2.3 Sample Development 
Beginning in December, 1987, considerable effort was 
expended in order to identify those financial 
institutions from which potential respondents could be 
drawn. Since the financial institutions were qualified 
on the basis of their use of ATMs, those banking 
institutions which were advertised in standard business 
publications as having ATMs were predominant on the list. 
By mid-January, 1988, forty-seven different financial 
institutions in thirty different cities and towns 
throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts were 
identified. These locations were widely dispersed, 
allowing the Commonwealth's five geographic regions 
(north, south, east, west and central) to be represented 
by approximately equal numbers of financial institutions. 
In order to determine the population of banking 
institutions within Massachusetts which provided ATM 
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services to their customers in 1987, the Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency in Boston, the Federal Reserve 
Bank in Boston, the Office of the State Banking 
Commissioner in Boston, Bank Administration Institute in 
Rolling Meadows, and the Nilson Report Banking Journal in 
Los Angeles were contacted. None of these organizations 
were able to provide the requested information. However, 
an extensive library search indicated that there were 102 
different banking institutions within the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts which provided ATM services to their 
customers in the year 1986 [National Council of Savings 
Institutions, 1987]. It was believed that the total 
population of such financial institutions in 1987 was not 
significantly different from this figure. 
The dearth of existing ATM fraud data and the 
subsequent nonparametric nature of this study mandated 
that the necessary sample size be established 
heuristically. From the small, finite population of 
Massachusetts banking institutions, a convenience sample 
was selected which was not believed to be biased. A 
sample of forty different banking institutions (39% of 
the population) which varied widely in size and 
geographical location was decided to be sufficiently 
representative. Given the sensitivity of the research 
subject, and the possibility that bank officials might 
46 
not comply with this study, it was decided that interview 
appointments should be attempted at each of the forty- 
seven identified financial institutions. 
The method of establishing interviews was somewhat 
indirect since it was first necessary to identify the 
individual responsible for ATM security within each of 
the designated banking institutions. In most cases, this 
initially involved telephoning the main number of the 
banking institution and asking for the name of the 
individual responsible for ATM security. What frequently 
ensued was a series of transfers within and between 
departments in an attempt to locate an appropriate 
respondent. In most cases, the name of the senior level 
individual responsible for ATM security was attained 
within fifteen minutes. However, it was usually 
necessary to place several telephone calls to each of 
these individuals in order to establish direct 
communication. 
In the telephone conversations with each of the 
potential respondents, the general objectives of the 
research were described. It was explained that a 
questionnaire would be used to record each respondent's 
opinions about the nature and frequency of occurrence of 
ATM crime. All were assured that the purpose of the 
study was not to obtain bank-specific confidential data. 
Interview appointments were successfully established at 
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thirty-nine different financial institutions between 
January 29, 1988, and April 28, 1988. Each interview was 
typically scheduled one week prior to the actual meeting. 
Bank officials from three of the remaining financial 
institutions were unable to schedule interviews, but 
expressed interest in participating in the study. Two of 
these individuals suggested that the questionnaire be 
forwarded to them for completion. The other bank 
official suggested that a telephone interview be 
conducted. These suggestions were immediately accepted. 
The remaining five designated financial institutions 
were not represented in the study for several reasons. 
Individuals from three of these financial institutions 
were unable to grant interviews because they were working 
on large-scale projects which entailed severe time 
constraints. An officer from another financial 
institution was not interested in participating in the 
study. The fifth banking institution was not represented 
because senior management felt the research study was too 
sensitive. 
3.2.4 Interviewing Procedures 
Forty interviews were conducted between January 29, 
1988 and April 28, 1988. As previously mentioned, one of 
these interviews was conducted over the telephone. Each 
of the remaining thirty-nine interviews took place in the 
respondent's office at his/her respective financial 
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institution. In addition, questionnaires and detailed 
cover letters were mailed to two bank officials in lieu 
of on-site interviews. 
The majority of the interviews began on time. 
Although the average duration of the interview was forty- 
five minutes, the length of time spent in each interview 
ranged from twenty minutes to two and one-half hours. 
Each interview followed a basic pattern. Once the 
introductions and social amenities were done, the purpose 
of the research was explained in greater detail than had 
been conveyed in the initial telephone conversation. 
Frequently, the respondent was interested in learning the 
manner in which his/her name had been obtained. As 
described in the previous section, the method used to 
identify and locate appropriate respondents was rather 
indirect. A description of the trial and error method 
employed was typically met with amusement. 
All of the bank officials were guaranteed anonymity 
in this study; all were assured that neither their names 
nor the names of their respective financial institutions 
would be disclosed. Furthermore, each respondent was 
asked if he/she would like to receive a copy of the 
research results covering the description and analysis of 
the data obtained from the questionnaires. In every 
case, the answer was affirmative. Arrangements were made 
to forward the research results to each respondent by 
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September, 1988. In addition, the possibility of 
conducting follow-up interviews was discussed with six 
bank officials in order to better explain the research 
results. 
The questionnaire administered to each respondent is 
shown in Appendix C. Each of the four sections was 
reviewed during the interview, and all respondent 
questions were answered. Each respondent was asked for 
suggestions to improve the questionnaire, and, in a few 
instances, some minor recommendations were made. A note 
was made to incorporate these suggestions into future 
research instruments. 
Many bank officials expressed surprise at the number 
and range of ATM problems listed in Part I of the 
questionnaire, and a few of these respondents expressed 
the desire that knowledge of these problems not be made 
available to the general public. These bank officials 
felt that widespread knowledge of the ease with which 
these acts could be committed would increase the number 
of fraudulent ATM incidents and resultant financial 
losses. When it was explained that most of these ATM 
problems appear in a book which is available to the 
general public at no charge from the U.S. Department of 
Justice [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986], interest was 
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expressed in seeing this publication. Since a copy of 
this book was brought to all interviews, it was 
immediately shared upon such a request. 
Although the questionnaire was designed to record 
the respondents' opinions of the nature and frequency of 
occurrence of ATM crime, most of the respondents used the 
events within their own financial institutions as a 
framework for their responses. The overall reaction of 
the bank officials to the research in general, and the 
questionnaire in particular, was surprisingly positive. 
In fact, many of the respondents commented that the 
questionnaire caused them to think seriously about their 
own levels of ATM security. 
Fourteen of the interviewed bank officials (36%) 
elected to complete and return the questionnaire during 
the interview. Twenty-five of the interviewed 
respondents (64%) chose to complete the questionnaire 
after the meeting had concluded. These twenty-five bank 
officials were telephoned one week after their respective 
interviews in order to ascertain their progress on 
completing the questionnaire. The telephone calls 
continued on a weekly basis until an appointment could be 
established to receive the completed questionnaire. 
Seven of these respondents mailed their completed 
questionnaires within two weeks after the interview. 
Arrangements were made to retrieve sixteen of the 
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completed questionnaires from the respondents' offices 
within an average of three weeks after the interview. 
One questionnaire was not returned because unexpected 
reductions in departmental personnel created a work 
backlog for the respondent. A second questionnaire was 
not allowed to be returned because the Executive Vice 
President of the financial institution felt the 
questionnaire was too sensitive. 
As mentioned above, one bank official elected to be 
interviewed over the telephone. The questionnaire was 
completed verbally by the respondent during the course of 
the conversation. In order to ensure that the 
individual's responses were recorded accurately, a copy 
of the completed questionnaire was forwarded to the 
respondent for review and approval. 
As previously mentioned, bank officials from two 
different financial institutions requested that the 
questionnaire be forwarded to them for completion. Both 
of these questionnaires were completed and returned 
within three weeks after the date they were initially 
mailed. 
Each respondent was mailed a letter of thanks after 
the completed questionnaire was received. An example of 
such a letter is shown in Appendix D. 
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In aggregate, completed questionnaires were received 
from bank officials in forty different financial 
institutions. The results of the data collection 
constitute the material covered in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH RESULTS 
This chapter presents in detail the results of the 
research study described in Chapter 3. The general 
characteristics of the respondents and their 
corresponding financial institutions are described in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Section 4.3 presents 
a detailed analysis of the data. In that section, the 
research questions and the questionnaire items concerning 
ATffl crime are subdivided into five topics: problems, 
locations, countermeasures, fraudulent account 
establishment, and projected trends. The analysis of the 
data is described within these same categories, and is 
presented within the context of the research questions 
listed in the prior chapter. The chapter concludes with 
a comparison of the responses obtained from different 
classifications of respondents. A discussion of the 
research results is withheld until Chapter 5. 
4.1 Respondent Characteristics 
As described in Chapter 3, potential respondents 
from forty-seven different financial institutions were 
initially contacted. The questionnaire was administered 
to bank officials from forty-two financial institutions, 
and completed questionnaires from respondents in forty 
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different banking institutions were ultimately returned. 
From five of these financial institutions, completed 
questionnaires were received from more than one bank 
official. In each of these cases, the questionnaire 
received from the highest level bank official was used 
for analysis purposes. 
The bank officials who participated in this research 
reported an average of 7.83 years of experience in the 
area of bank security, and were employed at their 
respective financial institutions for an average of 13.46 
years. Further respondent characteristics were 
determined on the basis of gender and managerial level. 
Twenty-four of the respondents (60%) were male. 
They reported an average of 8.79 years of experience in 
the area of bank security, and their average length of 
employment at their respective financial institutions was 
15.23 years. The sixteen female bank officials (40%) 
reported an average of 6.38 years of experience in the 
area of bank security. They were employed at their 
respective financial institutions for an average of 10.81 
years. These data are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Fourteen of the respondents (35%) were senior level 
managers who reported an average of 9.61 years of 
experience in bank security, and were employed at their 
respective financial institutions for an average of 14.64 
years. Twelve of the respondents (30%) were middle level 
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managers. They reported an average of 10 years of 
experience in bank security, and their average length of 
employment at their respective banking institutions was 
17.08 years. Fourteen of the respondents (35%) were 
lower level managers who reported an average of 4.18 
years of experience in bank security, and were employed 
at their respective financial institutions for an average 
of 9.18 years. These data are summarized in Table 4.2. 
TABLE 4.1 
Male/Female Respondent Characteristics 
Number of Years of Experience in Bank Securitv 
*■ 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Low 
Range 
High 
Male 8.79 7.24 0 25 
Female 6.38 5.14 0 15 
Total 7.83 6.52 0 25 
Number of Years Emoloved in Bankincr Institution 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Low 
Range 
High 
Male 15.23 10.30 1 37 
Female 10.81 7.00 1.! 5 25 
Total 13.46 9.28 1 37 
56 
TABLE 4.2 
Senior/Middle/Lower Management 
Respondent Characteristics 
Number of Years of Experience in Bank Security 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Low 
Range 
High 
Senior 9.61 7.40 0 25 
Middle 10.00 6.19 2 20 
Lower 4.18 4.26 0 14 
Total 7.83 6.52 0 25 
Number of Years Employed in Banking Institution 
Standard Range 
Mean Deviation Low High 
Senior 14.64 10.41 1.5 36 
Middle 17.08 9.22 6 37 
Lower 9.18 6.70 1 23 
Total 13.46 9*. 28 1 37 
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A cross tabulation was done between managerial level 
and gender. As can be seen below in Table 4.3, females 
may have been slightly overrepresented in lower 
management, and slightly underrepresented in senior 
management. However, caution should be exercised in 
interpreting these values, since even the smallest change 
in the numbers would have had a dramatic impact on the 
corresponding percentages. 
TABLE 4.3 
Managerial Level and Gender 
Cross Tabulation 
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4.2 Financial Institution Characteristics 
The responses obtained from the first six questions 
in Part IV of the questionnaire (Appendix C) provided 
descriptive information concerning the financial 
institutions represented in this study. As shown in 
Table 4.4, these banking institutions had an average of 
27 ATMs, and provided ATM services to their customers for 
an average of 6.4 years. Twenty-five of the respondents 
provided an indication of the amount of money spent by 
their respective financial institutions on ATM security 
measures. This amount averaged $53,636 per year, 
although the figures ranged from $1,000 to $440,000. 
Bank officials in thirty-four different financial 
institutions (87.2%) indicated that at least one 
individual was responsible for ATM security at their 
respective banks. Most of the respondents do not 
anticipate any changes in the amount of money to be spent 
on ATM security measures in the next year, nor do they 
anticipate any forthcoming changes in staff levels for 
those responsible for ATM security. These data are 
summarized in Table 4.5. 
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TABLE 4.4 
Financial Institution Characteristics 
Ouestion N 
Mean 
Resoonse 
Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Low Hiah 
How many ATMs 
does your 
bank have? 40 27.275 72.75 1 425 
How many years 
has your bank 
used ATMs? 40 6.419 3.33 0.75 15 
Approximately 
how much is 
your bank 
currently 
spending on 
ATM security 
measures? 25 53,636 100,785 1,000 440 i, 000 
TABLE 4.5 
General Security Characteristics Within 
Respondent Financial Institutions 
Question 
Is there a designated individual 
or group of individuals responsible 
for ATM security at your bank? 
Do you anticipate any changes in 
the amount of money spent on ATM 
security in the next year? 
Do you anticipate any changes in 
staff levels for those responsible 
for ATM security in the next year? 
N YES_NO 
39 87.2% 12.8% 
39 35.9% 64.1% 
40 17.5% 82.5% 
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4.3 Analysis of the Data 
The research questions and the questionnaire items 
concerning ATM crime may be subdivided into five topics: 
problems, locations, countermeasures, fraudulent account 
establishment, and projected trends. The analysis of the 
data is described within these same categories, and is 
presented within the context of the corresponding 
research questions. The section concludes with a 
comparison of the responses obtained from different 
classifications of respondents. 
4.3.1 Problems 
Part I of the questionnaire (Appendix C) was 
designed to measure the respondents' perceptions of the 
occurrence and severity of ATM fraudulent activities, and 
it corresponds to five research questions listed in 
section 3.1. Each of these questions, and their answers, 
are given below. The raw data for the data analyses, 
from which these results were obtained, are given in 
Appendices E, I, J, and K. 
Question: What are the most frequently occurring 
ATM problems? 
The responses received from 37 bank officials were 
analyzed in order to determine the rank, average, and 
variability of each problem. Table 4.6 shows the average 
of the weighted ranks, overall rank, median (Mdn), 
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TABLE 4.6 
Ranking of ATM Problems 
Avg of 
Weighted Overall Range 
ATM Problem N Ranks Rank Mdn 0 Low Hiqh 
Card reported 
stolen 25 2.11 3 2.94 1.04 1 5 
Card reported 
lost 
24 1.76 5 3.72 1.19 1 5 
Card 
counterfeiting 
operations 1 0.03 15 5.00 * . ** 5 5 
Unauthorized use 
by family, 
friend, or 
acquaintance 29 2.84 • 1 2.23 1.00 1 4 
Misrepresentation 
of ATM 
transactions 13 0.78 7 4.64 1.45 1 5 
Overdraft 
resulting from 
empty envelope 
deposits 28 2.05 4 3.20 1.00 1 5 
Stolen/fraudulent 
check deposited 
in ATM followed 
by withdrawal 
against 
insufficient 
funds 13 1.22 6 2.50 1.29 1 5 
Off-line 
overdraft 28 2.54 2 2.00 1.77 1 5 
False reporting 
that ATM 
dispensed 
incorrect funds 8 0.46 8.5 3.83 0.67 3 5 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.6 
Continued 
Avg of 
Weighted Overall Range 
ATM Problem_N Ranks_Rank Mdn 0 Low High 
ATM vandalized 7 0.46 8.5 3.50 0.83 2 5 
Replenishment 
cash stolen by 
service team 
individuals 2 0.11 13.5 4.00 *.** 4 4 
Electronic 
attack on 
data 
communication 
lines 3 0.19 11 4.00 0.25 3 4 
Manipulation 
of ATM 
software 1 0.14 12 1.00 *.** 1 1 
Flaws in 
system 
procedures 
which allow 
one customer 
to withdraw 
cash from 
another 
account 2 0.22 10 2.00 * . ** 2 2 
Other 1 0.11 13.5 2.00 *. ** 2 2 
(mechanical malfunction) 
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quartile deviation (Q), and range for each problem. 
These measures are briefly described in the following 
paragraph. 
The average of the weighted ranks took into account 
the number of respondents who selected a problem, and the 
scores attributed to that problem. As a result, these 
values provided an accurate basis for comparing the 
perceived importance of the ATM problems. The overall 
rank was determined by rank ordering the average of the 
weighted ranks. From those respondents who selected each 
problem, the median and quartile deviation were computed. 
The calculations for the average of the weighted ranks, 
median, and quartile deviation for each problem are given 
in Appendices F and G. 
It can be seen from the overall rank assigned to 
each problem in Table 4.6 that the five most frequently 
occurring problems were perceived to be: (1) the 
unauthorized use of ATM cards by family members, friends, 
or acquaintances; (2) off-line overdrafts; (3) ATM 
cards which are reported stolen; (4) overdrafts 
resulting from empty envelope deposits; and (5) ATM 
cards which are reported lost. These five problems were 
identified by at least twenty-four of the respondents 
(65%), while the remaining ten problems were identified 
by no more than thirteen respondents (35%). 
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The number and percentage of respondents who 
identified each ATM problem are presented in Table 4.7. 
Although the unauthorized use of ATM cards by family 
members, friends, or acquaintances was determined to be 
the most frequently occurring problem, only seven 
respondents (24.1%) assigned it a rank of 1. In 
comparison, twelve respondents (42.9%) assigned a rank of 
1 to off-line overdrafts, identified above as the second 
most important ATM problem. This apparent contradiction 
is resolved by examining the second place rankings 
assigned to these problems. Eleven respondents (37.9%) 
assigned a rank of 2 to the unauthorized used of ATM 
cards; only four respondents (14.3%) assigned this rank 
to off-line overdrafts. On a cumulative basis, then, the 
unauthorized use of ATM cards was ranked first or second 
by 62.1% of the respondents who identified this as a 
problem. In contrast, 57.2% of the respondents who 
identified off-line overdrafts as a problem ranked it 
first or second. 
Question: Is there a significant difference in the 
rankings of the various ATM problems? 
As described above, the overall rank was used to 
determine the most frequently occurring ATM problems. 
This measure was based upon the average of the weighted 
ranks, which took into account the number of respondents 
who selected each problem, and the rankings attributed to 
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TABLE 4.7 
Number and Percentage of 
ATM Problem 
Card reported stolen 
Card reported lost 
Card counterfeiting 
operations 
Unauthorized use by 
family, friend, or 
acquaintance 
Misrepresentation of 
ATM transactions 
Overdraft resulting 
from empty envelope 
deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM 
followed by withdrawal 
against insufficient 
funds 
Respondents per ATM Problem 
Cumulative 
N Rank n % % 
25 1 5 20.0 20.0 
2 4 16.0 36.0 
3 9 36.0 72.0 
4 3 12.0 84.0 
5 4 16.0 100.0 
24 1 4 16.7 16.7 
2 4 16.7 33.4 
3 2 8.3 41.7 
4 9 37.5 79.2 
5 5 20.8 100.0 
1 1 0 0.0 0.0 
2 0 0.0 0.0 
3 0 0.0 0.0 
4 0 0.0 0.0 
5 1 100.0 100.0 
29 1 7 24.1 24.1 
2 11 37.9 62.1 
3 * 4 13.8 75.9 
4 7 24.1 100.0 
5 0 0.0 100.0 
13 1 1 7.7 7.7 
2 3 23.1 30.8 
3 1 7.7 38.5 
4 1 7.7 46.2 
5 7 53.8 100.0 
28 1 3 10.7 10.7 
2 4 14.3 25.0 
3 10 35.7 60.7 
4 4 14.3 75.0 
5 7 25.0 100.0 
13 1 4 30.8 30.8 
2 3 23.1 53.8 
3 2 15.4 69.2 
4 3 23.1 92.3 
5 1 7.7 100.0 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.7 
Continued 
Cumulative 
ATM Problem N Rank n % % 
Off-line overdraft 28 1 12 42.9 42.9 
2 4 14.3 57.2 
3 2 7.1 64.3 
4 2 7.1 71.4 
5 8 28.6 100.0 
False reporting that 8 1 0 0.0 0.0 
ATM dispensed incorrect 2 0 0.0 0.0 
funds 3 3 37.5 37.5 
4 3 37.5 75.0 
5 2 25.0 100.0 
ATM vandalized 7 1 0 0.0 0.0 
2 1 14.3 14.3 
3 3 42.9 57.1 
4 1 14.3 71.4 
5 2 28.6 100.0 
Replenishment cash 2 1 0 0.0 0.0 
stolen by service team 2 0 0.0 0.0 
individuals 3 0 0.0 0.0 
4 2 100.0 100.0 
5 0 0.0 100.0 
Electronic attack on 3 1 0 0.0 0.0 
data communication 2 0 0.0 0.0 
lines 3 1 33.3 33.3 
4 2 66.7 100.0 
5 0 0.0 100.0 
Manipulation of ATM 1 1 1 100.0 100.0 
software 2 0 0.0 100.0 
3 0 0.0 100.0 
4 0 0.0 100.0 
5 0 0.0 100.0 
Flaws in system 2 1 0 0.0 0.0 
procedures which allow 2 2 100.0 100.0 
one customer to 3 0 0.0 100.0 
withdraw cash from • 4 0 0.0 100.0 
another account 5 0 0.0 100.0 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.7 
Continued 
ATM Problem N Rank n 
Cumulative 
Other 
(mechanical malfunction) 
0 0.0 0.0 
1 100.0 100.0 
0 0.0 100.0 
0 0.0 100.0 
0 0.0 100.0 
each problem. From Table 4.7, it can be seen that a rank 
of 1 was attributed most often to off-line overdrafts, 
and a rank of 2 was attributed most often to the 
unauthorized use of ATM cards by family members, friends, 
or acquaintances. A rank of 3 was more frequently 
assigned to two different problems: overdrafts resulting 
from empty envelope deposits, and ATM cards which are 
reported stolen. A rank of 4 was attributed most often 
to ATM cards which are reported lost. Three different 
problems were more frequently assigned a rank of 5: off¬ 
line overdrafts, misrepresentations of ATM transactions, 
and overdrafts resulting from empty envelope deposits. 
From the differences presented above, it appears to 
be obvious that the problems were not perceived to be 
equally important. However, chi-square tests were used 
to determine whether the differences in the assignment of 
each of the five ranks to the fifteen ATM problems were 
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significant. From the calculations shown in Appendix H, 
these differences were determined to be significant 
beyond the .001 level. 
Question: What percentage of fraud is attributable 
to these problems? 
Thirty-four of the thirty-seven respondents provided 
an indication of the approximate percentage of fraud 
which may be attributed to each of the previously 
identified ATM problems. From Table 4.8, it can be seen 
that the highest percentage of fraud (60%) was attributed 
to the manipulation of ATM software. However, this large 
percentage was ascribed to this particular problem by 
only one respondent. 
It was established above in the analysis of the 
first question that the two most frequently occurring ATM 
problems were perceived to be the unauthorized use of ATM 
cards, and off-line overdrafts. As shown in Table 4.8, 
both of these problems were ascribed a relatively large 
average percentage of fraud. Twenty-seven respondents 
attributed an average of slightly more than 22% of all 
fraud to the unauthorized use of ATM cards, and twenty- 
six respondents attributed an average of almost 36% of 
all fraud to off-line overdrafts. 
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TABLE 4.8 
Average Percentage of Fraud per ATM Problem 
Average Standard Range 
ATM Problem N % Fraud Deviation Low Hioh 
Card reported 
stolen 
23 18.64 18.48 4.00 70.00 
Card reported 
lost • 
21 15.15 15.20 1.00 55.00 
Card 
counterfeiting 
operations 1 6.45 *. ** 6.45 6.45 
Unauthorized use 
by family, 
friend, or 
acquaintance 27 22.38 19.02 1.00 60.00 
Misrepresentation 
of ATM 
transactions 12 12.36 11.03 2.00 45.00 
Overdraft 
resulting from 
empty envelope 
deposits 25 16.15 10.50 2.44 40.00 
Stolen/fraudulent 
check deposited 
in ATM followed 
by withdrawal 
against 
insufficient 
funds 11 24.57 18.67 3.00 65.00 
Off-line 
overdraft 26 35.99 28.03 4.00 98.00 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.8 
ATM Problem 
Continued 
Average Standard Range 
N % Fraud Deviation Low High 
False reporting 
that ATM 
dispensed 
incorrect funds 
ATM vandalized 
Replenishment 
cash stolen by 
service team 
individuals 
Electronic 
attack on 
data 
communication 
lines 
Manipulation 
of ATM 
software 
7 10.31 
6 16.13 
2 7.50 
3 4.67 
1 60.00 
Flaws in 
system 
procedures 
which allow 
one customer 
to withdraw 
cash from 
another 
account 2 7.05 
Other 1 12.19 
(mechanical malfunction) 
8.70 
9.60 
3.54 
0.58 
*. ** 
2.00 
6.00 
5.00 
4.00 
60.00 
25.00 
30.00 
10.00 
• 5.00 
60.00 
4.17 4.10 10.00 
*.** 12.19 12.19 
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Question: For each of the identified ATM problems, 
what is the average reported dollar loss 
sustained by a bank within the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts during the 
year 1987? 
Eighteen of the thirty-seven respondents (48.6%) 
provided an estimate of the dollar loss sustained by a 
banking institution within the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts during 1987 which may be attributed to each 
of the previously identified ATM problems.. From Table 
4.9, it can be seen that the higher average dollar loss 
estimates were not attributed to .the more frequently 
occurring ATM problems. In fact, the highest average 
dollar loss ($45,000) was attributed to ATM vandalism; a 
problem previously ranked between eighth and ninth in 
terms of its frequency of occurrence. The second highest 
average dollar loss (approximately $28,227) was 
attributed to the deposit of a stolen or fraudulent check 
in an ATM followed by a withdrawal against insufficient 
funds; a problem previously ranked sixth in terms of its 
frequency of occurrence. 
As described above, the two most frequently 
occurring ATM problems were perceived to be the 
unauthorized use of ATM cards, and off-line overdrafts. 
As shown in Table 4.9, both of these problems were 
assigned comparatively small average dollar losses. 
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TABLE 4.9 
Average of Reported Dollar Losses per Bank 
for Each ATM Problem Area 
Standard Range 
ATM Problem N Mean Deviation Low Hiah 
Card reported 
stolen 12 10,895.83 15,103.35 100 40,000 
Card reported 
lost 9 10,311.11 14,122.72 100 40,000 
Card 
counterfeiting 
operations 1 10,000.00 *. ** 10,000 10,000 
Unauthorized 
use by 
family, 
friend, or 
acquaintance 13 6,367.31 7,246.70 100 20,000 
Misrepresen¬ 
tation of 
ATM 
transactions 4 16,618.75 18,452.36 500 35,000 
Overdraft 
resulting from 
empty envelope 
deposits 15 7,730.00 13,395.63 50 50,000 
Stolen/ 
fraudulent 
check 
deposited 
in ATM 
followed by 
withdrawal 
against 
insufficient 
funds 6 28,227.08 30,258.68 400 77,500 
Off-line 
overdraft 13 7,780.81 13,401.56 200 50,000 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.9 
Continued 
Standard Range 
ATM Problem_N_Mean_Deviation_Low_High 
False 
reporting 
that ATM 
dispensed 
incorrect 
funds 1 150.00 *. ** 150 150 
ATM vandalized 3 45,000.00 25,980.76 30,000 75,000 
Replenishment 
cash stolen by 
service team 
individuals 1 800.00 *. ** 800 800 
Electronic 
attack on 
data 
communication 
lines 1 2,000.00 *. ** 2,000 2,000 
Manipulation 
of ATM 
software 0 * . ** *. ** ** ** 
Flaws in 
system 
procedures 
which allow 
one customer 
to withdraw 
cash from 
another 
account 1 500.00 *. ** 500 500 
Other 1 300.00 *. ** 300 300 
(mechanical malfunction) 
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Thirteen respondents attributed an average annual loss of 
slightly more than $6,367 to the unauthorized use of ATM 
cards, and the same number of respondents attributed an 
average annual loss of almost $7,781 to off-line 
overdrafts. 
Question: For each of the identified ATM problems, 
what is the average reported dollar loss 
per ATM within the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts during the year 1987? 
The dollar loss reported for each ATM problem from 
each financial institution was divided by the 
corresponding number of ATMs in order to determine the 
dollar loss per ATM for each banking institution. From 
these data, the mean, standard deviation, and range of 
the reported dollar losses were calculated, and are shown 
in Table 4.10. 
It was mentioned above that the highest average 
dollar loss per bank ($45,000) was reportedly due to ATM 
vandalism. However, from Table 4.10, it can be seen that 
the average dollar loss per ATM attributed to this 
problem was less than $1,109. Other problems were 
determined to have a higher average dollar loss per ATM 
than that of ATM vandalism, among them: (1) the deposit 
of a stolen or fraudulent check in an ATM followed by a 
withdrawal against insufficient funds ($5,261.56); 
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TABLE 4.10 
Average Dollar Loss per ATM for Each Loss Reported 
in Each ATM Problem Area 
ATM No. Avg.# Standard Range 
Problem_Banks ATMs Mean Deviation_Low_High 
Card 
reported 
stolen 12 
Card 
reported 
lost 9 
Card 
counterfeiting 
operations 1 
Unauthorized 
use by 
family, 
friend, or 
acquaintance 13 
Misrepresen¬ 
tation of 
ATM 
transactions 4 
Overdraft 
resulting 
from empty 
envelope 
deposits 15 
Stolen/ 
fraudulent 
check 
deposited 
in ATM 
followed by 
withdrawal 
against 
insufficient 
funds 6 
34 977.30 1,884.05 
20 937.27 1,628.33 
8 1,250.00 *.** 
28 1,172.46 2,745.33 
10 1,158.25 1,743.39 
58 1,858.26 6,407.37 
22 5,261.56 9,818.79 
16.67 5,000.00 
16.67 5,000.00 
1,250.00 1,250.00 
14.29 10,000.00 
97.50 3,750.00 
2.82 25,000.00 
66.67 25,000.00 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.10 
Continued 
ATM No. Avg.# Standard Range 
Problem_Banks ATMs Mean Deviation_Low_High 
Off-line 
overdraft 
False 
reporting 
that ATM 
dispensed 
incorrect 
funds 
13 19 436.01 469.95 28.57 1,666.67 
1 5 30.00 *.** 30.00 30.00 
ATM 
vandalized 3 212 1,108.82 1,637.86 150.00 3,000.00 
Replenishment 
cash stolen 
by service 
team 
individuals 1 23 34.78 *.** 34.78 34.78 
Electronic 
attack on 
data 
communication 
lines 
Manipulation 
of ATM 
software 
Flaws in 
system 
procedures 
which allow 
one customer 
to withdraw 
cash from 
another 
account 
Other 
(mechanical malfunction) 
1 200 10.00 *.** 10.00 10.00 
0 0 *.** *.** *.** *.** 
1 3 166.67 *. ** 166.67 166.67 
1 5 60.00 * . * * 60.00 60.00 
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(2) overdrafts resulting from empty envelope deposits 
($1,858.26); (3) misrepresentations of ATM transactions 
($1,158.25); (4) card counterfeiting operations 
($1,250.00); and (5) the unauthorized use of ATM cards 
by family members, friends, or acquaintances ($1,172.46). 
4.3.2 Locations 
The second question in Part III of the questionnaire 
(Appendix C) was designed to measure the respondents' 
perceptions of the locations where ATM fraud problems may 
occur, and it corresponds to two research questions 
listed in section 3.1. Both of these questions, and 
their answers, are given below. The raw data for the 
data analyses, from which these results were obtained, 
are given in Appendix L. 
Question: Are incidents of ATM fraud more likely to 
occur in certain types of locations? 
From the responses received from thirty-five bank 
officials, the rank, average, and variability of each 
location were analyzed. Table 4.11 shows the average of 
the weighted ranks, overall rank, median (Mdn), quartile 
deviation (Q), and range for each location. These 
measures were previously described in section 4.3.1, and 
the calculations for the average of the weighted ranks, 
median, and quartile deviation for each location are 
given in Appendices M and N. 
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It can be seen from the overall rank assigned to 
each location in Table 4.11 that the branch offices of a 
bank, shopping centers, and supermarkets were perceived 
to be the three most frequent sites at which ATM fraud 
problems occur. In fact, these three locations were 
identified by at least sixty percent of the respondents. 
TABLE 4.11 
Ranking of Locations 
Avg of 
Weighted Overall Range 
Location N Ranks Rank Mdn Q Low Hiah 
Main office of 
the bank 14 0.86 4 1.83 0.60 1 3 
Branch offices 
of the bank 23 1.43 1.5 1.79 0.70 1 3 
Shopping 
centers 24 1.43 1.5 1.88 0.74 1 3 
Supermarkets 21 1.00 3 2.59 0.69 1 3 
Transportation 
terminals 11 0.66 5 ' 2.00 0.63 1 3 
Hospitals 0 0.00 9 0.00 * . ** 0 0 
Office building 
lobbies 3 0.11 7.5 3.00 0.25 2 3 
Residential 
neighborhoods 7 0.40 6 2.50 0.83 1 3 
Other 2 0.11 
(other banks' terminals) 
7.5 2.00 0.25 2 2 
(stand alone kiosks) 
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The number and percentage of respondents who 
identified each location are presented in Table 4.12. 
The values presented in this table substantiate the 
rankings of the locations described above. 
TABLE 4.12 
Number and Percentage of Respondents per Location 
Cumulative 
Location N Rank n % % 
Main office of 14 1 5 35.7 35.7 
the bank 2 6 42.9 78.6 
3 3 21.4 100.0 
Branch offices 23 1 10 43.5 43.5 
of the bank 2 7 30.4 73.9 
3 6 26.1 100.0 
Shopping centers 24 1 9 37.5 37.5 
2 8 33.3 70.8 
3 . 7 29.2 100.0 
Supermarkets 21 1 4 19.0 19.0 
2 6 28.6 47.6 
3 11 52.4 100.0 
Transportation 11 1 4 36.4 36.4 
terminals 2 4 36.4 72.7 
3 3 27.3 100.0 
Hospitals 0 1 0 0.0 0.0 
2 0 0.0 0.0 
3 0 0.0 0.0 
Office building 3 1 0 0.0 0.0 
lobbies 2 1 33.3 33.3 
3 2 66.7 100.0 
Residential 7 1 3 42.9 42.9 
neighborhoods 2 1 14.3 57.1 
3 3 42.9 100.0 
Other 2 1 0 0.0 0.0 
(other banks' terminals) 2 2 100.0 100.0 
(stand alone kiosks) 3 0 0.0 100.0 
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Question: Is there a significant difference in the 
rankings of the various locations? 
As described above, the overall rank was used to 
determine the most frequent locations at which ATM fraud 
problems occur. This measure was based upon the average 
of the weighted ranks, which took into account the number 
of respondents who selected each location, and the 
rankings attributed to each location. From Table 4.12, 
it can be seen that a rank of 1 was attributed most often 
to the branch offices of a bank. A rank of 2 was more 
frequently assigned to two different locations: shopping 
centers, and the branch offices of a bank. A rank of 3 
was attributed most often to supermarkets. 
Although it appeared to be obvious that differences 
were perceived between the locations of ATM fraud, chi- 
square tests were performed in order to determine whether 
these differences were significant. From the 
calculations shown in Appendix 0, these differences were 
determined to be significant beyond the .02 level. 
4.3.3 Countermeasures 
Part II of the questionnaire (Appendix C) was 
designed to measure the respondents' perceptions of the 
cost and effectiveness of various countermeasures which 
help to reduce the incidence of ATM fraud, and it 
corresponds to four research questions listed in section 
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3.1. Each of these questions, and their answers, are 
given below. The raw data for the data analyses, from 
which these results were obtained, are given in 
Appendices P and T. 
Question: Which countermeasures are considered to 
be the most effective in reducing the 
incidence of ATM fraud? 
The responses received from thirty-six bank 
officials were analyzed in order to determine the rank, 
average, and variability of each countermeasure. Table 
4.13 shows the average of the weighted ranks, overall 
rank, median (Mdn), quartile deviation (Q), and range for 
each countermeasure. These measures were previously 
described in section 4.3.1, and the calculations for the 
average of the weighted ranks, median, and quartile 
deviation for each location are given in Appendices Q 
and R. 
From the overall rank assigned to each 
countermeasure in Table 4.13, it can be seen that the 
five most effective countermeasures were perceived to be: 
(1) equipping 90% to 100% of the ATMs with cameras; 
(2) increasing the level of customer security awareness 
by distributing literature about the importance of 
nondisclosure of personal identification numbers (PINs) 
and safekeeping of ATM cards; (3) eliminating off-line 
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TABLE 4.13 
Ranking of Countermeasure Effectiveness 
Countermeasure N 
Avg of 
Weighted Overall Range 
Ranks Rank Mdn 0 Low Hiah 
Increase level 
of security 
awareness 
among bank 
employees 
through 
meetings, 
seminars, etc. 11 1.03 5 2.75 0.71 1 5 
Increase level 
of security 
awareness 
among 
customers by 
distributing 
literature 
about the 
importance of 
nondisclosure 
of PINs and 
safekeeping of 
ATM cards 27 2.50 2 2.75 0.86 1 5 
Have 90% - 100% 
of ATMs 
camera-equipped 33 3.25 1 2.14 1.10 1 5 
Have 24-hour 
on-line 
hotcarding 
(action which 
captures an 
ATM card the 
next time 
it is used) 24 2.19 4 2.50 0.92 1 5 
Reduce the 
number of 
incorrect PIN 
tries allowed 8 0.47 9 3.83 0.67 3 5 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.13 
Continued 
Avg of 
Weighted Overall Range 
Countermeasure_N Ranks_Rank Mdn_0 Low High 
Eliminate 
off-line 
withdrawal 
capabilities 26 2.39 
Generate a 
fraud suspect 
list each day 7 0.44 
Increase the 
number of 
unannounced 
internal audits 3 0.14 
Improve the 
level of 
communication 
between banking 
institutions on 
security-related 
issues 12 0.81 
Substitute the 
use of PINs 
with other 
methods of 
confirming the 
customer's 
identity (i.e., 
fingerprint 
recognition) 14 1.00 
Enact stricter 
legislation 
for the 
prosecution 
of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 14 0.69 
Other 1 0.08 
(dual control over ATM cash) 
3 2.50 1.65 1 5 
10 4.00 0.38 2 5 
11 5.00 0.75 3 5 
7 4.00 1.20 1 5 
6 4.00 1.70 1 5 
8 4.50 0.66 2 5 
12 3.00 *.** 3 3 
withdrawal capabilities; (4) providing 24-hour on-line 
hotcarding (an action which captures an ATM card the next 
tine it is used); and (5) increasing the level of 
security awareness among bank employees through meetings 
and seminars. 
Although the top four countermeasures were 
identified by at least two-thirds of the respondents, the 
fifth-ranked countermeasure was identified by fewer than 
one-third of the respondents. In fact, three other 
countermeasures (substituting the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's identity; improving 
the level of communication between banking institutions 
on security-related issues; and enacting stricter 
legislation for the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators) were identified by more respondents than 
the fifth-ranked countermeasure. This apparent 
discrepancy is resolved by examining the number and 
percentage of respondents who identified each 
countermeasure, as presented in Table 4.14. 
From this table, it can be seen that nine of the 
eleven respondents (81.8%) who identified increasing the ■ 
level of security awareness among bank employees as an 
effective countermeasure assigned it a relatively high 
rank (i.e., first, second, or third). In comparison, low 
rankings (i.e., fourth or fifth) were more frequently 
attributed to substituting the use of PINs with other 
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TABLE 4.14 
Number and Percentage of Respondents 
per Countermeasure Effect 
Countermeasure N Rank n % % 
Increase level of 11 1 2 18.2 18.2 
security awareness • 2 3 27.3 45.5 
among bank employees 3 4 36.4 81.8 
through meetings, 4 1 9.1 90.9 
seminars, etc. 5 1 9.1 100.0 
Increase level of 27 1 5 18.5 18.5 
security awareness 2 7 25.9 44.4 
among customers by 3 8 29.6 74.1 
distributing literature 4 6 22.2 96.3 
about the importance of 5 1 3.7 100.0 
nondisclosure of PINs and 
safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 33 1 10 30.3 30.3 
camera-equipped 2 11 33.3 63.6 
3 4 12.1 75.7 
4 3 9.1 84.8 
5 5 15.2 100.0 
Have 24-hour on-line 24 1 . 3 12.5 12.5 
hotcarding (action which 2 9 37.5 50.0 
captures an ATM card the 3 5 20.8 70.8 
next time it is used) 4 6 25.0 95.8 
5 1 4.2 100.0 
Reduce the number of 8 1 0 0.0 0.0 
incorrect PIN tries 2 0 0.0 0.0 
allowed 3 3 37.5 37.5 
4 3 37.5 75.0 
5 2 25.0 100.0 
Eliminate off-line 26 1 10 38.5 38.5 
withdrawal capabilities 2 3 11.5 50.0 
3 4 15.4 65.4 
4 3 11.5 76.9 
5 6 23.1 100.0 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.14 
Continued 
Countermeasure N Rank n % % 
Generate a fraud suspect 7 1 0 0.0 0.0 
list each day 2 1 14.3 14.3 
3 1 14.3 28.6 
4 4 57.1 85.7 
5 1 14.3 100.0 
Increase the number of 3 1 0 0.0 0.0 
unannounced internal 2 0 0.0 0.0 
audits 3 1 33.3 33.3 
4 0 0.0 33.3 
• 5 2 66.7 100.0 
Improve the level of 12 1 2 16.7 16.7 
communication between 2 1 8.3 25.0 
banking institutions 3 2 16.7 41.7 
on security-related 4 2 16.7 58.3 
issues 5 5 41.7 100.0 
Substitute the use of 14 1 4 28.6 28.6 
PINs with other methods 2 0 0.0 28.6 
of confirming the 3 1 7.1 35.7 
customer's identity 4 4 28.6 64.3 
(i. e. , fingerprint 5 5 35.7 100.0 
recognition) 
Enact stricter 14 1 0 0.0 0.0 
legislation for the 2 1 7.1 7.1 
prosecution of ATM 3 2 14.3 21.4 
fraud perpetrators 4 4 28.6 50.0 
5 7 50.0 100.0 
Other 1 1 0 0.0 0.0 
(dual control over ATM cash) 2 0 0.0 0.0 
3 1 100.0 100.0 
4 0 0.0 100.0 
5 0 0.0 100.0 
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methods of confirming the customer's identity, improving 
the level of communication between banking institutions 
on security-related issues, and enacting stricter 
legislation for the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators. Therefore, even though increasing the 
level of security awareness among bank employees was 
identified by fewer respondents, it was ranked higher 
than the other three countermeasures. 
Question: Is there a significant difference in the 
rankings of the various countermeasures? 
As described above, the overall rank was used to 
determine the most effective countermeasures. From Table 
4.14, it can be seen that a first place ranking was more 
frequently assigned to the effectiveness of two different 
countermeasures: equipping 90% to 100% of the ATMs with 
cameras, and eliminating off-line withdrawal 
capabilities. A second place ranking was attributed most 
often to the effectiveness of equipping 90% to 100% of 
the ATMs with cameras, and a third place ranking was 
attributed most often to the effectiveness of increasing 
the level of customer security awareness. A fourth place 
ranking was assigned more frequently to the effectiveness 
of two different countermeasures: increasing the level 
of customer security awareness, and providing 24-hour on¬ 
line hotcarding. A fifth place ranking was also assigned 
more frequently to the effectiveness of two different 
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countermeasures: enacting stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators, and eliminating 
off-line withdrawal capabilities. 
Given the differences in the countermeasures 
discussed above, it appears to be obvious that the 
countermeasures were not perceived to be equally 
effective. However, chi-square tests were performed to 
determine whether the differences in the assignment of 
each of the five ranks to the effectiveness of the twelve 
countermeasures were significant. From the calculations 
shown in Appendix S, the differences in the frequency of 
ranks 1, 2, and 5 were determined to be significant 
beyond the .05 level. 
Question: Which countermeasures are considered to 
be the most costly in terms of their 
implementation and maintenance? 
Table 4.15 shows the average of the weighted ranks, 
overall rank, median (Mdn), quartile deviation (Q), and 
range for the perceived cost of each countermeasure. 
These measures were previously described, and the 
calculations for the average of the weighted ranks, 
median, and quartile deviation are given in Appendices U 
and V. 
From the overall rank assigned to each 
countermeasure in Table 4.15, the five most costly 
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TABLE 4.15 
Ranking of Countermeasure Cost 
Avg of 
Weighted Overall Range 
Countermeasure_N Ranks_Rank Mdn 0 Low High 
Increase level 
of security 
awareness among 
bank employees 
through meetings, 
seminars, etc. 11 0.75 
Increase level 
of security 
awareness among 
customers by 
distributing 
literature about 
the importance 
of nondisclosure 
of PINs and 
safekeeping of 
ATM cards 27 2.31 
Have 90% - 100% 
of ATMs 
camera-equipped 33 3.69 
Have 24-hour 
on-line 
hotcarding 
(action which 
captures an ATM 
card the next 
time it is 
used) 24 2.14 
Reduce the 
number of 
incorrect PIN 
tries allowed 8 0.39 
Eliminate 
off-line 
withdrawal 
capabilities 26 1.53 
8 4.50 1.20 1 5 
2 2.88 0.82 1 5 
1 1.72 0.82 1 5 
3 2.80 0.66 1 5 
9 4.17 0.33 4 5 
5 4.33 1.00 1 5 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.15 
Countermeasure 
Continued 
Avg of 
Weighted Overall Range 
N Ranks Rank Mdn 0 Low Hicrh 
Generate a 
fraud suspect 
list each 
day 7 0.36 10 4.25 0.38 3 5 
Increase the 
number of 
unannounced 
internal audits 3 0.28 11 2.50 0.25 2 4 
Improve the 
level of 
communication 
between banking 
institutions on 
security-related 
issues 12 0.78 6.5 3.83 0.96 1 5 
Substitute the 
use of PINs with 
other methods of 
confirming the 
customer's 
identity (i.e., 
fingerprint 
recognition) 14 1.89 4 1.04 0.27 1 3 
Enact stricter 
legislation 
for the 
prosecution 
of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 14 0.78 6.5 4.10 0.70 2 5 
Other 1 0.11 12 2.00 *.** 2 2 
(dual control over ATM cash) 
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countermeasures were perceived to be: (1) equipping 90% 
to 100% of the ATMs with cameras; (2) increasing the 
level of customer security awareness by distributing 
literature about the importance of nondisclosure of 
personal identification numbers (PINs) and safekeeping of 
ATM cards; (3) providing 24-hour on-line hotcarding (an 
action which captures an ATM card the next time it is 
used); (4) substituting the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's identity; and (5) 
eliminating off-line withdrawal capabilities. Not 
surprisingly, these five countermeasures were identified 
by the largest percentage of respondents. However, once 
again, there is an apparent discrepancy between the 
number of respondents who identified a given 
countermeasure, and its corresponding overall rank; 
substituting the use of PINs with other methods of 
confirming the customer's identity was ranked higher than 
eliminating off-line withdrawal capabilities, although 
more respondents identified the latter countermeasure as 
being more costly than the former. This conflict is 
resolved by examining the data presented in Table 4.16. 
From this table, it can be seen that thirteen of the 
fourteen respondents (92.9%) gave a first place ranking 
to substituting the use of PINs with other methods of 
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TABLE 4.16 
Number and Percentage of Respondents 
per Countermeasure Cost 
Cumulative 
Countermeasure N Rank n % % 
Increase level of 11 1 2 18.2 18.2 
security awareness 2 1 9.1 27.3 
among bank employees 3 2 18.2 45.5 
through meetings, 4 1 9.1 54.5 
seminars, etc. 5 5 45.5 100.0 
Increase level of 27 1 2 7.4 7.4 
security awareness 2 9 33.3 40.7 
among customers by 3 8 29.6 70.4 
distributing literature 4 5 18.5 88.9 
about the importance of 
nondisclosure of PINs and 
5 3 11.1 100.0 
safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 33 1 15 45.5 45.5 
camera-equipped 2 9 27.3 72.7 
3 6 18.2 90.9 
4 1 3.0 93.9 
5 2 
• 
6.1 100.0 
Have 24-hour on-line 24 1 2 8.3 8.3 
hotcarding (action which 2 7 29.2 37.5 
captures an ATM card the 3 10 41.7 79.2 
next time it is used) 4 4 16.7 95.8 
5 1 4.2 100.0 
Reduce the number of 8 1 0 0.0 0.0 
incorrect PIN tries 2 0 0.0 0.0 
allowed 3 0 0.0 0.0 
4 6 75.0 75.0 
5 2 25.0 100.0 
Eliminate off-line 26 1 1 3.8 3.8 
withdrawal capabilities 2 5 19.2 23.0 
3 2 7.7 30.7 
4 6 23.1 53.8 
5 12 46.2 100.0 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4.16 
Continued 
Cumulative 
Countermeasure N Rank n % % 
Generate a fraud suspect 7 1 0 0.0 0.0 
list each day 2 0 0.0 0.0 
3 1 14.3 14.3 
4 4 57.1 71.4 
5 2 28.6 100.0 
Increase the number of 3 1 0 0.0 0.0 
unannounced internal 2 2 66.7 66.7 
audits 3 0 0.0 66.7 
4 1 33.3 100.0 
5 0 0.0 100.0 
Improve the level of 12 1 1 8.3 8.3 
communication between 2 1 8.3 16.7 
banking institutions 3 3 25.0 41.7 
on security-related 4 3 25.0 66.7 
issues 5 4 33.3 100.0 
Substitute the use of 14 1 13 92.9 92.9 
PINs with other methods 2 0 0.0 92.9 
of confirming the 3 1 7.1 100.0 
customer's identity 4 0 0.0 100.0 
(i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 
5 0 0.0 100.0 
Enact stricter 14 1 0 0.0 0.0 
legislation for the 2 1 7.1 7.1 
prosecution of ATM 3 3 21.4 28.6 
fraud perpetrators 4 5 35.7 64.3 
5 5 3 5.. 7 100.0 
Other 1 1 0 0.0 0.0 
(dual control over ATM cash) 2 1 100.0 100.0 
3 0 0.0 100.0 
4 0 0.0 100.0 
5 0 0.0 100.0 
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confirming the customer's identity. In contrast, only 
one respondent (3.8%) assigned this rank to eliminating 
off-line withdrawal capabilities. 
Question: Is there a significant difference in the 
rankings of the various countermeasures? 
As described above, the overall rank was used to 
determine the most costly countermeasures. From Table 
4.16, it can be seen that a rank of 1 was attributed most 
often to the cost of equipping 90% to 100% of the ATMs 
with cameras. A rank of 2 was more frequently assigned 
to two different countermeasures: the cost of increasing 
the level of customer security awareness, and the cost of 
equipping 90% to 100% of the ATMs with cameras. A rank 
of 3 was attributed most often to the cost of providing 
24-hour on-line hotcarding. A rank of 4 was assigned 
more frequently to the cost of two different 
countermeasures: reducing the number of incorrect PIN 
tries allowed, and eliminating off-line withdrawal 
capabilities. A rank of 5 was attributed most often to 
the cost of eliminating off-line withdrawal capabilities. 
From the differences presented above, it appears to 
be obvious that the countermeasures were not perceived to 
be equally costly. However, chi-square tests were 
performed to determine whether the differences in the 
assignment of each of the five ranks to the cost of the 
twelve countermeasures were significant. From the 
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calculations shown in Appendix W, these differences were 
determined to be significant beyond the .10 level. 
Question: What is the correlation between the 
effectiveness and the cost of the 
countermeasures? 
The overall ranks of the effectiveness of the 
countermeasures, and the cost of the countermeasures, 
were used to compute the Spearman rank-order correlation 
coefficient. Rho was calculated to be equal to .92820, 
indicating.that the effectiveness and the cost of the 
countermeasures are highly related. This correlation is 
significant beyond the .001 level. 
4.3.4 Fraudulent Account Establishment 
The first question in Part III of the questionnaire 
(Appendix C) was designed to measure the respondents' 
perceptions of the ease with which a bank employee could 
establish an account with the intent to defraud. This 
part of the questionnaire corresponds to one research 
question in section 3.1. This question, and its answer, 
are given below. 
Question: Which is the more conducive for a bank 
employee to establish an account with 
the intent to defraud: a computerized 
system or a manual system? 
The largest percentage of the thirty-eight 
respondents (34.21%) indicated that they felt it was more 
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difficult for an employee to establish an account with 
the intent to defraud through the use of a computerized 
system than through the use of a manual system. Almost 
as many respondents (31.58%) indicated that they felt 
there was no difference between the opportunities 
provided by either system for such a purpose. The 
categorical responses obtained from the thirty-eight 
respondents are summarized in Table 4.17. 
4.3.5 Projected Trends 
The third and fourth questions in Part III of the 
questionnaire (Appendix C) were designed to measure the 
respondents' perceptions of the projected trends of ATM 
fraudulent activities. This part of the questionnaire 
corresponds to three research questions listed in section 
3.1. Each of these questions, and their answers, are 
given below. 
Question: Is the number of fraudulent ATM incidents 
expected to increase in the next five 
years? By what percent? 
Thirty-two out of forty respondents (80%) indicated 
that they believe the number of fraudulent ATM activities 
will increase over the course of the next five years. 
Twenty-seven of these respondents (67.5% of the total) 
felt that the number of these incidents will increase at 
97 
TABLE 4.17 
Fraudulent Account Establishment 
QUESTION: The use of manual systems has largely been 
replaced by a widespread use of computer 
technology in the banking industry. How easy 
do you think it would be for an employee at 
your bank to set up an account, through the 
use of computer technology, with the intent to 
defraud? 
N = 38 
Number of Percentage of 
Response Resoondents Resoondents 
Very easy compared to 
manual system 3 7.89% 
Easy compared to manual system 5 13.16% 
No change from manual system 12 31.58% 
Difficult compared to 
manual system 13 34.21% 
Very difficult compared to 
manual system 5 13.16% 
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a rate less than 50%. The categorical responses obtained 
from the forty respondents are summarized in Table 4.18. 
Question: If the number of fraudulent ATM incidents 
is expected to increase, will there be a 
corresponding increase in the amount of 
money spent on ATM security measures? 
As previously described, most of the respondents 
indicated that they feel the number of fraudulent ATM 
activities will increase at a rate less than 50% over the 
TABLE 4.18 
Projected Change in the Number of 
Fraudulent ATM Incidents 
QUESTION: How do you think the number of fraudulent ATM 
incidents is likely to change in the next five 
years? 
N = 40 
Number of Percentage of 
Response__Respondents_Respondents 
Increase more than 50% 5 12.5% 
Increase less than 50% 27 67.5% 
No change 2 5.0% 
Decrease less than 50% 5 12.5% 
Decrease more than 50% 1 2.5! 
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course of the next five years. However, as presented in 
Table 4.5, most of the respondents (64.1%) do not 
anticipate any changes in the amount of money spent on 
ATM security measures. This apparent contradiction is 
clearly shown in Table 4.19; seventeen of the respondents 
(65.4%) anticipate an increase of less than 50% in the 
number of fraudulent ATM incidents, but do not anticipate 
a corresponding increase in the amount of money spent on 
ATM security measures. 
Question: What is perceived to be the single most 
important ATM problem confronting the 
state-wide banking industry in the next 
five years? 
Thirty-seven respondents independently provided 
their suggestions as to the most important ATM problem 
which will confront the state-wide banking industry 
within the next five years. Nine of these respondents 
(24.33%) indicated that the most serious ATM problem will 
be fraudulent deposits (i.e., fraudulent check deposits, 
or empty envelope deposits), and five respondents 
(13.52%) indicated that the most serious ATM problem will 
be off-line overdrafts. A total of eight respondents 
(21.62%) indicated that the two most serious ATM problems 
will be customer injury (i.e., customers attacked or 
robbed while using ATMs), and the unauthorized use of ATM 
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TABLE 4.19 
Projected Changes in Fraudulent ATM Incidents and 
Amount of Money Spent on ATM Security Measures 
Cross Tabulation 
Projected 
change in 
fraudulent 
ATM incidents 
Anticipate changes in the 
amount of money spent on 
ATM security in the next year? 
Yes No Total 
Increase more 3 2 5 
than 50% (60%) (40%) (100%) 
Increase less 9 17 26 
than 50% (34.6%) (65.4%) (100%) 
No change 0 
(0.00%) 
2 
(100%) 
2 
(100%) 
Decrease less 1 4 5 
than 50% (20%) (80%) (100%) 
Decrease more 1 0 1 
than 50% (100%) (0.00%) (100%) 
Total 14 25 39 ■ 
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cards by family members, friends, or acquaintances. The 
list of projected ATM problems is presented in Table 
4.20. 
4.3.6 Classifications of Respondents 
Since the respondents' perceptions were subjective, 
the theoretical possibility was recognized that different 
categories of respondents might have perceived certain 
ATM security issues differently. In order to determine 
the degree to which these perceptions differed, and to 
provide a more descriptive profile of the respondents, 
the bank officials were categorized, and their responses 
were compared. 
The respondents were first classified by gender, and 
the Mann-Whitney U Test was used to determine whether the 
observed differences in the ranks assigned by male and 
female respondents were significant. From the data and 
the calculations shown in Appendices X through AA, it can 
be seen that no significant differences were found 
between the rankings assigned by male and female 
respondents (p < .01). 
The respondents were then classified according to 
managerial level. Those whose titles were Senior Vice 
President, Vice President, or Treasurer were classified 
as senior management. Those whose titles were Assistant 
Vice President or Assistant Treasurer were classified as 
middle management, and those whose titles were Manager, 
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TABLE 4.20 
Projected Important ATM Problems 
Question: What do you think the single most important 
ATM problem will be in the next five years? 
N = 37 
Response 
Number of Percent of 
Respondents Respondents 
Fraudulent deposits 
Off-line overdrafts 
Customers attacked or robbed 
Unauthorized use of ATM cards 
Security problems resulting 
from network consolidations 
9 24.33% 
5 13.52% 
4 10.81% 
4 10.81% 
3 8.11% 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 2 
Security problems resulting from the 
introduction of higher levels of tech¬ 
nology (i.e., fingerprint recognition) 2 
Embezzlement by bank officers 
or employees 1 
Equipment maintenance and replacement 1 
Fraudulent activities resulting 
from illegal drug use 1 
Fraudulent claims 1 
Increasing customer security awareness 
regarding the nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 1 
Manipulation of ATM software 1 
Stolen PINs or ATM cards from 
vendor or bank 1 
Vandalism i 
5.41% 
5.41% 
2.70% 
2.70% 
2.70% 
2.70% 
2.70% 
2.70% 
2.70% 
2.70% 
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Security Officer, or Business Officer were classified as 
lower management. These classifications provided for 
roughly equal groups, and the chi-square approximation of 
the Kruskal-Wallis H Test was used to determine whether 
the observed differences in the ranks assigned by the 
three groups were significant. From the data and the 
calculations shown in Appendices AB through AE, it can be 
seen that there were no significant differences between 
the rankings assigned by the senior, middle,and lower 
level managers (p < .01). 
Since the bank officials were representatives of 
different sized financial institutions, a final 
classification was made according to banking institution 
size. The relative size of each financial institution 
was established according the number of ATMs reported by 
each respondent. Those banks with five or fewer ATMs 
were categorized as small financial institutions; those 
with six to fifteen ATMs were classified as medium-sized 
financial institutions; and those with sixteen or more 
ATMs were categorized as large financial institutions. 
The chi-square approximation of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
was used to determine whether the observed differences in 
the ranks assigned by the three groups were significant. 
From the data and the calculations shown in Appendices AF 
through AK, it can be seen that there were no significant 
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differences between the rankings assigned by those from 
small-, medium-, and large-sized financial institutions 
(p < .01). 
The answers to the final seven questions listed in 
section 3.1 were the same; no significant differences 
were found between any of the rankings assigned by the 
various classifications of respondents. As a result, the 
respondents' perceptions were treated equivalently when 
the data were analyzed. 
This chapter has presented in detail the results of 
the research study described in Chapter 3. A discussion 
of these results is provided in the following chapter. 
f 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH RESULTS 
In the previous chapter, the research results were 
analyzed. A discussion of these results is presented in 
this chapter. The general characteristics of the 
respondents and their corresponding financial 
institutions are examined in sections 5.1 and 5.2, 
respectively. Section 5.3 presents a discussion of the 
analysis of the data within the context of the previously 
established categorical subdivisions of ATM crime: 
problems, locations, countermeasures, fraudulent account 
establishment, and projected trends. 
n_ 5..1 Respondent Characteristics 
As described in Chapter 4, the bank officials who 
participated in this research reported an average of 7.83 
years of experience in the area of bank security. During 
the course of the interviews with many of these 
respondents, bank security was described as being 
intrinsic to their jobs. Most of the bank officials 
mentioned that they were involved with various aspects of 
security in both routine, and unusual, circumstances from 
their first days on the job. From Tables 4.1 and 4.2, it 
can be seen that the reported number of years of 
experience in bank security ranged from zero to twenty- 
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five years. Although the high end of this range is 
reasonable, the low value is subject to question. 
In response to question 8 in Part IV of the 
questionnaire (Appendix C), five respondents indicated 
that they had no experience in the area of bank security. 
Given the level of responsibility assumed by these 
individuals within their respective banking institutions, 
it would be incorrect to believe that they did not have 
any experience in bank security. It is more likely that 
the question was misunderstood. The "number of years of 
experience in bank security" could have been misconstrued 
to mean the "number of years employed as a security guard 
within a financial institution", or the "number of years 
involved with the more technical aspects of security", 
^ (i.e., data encryption). If this question was 
misinterpreted in such a way, then the corresponding 
answer of zero years of experience is a logical response. 
The data contained in Table 4.2 also indicate that 
middle level managers have had more years of experience 
in bank security, and have been employed by their 
respective banking institutions for a longer period of 
time, than have senior level managers. While this may be 
an anomaly of this particular sample, a better 
explanation may lie within the hierarchy of. the banking 
structure itself. In general, a financial institution 
has fewer senior level managers than middle level 
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managers. Despite the number of years of experience in 
bank security or the length of employment, the highest 
title some individuals attain is at the middle management 
level. The fact that not all middle level managers may 
be promoted to the ranks of senior management is 
compounded by the observation that some financial 
institutions prefer to hire their senior level managers 
from other banking institutions, rather than to promote 
from within. 
From Table 4.3, it can be seen that there were more 
male than female senior and middle level managers who 
participated in this study. This is neither a surprising 
observation nor an indication of gender bias. Instead, 
this is representative of the fact that, in general, 
males have been involved in bank administration for a 
longer period of time than have females. It is likely 
that the difference between these numbers will become 
smaller in the future - a speculation which is supported 
in this research by the observation that lower level 
management was comprised of an equal number of male and 
female respondents. 
5.2 Financial Institution Characteristics 
According to a recent American Banker survey, the 
average number of ATMs for the seven largest financial 
institutions in Massachusetts is 240 ["Automated teller 
machines at top banking firms", 1987]. From Table 4.4, 
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it can be seen that the number of ATMs per banking 
institution represented in this study ranged from 1 to 
425. As described in Chapter 3, the primary 
qualification for each financial institution represented 
in this research was that it provide ATM services to its 
customers. As a result, banking institutions ranging in 
size from very small to very large were included. That 
these financial institutions had an average of 27 ATMs 
indicates that more small than large banking institutions 
were represented in this study. It is not unusual for a 
large financial institution to centralize control over 
its security operations, causing the security 
responsibilities within the large institution to 
encompass many, if not all, of the institution's other 
banks in different locations. Unfortunately, several of 
r 
the larger financial institutions, for reasons of their 
own, chose not to participate in this study, thus skewing 
the sample average. No conscious effort was made to 
either select or eliminate banking institutions on the 
basis of their size. However, this study represents the 
fact that there were more small than large banks from 
which respondents could be drawn. 
It is also apparent from Table 4.4 that the amount 
of money spent by various financial institutions on ATM 
security measures varied widely, ranging from $1,000 to 
$440,000 per year. The great dispersion of these values 
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indicates that many of the respondents were uncertain 
about the amount of money spent by their respective 
financial institutions on such security measures. Since 
ATM security is typically bundled with security expenses 
in general, and is not treated as a separate budgetary 
line item, many of the respondents had to extrapolate 
various expenditures - such as the costs of the cameras, 
film, and personnel time - in order to arrive at a single 
dollar estimate. 
The uncertainty of these estimates is also 
compounded by the merger and acquisition activity 
prevalent among banking institutions today. Several of 
the financial institutions represented in this study were 
in the process of either taking over, or being taken over 
by, other financial institutions. Shifts in security 
responsibilities often follow these mergers. Those of 
the acquiring institution are frequently expanded, while 
those of the acquired institution are often reduced, or 
eliminated. Given the respondents' difficulty in 
estimating the amount of money spent by their respective 
banking institutions on ATM security measures, the varia¬ 
bility of the reported expenditures is not surprising. 
5.3 Discussion of the Data 
In Chapter 4, the analysis of the data was described 
within the context of five categories: ' problems, 
locations, countermeasures, fraudulent account 
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establishment, and projected trends. The discussion 
which follows is presented within these same categories. 
5.3.1 Problems 
As described in section 4.3.1, the most frequently 
occurring ATM problem was perceived to be the 
unauthorized use of ATM cards by family members, friends, 
or acquaintances. Interestingly enough, this same 
problem has frequently been identified by representatives 
of other financial institutions in the United States and 
Canada. A survey on the frequency with which customers 
commit ATM crimes, recently conducted by the American 
Bankers Association, concluded that the most frequently 
occurring fraudulent act was thought to be the withdrawal 
of cash from a relative's account without his/her consent 
or knowledge ["How safe are ATMs?", 1987]. Interviews 
with vice presidents, security directors, and managers 
affiliated with banking institutions throughout the 
United States, Australia, and Canada have also identified 
the unauthorized use of ATM cards by relatives or friends 
as a serious fraud problem [Sullivan, 1987; Gist, 1985; 
Barentine, Caci, Imrie, Krueger, Loeb, McDonough, Nolte, 
O'Brien, Parks, Pritchett, Rafferty, Regan, Richardson, 
Rossi, and Waterstreet, 1985a; Ballard, 1984b; "ATM 
cameras help cut 'family' fraud", 1983]. Where Canadian 
banks are concerned, the most common ATM fraud losses 
involve: (1) the use of stolen ATM cards and PINs; 
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(2) cash withdrawals against fictitious deposits; (3) 
the unauthorized use of ATM cards and PINs by family 
members or close friends; and (4) transaction denial by 
the customer [Ballard, 1984b]. A comparison of these 
problems with those presented in Table 4.6 shows a strong 
similarity between the two groups. 
As presented in section 4.3.1 and Table 4.6, off¬ 
line overdrafts were perceived to be the second most 
frequently occurring ATM problem. This problem was 
ranked high because many of the financial institutions 
represented in this study currently operate in an off¬ 
line mode. Although off-line overdrafts are a 
significant ATM fraud loss problem for these 
institutions, this problem does not exist for those 
institutions which process transactions on-line. 
The differences in the assignment of the overall 
ranks to the various ATM problems were found to be 
significant beyond the .001 level, as described in 
section 4.3.1. However, no significant differences were 
found between the rankings of the ATM problems assigned 
by male and female respondents, or those assigned by 
senior, middle, and lower level managers, or those 
assigned by bank officials from small-, medium-, and 
large-sized banks. Collectively, these statistics 
substantiate the inferences that certain problems are 
perceived to be more serious than others, and that ATM 
crime is perceived to be a universal problem for those 
banks which provide ATM services to their customers. 
From Table 4.8, it can be seen that there is a great 
deal of variability in the average percentage of fraud 
reported for each ATM problem. This is primarily due to 
the fact that very few statistics have been compiled 
about ATM crime, and that fraud loss data are not shared 
between banking institutions. As a result, the 
percentages given by the respondents were often based 
upon rough estimates of the extent of ATM fraud. That 
these percentages appear to be somewhat high indicate 
that they were based upon estimates of ATM fraud losses, 
rather than upon estimates of total fraud losses. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the bank officials who 
participated in this study are aware of the extent of ATM 
fraud only within the realm of their own financial 
institutions. Dollar losses sustained by financial 
institutions other than their own are largely left to 
speculation. Furthermore, given the clandestine 
atmosphere which surrounds the revelation of specific 
fraud data, it was assumed that many respondents would be 
reluctant to share their own banking institutions' dollar 
loss figures. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
only eighteen out of thirty-seven respondents (48.6%) 
chose to provide an estimate of the annual dollar loss 
sustained by a banking institution within Massachusetts 
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which could be attributed to each of the previously 
identified ATM problems. As shown in Tables 4.9 and 
4.10, the wide range of dollar loss figures given for 
most of the ATM problems indicates that the respondents 
did not know how much money was lost due to ATM fraud; 
even their "best guesses" are widely dispersed. 
Although the average dollar losses presented in 
section 4.3.1 are subject to question in terms of their 
accuracy, they support the belief that, on a per 
transaction and dollar volume basis, ATM fraud losses are 
significantly lower than other fraud losses [Tien, Rich, 
and Cahn, 1986; U.S. Department of Justice, 1985]. With 
the growth in shared networks between banking 
institutions, and the corresponding increase in ATM 
usage, these financial losses are expected to increase. 
By 1990, ATM transaction volume is expected to reach $524 
billion annually, with losses approximated at 0.04% of 
the total volume [Brantley, 1987]. Clearly, the 
countermeasures applied by banking institutions have been 
effective in reducing their ATM losses. These counter¬ 
measures will be discussed further in section 5.3.3. 
As indicated in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, the dollar 
losses resulting from ATM fraud are small, from a banking 
perspective. However, the possibility remains that these 
losses may be underreported. Until ATM crime is 
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perceived by the banking sector to be a major problem, 
its resultant financial losses will not be openly 
acknowledged. 
5.3.2 Locations 
As described in section 4.3.2, the differences in 
the assignment of the overall ranks to the various 
locations were found to be significant beyond the .02 
level. However, no significant difference was found 
between the rankings of the locations assigned by bank 
officials from small-, medium-, and large-sized financial 
institutions. Together, these statistics indicate that 
incidents of ATM fraud are perceived to be more likely to 
occur in certain types of locations, and that officials 
from banks of varying size recognize the ATM fraud 
potential at these locations. 
Most banking institutions which provide ATM services 
to their customers begin by locating their machines at 
their main offices and their branch offices. Many of the 
bank officials interviewed reported that problems were 
more likely to occur at the branch offices. It is not 
surprising, then, that this location was identified as 
one of the most frequent sites of ATM criminal activity, 
as shown in Table 4.11. 
Since ATMs are both competitive tools for banking 
institutions and items of convenience for customers, it 
is not unusual to see these machines in locations which 
115 
are easily accessible to large numbers of people. Two of 
these locations - shopping centers and supermarkets - are 
also among the most frequent sites of fraudulent 
activity, as indicated in Table 4.11. The ATMs located 
in supermarkets often allow only cash withdrawal 
transactions, and are frequently not equipped with 
cameras. It is easy to recognize the potential risk 
here: the lack of a surveillance system increases the 
customer's level of anonymity, and the high volume of 
customers increases the possibility that fraudulent 
activity will occur. 
In conversations with many of the bank officials who 
participated in this research, stand alone kiosks were 
also mentioned as potential sites for ATM criminal 
activity. Although only one respondent included these 
structures when completing Part III of the questionnaire 
(Appendix C), it is possible that stand alone kiosks were 
considered to be part of the shopping center or 
supermarket locations by some of the respondents. 
From Table 4.11, it can be seen that residential 
neighborhoods were not ranked highly as potential 
locations for ATM fraud problems. That they were not may 
be because there are fewer isolated ATMs situated in 
these locations, or the ATMs located in these 
neighborhoods were included with those in other sites, 
such as shopping centers and supermarkets. 
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5.3.3 Countermeasures 
Because banking institutions are highly competitive 
businesses, those countermeasures which provide higher 
levels of customer and account protection are also 
perceived to be more effective in reducing potential 
adverse publicity costs, litigation expenses, and 
financial loss. However, the decision to implement these 
countermeasures is based on simple economic reasoning: 
the cost of the security measures should not exceed the 
perceived cost of risk. 
As described in section 4.3.3, the most effective 
countermeasure was perceived to be the equipping of ATMs 
with cameras. This same countermeasure has also been 
identified by bank officials from other financial 
institutions located throughout the United States 
[Gruber, 1987; Gist, 1985; George, 1984; "ATM cameras 
help cut 'family' fraud", 1983; "Cameras, careful 
mailouts curb ATM fraud", 1982; "Dayton bank's ATM 
cameras prove effective in cutting fraud", 1981]. When 
film and videotape cameras are located at the ATM sites, 
the level of anonymity afforded to the customers is 
reduced. The photographs are used not only to jog the 
memories of those who dispute certain transactions, but 
to reduce the number of fraudulent claims. In cases 
where photographs are used to document the unauthorized 
withdrawals made by individuals known to the customers, 
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the claims are often withdrawn; many customers prefer not 
to press charges against family members, friends, or 
acquaintances. As a result, a financial institution's 
ATM fraud losses are typically minimized. 
The most costly countermeasure was also perceived to 
be the equipping of ATMs with cameras, as shown in Table 
4.15. Although the cost to install the cameras is 
considered to be relatively insignificant when compared 
with the benefits provided ["ATM cameras help cut 
'family' fraud", 1983], the recurring expenses - such as 
developing and replacing film, and compensating personnel 
for their time in locating the appropriate frames when 
customer claims are filed - can be sizeable. 
Increasing the level of customer security awareness 
was perceived to be the second most effective, and the 
second most costly, countermeasure, as presented in 
Tables in 4.13 and 4.15. The importance of providing 
customer information and education has also been 
emphasized by several bank officials and senior level 
executives from nationwide financial networks, although 
more attention has been focused on the issue of customer 
safety than on the protection of customer accounts ["Bank 
crime series part one: Armed assault on ATM users", 
1988; Bloom, 1988; Hudak, 1988; Quinn, 1988; "Update 
on serious ATM crime", 1988; Brantley, 1987; "How safe 
are ATMs?", 1987; Kutler, 1987; Marshall and Pylitt, 
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1987; "Survey findings paint different picture of ATM 
crime", 1987; Ballard, 1984b; "Poor lighting, design 
prove costly at ATM site", 1984]. A recent study 
conducted by the American Bankers Association found that 
most customer victimizations occurred at walk-up 
installations on bank premises, and that cameras had been 
installed in only thirty percent of the locations where 
customers had become victims ["How safe are ATMs?", 
1987]. From a banking perspective, the aftereffects of 
such incidents can range from customer claims for stolen 
cash to lawsuits, each carrying the threats of adverse 
publicity and financial loss. 
The issue of customer safety has received so much 
media attention, that legislation has recently been 
introduced by Representative Mario Biaggi (D-NY) which 
would require regulators of financial institutions to 
develop and enforce certain ATM security standards, such 
as the installation of emergency alarms, secured 
enclosures around ATMs, surveillance cameras, and video 
transaction recorders ["How safe are ATMs?", 1987]. Bank 
officials are generally not in favor of any legislative 
intervention in this area, an observation partially 
supported by the low (eighth place) ranking attributed to 
a similar suggested countermeasure in Table 4.13. Yet, 
ironically, all of the banking institutions represented 
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in this research have installed more security measures 
than those suggested in potential legislative mandates. 
Another rather low ranking (seventh place) was 
assigned to the effectiveness of improving the level of 
communication between banking institutions on security- 
related issues, as shown in Table 4.13. Although 
security techniques and customer scams are informally 
shared between financial institutions, specific fraud 
loss data remain confidential. It is possible that some 
of the respondents felt that further communication 
between banking institutions would necessarily require 
the sharing of such data, and so rejected its 
effectiveness on this basis. 
5.3.4 Fraudulent Account Establishment 
As described in section 4.3.4, the largest 
percentage of the respondents indicated that they felt it 
was more difficult for an employee to establish an 
account with the intent to defraud through the use of a 
computerized system than through the use of a manual 
system. Almost as many respondents indicated that they 
felt there was no difference between the opportunities 
provided by either system for such a purpose. At first 
glance, these findings appear to be in conflict with the 
more popular belief that information in computers is more 
vulnerable than ever, despite advances made in computer 
security in recent years [Gasser, 1988]. However, the 
120 
data presented in Table 4.17 support the fundamental 
problem underlying data and computer security: people. 
Most of the recorded cases of computer abuse and fraud 
involve the exploitation of weaknesses in procedural or 
personnel controls, not weaknesses in internal, 
technological controls [Gasser, 1988? BloomBecker, 
1988]. The .assertion that technological controls have 
surpassed human controls is supported in this research by 
the observation that only eight respondents (21.05%) 
indicated that it would be easy, or very easy, for an 
employee to use computer technology to establish an 
account with the deliberate attempt to defraud. 
5.3.5 Projected Trends 
Based upon the responses obtained from this 
research, the number of fraudulent ATM activities are 
expected to increase over the course of the next five 
years, but no changes are anticipated in the amount of 
money to be spent on ATM security measures. The data 
presented in Table 4.19 clearly show this apparent, but 
justifiable, contradiction. As discussed above in 
section 5.3.1, the financial losses resulting from ATM 
fraud are believed to be significantly lower than other 
fraud losses. For example, although the total annual 
nationwide bank loss due to automated teller machine 
fraud has been estimated to be between $70 and $100 
million [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986], the corresponding 
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loss due to credit card fraud has been estimated at $561 
million [U.S. Department of Justice, 1985]. Since the 
financial losses resulting from sources other than ATM 
fraud are perceived to be more significant, the limited 
resources which may be expended on security measures - 
all of which must be cost-justified - will necessarily go 
to those areas where the losses are believed to be 
largest. Therefore, despite the expected increase in the 
number of fraudulent ATM incidents, the corresponding 
financial losses are not expected to be significant 
enough to warrant increased expenditures on ATM security 
measures. 
As shown in Table 4.20, the largest percentage of 
respondents indicated that the most serious ATM problem 
to confront the state-wide banking industry within the 
next five years will be fraudulent deposits (i.e., empty 
envelope deposits or fraudulent check deposits), and not 
the unauthorized use of ATM cards by family members, 
friends, or acquaintances. As previously discussed, the 
installation of cameras at ATM sites has helped to reduce 
the number of customer claims involving the unauthorized 
use of ATM cards, and has minimized the corresponding 
losses sustained by financial institutions. While the 
use of cameras is also an effective countermeasure where 
fraudulent deposits are concerned, these incidents are 
generally more serious in terms of their financial 
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consequences. In 1983, the average amount claimed by a 
customer on the unauthorized withdrawal of cash from 
his/her account was $283, while the average amount 
claimed by a banking institution on stolen/fraudulent 
check deposit incidents was $1,032 [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 
1986]. 
It is difficult for a banking institution to recoup 
its financial losses resulting from fraudulent deposits, 
as exemplified by the following scam described by several 
bank officials during the course of their interviews, and 
recounted here in generalized form. A customer deposited 
several checks worth a sizeable sum of money in various 
ATMs, and, shortly thereafter, began withdrawing funds 
against these deposits. Although none of the checks had 
cleared, the banking institution had granted provisional 
credit against these deposits. By the time the financial 
institution discovered that the checks were worthless, 
the customer had severely overdrawn his/her account, and 
then left town. The banking institution was unable to 
locate this individual, and was forced to write off the 
loss as a cost of doing business. Given the ease with 
which this crime may be committed, and the difficulty in 
locating the perpetrator(s) of activity, it is not 
surprising that fraudulent deposits are perceived to be. 
the most important ATM problem to confront the state-wide 
banking industry within the next five years. 
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This chapter has presented a discussion of the 
research results initially described in Chapter 4. An 
evaluation of this research study, and suggestions for 
future research efforts, are provided in the final 
chapter. 
CHAPTER 6 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has documented a pilot effort to 
assess the perceptions of ATM security issues maintained 
by various bank officials within the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. In this final chapter, the research study 
is evaluated, and suggestions for future research are 
provided. 
6.1 Evaluation of the Research Study 
The evaluation of this study is divided into two 
categories: an assessment of the research approach, and 
an analysis of the key findings. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the research approach are evaluated in 
section 6.1.1. Section 6.1.2 presents a summary of the 
key study findings, and provides a brief discussion of 
these results in terms of customer anonymity and 
institutional control. 
6.1.1 Assessment of the Research Approach 
As discussed in Chapter 2, financial institutions 
have traditionally been reluctant to release information 
on the incidence of ATM crime. As a result, 
statistically valid data concerning the nature and extent 
of ATM criminal activities do not exist. This study was 
therefore based upon the belief that insight into the 
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nature and extent of ATM crime could be provided through 
an investigation of the perceptions of ATM security 
issues held by various Massachusetts bank officials. The 
viability of this research approach was supported by the 
high percentage of financial institutions represented in 
this study. Bank officials from forty out of the forty- 
seven initially identified financial institutions (85.1%) 
chose to participate in this study. As previously 
discussed, these forty institutions constituted 39% of 
the total population, and they varied widely in size and 
geographical location. 
In order to encourage participation and ensure the 
value of the responses obtained, the bank officials and 
their corresponding financial institutions were 
guaranteed anonymity. No attempt was made to collect 
bank-specific confidential data, and the results of this 
research were intentionally reported in aggregate form in 
order to avoid the possibility of identifying specific 
banking institutions. 
The questionnaire administered to the bank officials 
(Appendix C) was developed to facilitate the collection 
of data concerning the respondents' perceptions of ATM 
security issues. Its design was based upon five security 
concerns: the problems surrounding ATMs, the locations 
where these problems occur, the countermeasures designed 
to reduce the incidence of ATM criminal activity, the 
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establishment of fraudulent accounts by bank personnel, 
and projected trends in ATM crime. The questionnaire 
provided a level of consistency so that the data obtained 
on these five areas of concern could be analyzed and 
compared. 
Although this research provided some insight into 
the perceived nature, frequency of occurrence, and 
projected trends of ATM criminal activities within 
certain Massachusetts financial institutions, this study 
should be viewed as a pilot effort, and the research 
findings should be considered preliminary. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, many of these findings were similar to 
those presented in other studies. However, it is 
uncertain whether this study, which collectively involved 
forty Massachusetts banks and 1,076 ATMs, is 
representative of the more than 68,000 ATMs currently in 
operation throughout the United States [Luchsinger, 
1988]. As a result, the results of this research study 
should not be generalized beyond the sample population. 
6.1.2 Summary of the Key Study Findings 
The major findings of this research are listed 
below. 
1) The five most frequently occurring ATM problems 
were perceived to be: 
— the unauthorized use of ATM cards by family members, 
friends, or acquaintances. This problem was attributed 
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an average of slightly more than 22% of all fraud, with 
annual reported dollar losses estimated to be $6,367.31 
per bank, and $1,172.46 per ATM. 
off-line overdrafts. This problem was attributed an 
average of almost 36% of all fraud, with annual reported 
dollar losses estimated to be $7,780.81 per bank, and 
$436.01 per ATM. 
— ATM cards which were reported stolen. This problem 
was attributed an average of 18.64% of all fraud, with 
annual reported dollar losses estimated to be almost 
$10,896.00 per bank, and $977.00 per ATM. 
— overdrafts resulting from empty envelope deposits. 
This problem was attributed an average of slightly more 
than 16% of all fraud, with annual reported dollar losses 
estimated to be $7,730.00 per bank, and $1,858.26 per 
ATM. 
ATM cards which were reported lost. This problem 
was attributed an average of slightly more than 15% of 
all fraud, with annual reported dollar losses estimated 
to be slightly more than $10,311.00 per bank, and $937.00 
per ATM. 
2) ATM fraud problems were perceived to be most 
likely to occur at the branch offices of a bank, 
shopping centers, and supermarkets. 
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3) The five most effective countermeasures were 
perceived to be: 
equipping 90% to 100% of the ATMs with cameras, 
increasing the level of security awareness among 
customers by distributing literature about the importance 
of nondisclosure of PINs and safekeeping of ATM cards, 
eliminating off-line withdrawal capabilities, 
providing 24-hour on-line hotcarding. 
increasing the level of security awareness among 
bank employees through meetings and seminars. 
4) The five most costly countermeasures were 
perceived to be: 
equipping 90% to 100% of the ATMs with cameras. 
— increasing the level of security awareness among 
customers by distributing literature about the importance 
of nondisclosure of PINs and safekeeping of ATM cards. 
providing 24-hour on-line hotcarding. 
substituting the use of PINs with other methods of 
confirming the customer's identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition). 
— eliminating off-line withdrawal capabilities. 
5) The largest percentage of the respondents 
indicated that they felt it was easier for an employee to 
establish an account with the deliberate intent to 
defraud through the use of a manual system than through 
the use of a computerized system. 
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6) The number of fraudulent ATM activities was 
expected to increase at a rate less than 50% over the 
course of the next five years, but no changes were 
anticipated in the amount of money to be spent on ATM 
security measures. 
Bank officials have long known that a criminal's 
best defense is anonymity [Baumer and Carrington, 1986; 
George, 1984]. As discussed in Chapter 5, the use of 
surveillance systems at ATM sites is the most effective 
way to reduce the level of anonymity afforded to the 
customers, since photographs are generated which document 
all transactions. However, if the photograph generated 
does not present a clear image of the individual making 
the transaction in question, the financial institution 
often finds it difficult to deny a customer's claim. 
Although the dollar losses sustained by banking 
institutions due to ATM fraud are believed to be 
significantly lower than those resulting from other types 
of fraud [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986; U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1985], these losses should not be considered 
insignificant. In many cases, the legal restrictions 
imposed upon financial institutions often contribute to 
their losses. According to the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act (the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation E), account 
holder liability is limited to $50 if the card is 
reported missing within two days of discovery, or $500 if 
the card is reported missing more than two days after 
discovery [U.S. Department of Justice, 1985; Ellis and 
Greguras, 1983]. However, this liability provision 
allows an account holder to claim that discovery of the 
missing card occurred within two days, whether it 
actually did or not, thereby avoiding any liability in 
excess of $50 [Colton, Tien, Davis, Dunn, and Barnett, 
1982]. Whenever there is an unauthorized transfer of 
funds from a customer's account, it is the banking 
institution's responsibility to prove that the funds 
transfer was authorized. If the institution cannot prove 
that the transaction was made with the customer's 
consent, restitution must be made to the customer. This 
burden of proof is difficult to supply, causing many bank 
officials to claim that the law encourages irresponsible 
behavior on the part of the customers, and makes it too 
easy for dishonest individuals to defraud banking 
institutions [Tien, Rich, and Cahn, 1986; Weinstein, 
1985]. 
ATMs have been successfully marketed as easily 
accessible and dependable extensions of banking 
institutions [Helm, 1987]. Financial institutions have 
popularized ATMs for the sake of competitive advantage, 
and encouraged customer usage of these machines for a 
variety of transactions. Today, more than 140 million 
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card holders perform over 325 million ATM transactions 
per month [Burchfield, 1987] via local, regional, and 
national networks. However, studies have shown that the 
levels of user capability and exposure strongly correlate 
with the level of protection needed [Neugent, Gilligan, 
Hoffman, and Ruthberg, 1985]. For the banking industry, 
as user reliance upon ATMs has grown, so have the 
security risks associated with ATM cards [Burchfield, 
1987], As a result, those security measures which 
corresponded to the perceived risks have been 
implemented. Some, but not all, of the security problems 
posed by the proliferation of networks have been 
addressed through the use of technological controls, such 
as encryption, message authentication, and strict 
internal operating procedures. In the future, the 
banking industry will probably see the implementation of 
additional security devices based upon more advanced 
technologies, such as fingerprint technology and voice 
response technology ["How safe are ATMs?", 1987], 
although the current cost to implement these access 
controls is prohibitive. 
Banking institutions have effectively utilized 
computer technology in the design of their ATM systems, 
and as a result, the number of fraudulent ATM incidents 
and resultant financial losses have been minimized. 
Front-end security measures - such as requiring the use 
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of a PIN, and restricting the number of incorrect PIN 
tries allowed - have provided a layer of protection 
against unauthorized account access. Other security 
measures - such as enforcing a maximum daily withdrawal 
limit, restricting the number of daily transactions 
allowed, and retaining an ATM card (i.e., after it has 
been reported lost or stolen, or after the PIN has been 
repeatedly misentered) - have minimized potential losses 
once account access has been accomplished. 
As previously discussed, the fundamental problem 
underlying security is people, and human controls are 
considered to be much weaker than the existing 
technological controls [Parker, 1984]. The sole use of 
such technological security measures as those mentioned 
above will not effectively reduce the financial losses 
caused by customer negligence or employee 
dissatisfaction. Despite the projected increase in the 
number of fraudulent ATM activities, increased 
expenditures on ATM security are not perceived to be 
warranted until financial institutions examine the 
existing controls in their ATM systems and networks, and 
find them to be inadeguate. 
6.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
This study provided some insight into the nature and 
extent of ATM crime as perceived by forty Massachusetts 
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bank officials. However, there are several areas in 
which further research should be undertaken. 
The questionnaire used in this study should be 
administered to bank officials in states other than 
Massachusetts in order to extend the existing knowledge 
of the perceptions of ATM security issues. A comparison 
of the research results reported in this dissertation 
with those from a subsequent study would enable the 
perceptual similarities between the two groups to be 
ascertained, and would provide further evidence of the 
trend of ATM criminal activities. 
Modifications could be made to the questionnaire 
which would provide more descriptive information on the 
represented financial institutions, and the nature of ATM 
fraud as perceived by their corresponding bank officials. 
Questions should be added which concern the asset size of 
the bank, the size of the card base, the criteria used 
for granting an account holder an ATM card, and the 
maximum daily withdrawal limit allowed, and the responses 
used to determine the extent to which these factors 
correlate with the perceived incidence of ATM criminal 
activity. In addition, the responses to other questions 
- such as those concerning the number of monthly ATM 
transactions, and the estimated number of fraudulent ATM 
incidents per month - should be used to establish 
preliminary fraud loss ratios. 
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The survey instrument could also be altered to 
include more descriptive questions concerning the 
perceived characteristics of the users of ATMs, and the 
perpetrators of ATM crime. The responses to these 
questions should be supplemented by the data published in 
the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports in order to establish a 
predictive model of ATM crime based upon a series of 
demographic factors. 
Executives from local, regional, and national 
networks might be contacted in order to further the 
understanding of the perceived characteristics of ATM 
fraud within a network environment. Additional questions 
should be added to the survey instrument in order to 
determine the responsibilities of the host bank which 
owns the ATM through which a fraudulent act was 
committed, the responsibilities of the switch which owns 
or operates the network, and the responsibilities of the 
home bank against which a fraud was committed [Tien, 
Rich, and Cahn, 1986]. 
The focus of further research efforts might also be 
altered in order to investigate the perceptions of 
security issues within other electronic fund transfer 
technologies. These studies could be conducted within 
the retail banking industry (i.e., point-of-sale 
systems), corporate banking sector (i.e., wire transfer, 
automated clearing house, and cash management systems), 
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and internal banking operations (i.e., on-line teller 
terminals, credit card purchases, and computerized check 
processing). The results of these studies would 
contribute to a more cohesive understanding of the nature 
and extent of EFT fraud. 
The suggested areas for research described above are 
bound by the constraint that bank-specific confidential 
data cannot be obtained. However, (in ah effort to end 
this dissertation on an optimistic note), if banking 
institutions were amenable to disclosing their ATM fraud 
data, ongoing analyses of bank-specific incident and 
summary level data could be performed, and the results 
used to measure the nature and extent of ATM crime on a 
continual basis. 
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APPENDIX A 
Open-Ended Interview Questions for Pilot Study 
1) What are your most critical security concerns? 
2) Do you feel that there are any weaknesses in your 
existing security measures? 
3) Do you feel that the level of impersonality of a 
transaction has an effect on the incidence of fraud? 
4) With what types of ATM security problems are you 
confronted? 
5) Where are your potential sources of loss where ATMs 
are concerned? (i.e., repair personnel, employees, 
customers) 
6) Do you feel that there are specific security threats 
posed by ATM networks? If so, what are they? 
7) How do you decide where to locate your automated 
teller machines? 
8) Do you think a fraudulent transaction is more likely 
to occur via an ATM or a bank teller? 
9) Do you think that the customers using the ATMs for 
their banking transactions are younger than those 
who rely on bank tellers? 
10) Are any statistics on ATM usage or ATM criminal 
activity maintained by your bank? If so, what type 
of statistics are gathered? 
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11) Are any data on fraudulent credit card transactions, 
or fraudulent loan activities, maintained by your 
bank? If so, what type of statistics are gathered? 
12) Do you think the financial losses resulting from ATM 
criminal or fraudulent activities are as large as 
those resulting from fraudulent credit card 
transactions, or fraudulent loan activities? 
13) We are beginning to see a rise in the use of 
microcomputers for banking applications. Do you 
foresee this as a potential security problem? 
14) What types of fraudulent transactions might there be 
from home banking applications? 
15) According to the FBI, banks are responsible for 
reporting certain types of financial loss data, as 
well as how the loss occurred, to the FBI. Are 
these facts reported directly by each bank to the 
FBI, or or are they reported to another organization 
(such as the area Federal Reserve Bank, or the 
Comptroller of Currency), prior to being reported to 
the FBI? 
16) Are there any facts regarding fraud losses which are 
available to the general public? 
17) Is there someone within your bank who is responsible 
for investigating fraudulent or criminal activities? 
18) Could you recommend someone in another bank with 
whom I could speak about fraud and security issues? 
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APPENDIX B 
Preliminary Interview Letter of Thanks 
P.0. Box 29.1 
Chicopee, MA 01014-0291 
[Date] 
[Name] 
[Title] 
[Bank Name] 
[Street Address] 
[City, State, Zip] 
Dear [Name]: 
I appreciate your taking the time to meet with me on 
[date of interview]. Your answers to my security 
questions were very helpful, and I found our conversation 
to be very informative. 
Thank you again for your help. 
Sincerely, 
Marie Wright 
APPENDIX C 
A Survey of the Nature of ATM Crime and 
the Frequency of Occurrence of ATM Criminal Activities 
Within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
The objective of this survey is to obtain a better 
understanding of the nature of ATM crime and the 
frequency of occurrence of ATM criminal activities within 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This survey is being 
conducted because the're is no consensus as to the exact 
figures involved, and none of the existing data sources 
can provide valid data for measuring the nature and 
extent of ATM fraud. 
Please answer the following questions to the best of 
your knowledge. Since the hard facts will probably not 
be known, please use your "best guess". All information 
will be held in the strictest of confidence. 
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PART I 
A list of problems associated with ATMs is provided 
on the following page. Please identify what you feel are 
the five most important ATM problems confronting the 
banking industry today. 
In column (A), number these problems from 1 (most 
important) to 5 (fifth most important). 
In column (B), for the five most important problems, 
enter the approximate percentage of all fraud which is 
attributable to each of these five problems. 
In column (C), for each of the five problems, enter 
your estimate of the average dollar loss sustained by a 
bank within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts during the 
past year (1/1/87 - 12/31/87). If you prefer, upper and 
lower dollar loss estimates may be entered in column (C) 
rather than a single dollar loss estimate. 
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In column (A), number the five most important ATM prob¬ 
lems from 1 (most important) to 5 (fifth most important). 
In column (B), for each of the five problems, enter your 
estimate of the percentage of all fraud which is 
attributable to each of these five problems. 
In column (C), for each of the five problems, enter your 
estimate of the dollar loss sustained by a bank within 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts during the past year. 
If you prefer, upper and lower dollar loss estimates may 
be entered rather than a single dollar loss figure. 
ATM PROBLEMS (A) (B) (C) 
Card reported stolen ___ ___ 
Card reported lost ___ _ __ 
Card counterfeiting operations _ __ _ 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance __ __ _____ 
Misrepresentation of ATM transactions _____ _ _ 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits „ __ _ _ 
Stolen/fraudulent check deposited 
in ATM followed by withdrawal 
against insufficient funds __ _ ______ 
Off-line overdraft 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 
ATM vandalized 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 
Manipulation of ATM software 
Flaws in system procedures which 
allow one customer to withdraw 
cash from another account 
Other: _ 
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PART II 
From the following list of countermeasures which might 
help to reduce the incidence of ATM fraud, please rank 
the five which you feel would be the most effective, 
(i.e., which would reduce the amount of ATM fraud without 
regard to cost). In column (A), rank order these 
countermeasures from 1 (most effective) to 5 (least 
effective). In column (B), rank order the cost of these 
five countermeasures from 1 (greatest cost) to 5 (least 
cost). 
COUNTERMEASURE (A) (B) 
Effectiveness Cost 
Increase level of security awareness 
among bank employees through meetings, 
seminars, etc. _ _ 
Increase level of security awareness 
among customers by distributing literature 
about the importance of nondisclosure of 
PINS and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect PIN 
tries allowed 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint recognition) 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 
Other: __ 
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PART III 
1) The use of manual systems has largely been replaced 
by a widespread use of computer technology in the banking 
industry. How easy do you think it would be for an 
employee at your bank to set up an account, through the 
use of computer technology, with the intent to defraud? 
Very easy 
compared 
to manual 
system 
Easy 
compared 
to manual 
system 
No change 
from 
manual 
system 
Difficult 
compared 
to manual 
system 
Very 
difficult 
compared 
to manual 
system 
2) From the following list of locations where ATM fraud 
problems may occur, please rank the top three locations 
from 1 (most frequent location) to 3 (third most frequent 
location). 
Main office of the bank 
Branch offices of the bank 
Shopping centers 
Supermarkets 
Transportation terminals 
Hospitals 
Office building lobbies 
Residential neighborhoods 
Other: 
3) How do you think the number of fraudulent ATM 
incidents is likely to change in the next 5 years? 
Increase Increase Decrease Decrease 
more less No less more 
than 50% than 50% 
• • 
Change 
• • 
than 50% 
• • • • 
than 50% 
4) What do you think the single most important ATM 
problem will be in the next 5 years? 
PART IV 
1) How many ATMs does your bank have? _ 
2) How many years has your bank used ATMs? _ 
3) Approximately how much is your bank currently 
spending on ATM security measures? $_ 
4) Is there a designated individual or group of 
individuals responsible for ATM security at your bank? 
_ Yes _____ No 
5) Do you anticipate any changes in the amount of money 
spent on ATM security in the next year? 
_ Yes _____ No 
6) Do you anticipate any changes in staff levels for 
those responsible for ATM security in the next year? 
_ Yes _ No 
7) What is your title? ____ 
3) How many years of experience have you had in the area 
of bank security?  
9) How many years.have you been employed at your bank? 
145 
APPENDIX D 
Respondent Letter of Thanks 
P.0. Box 291 
Chicopee, MA 01014-0291 
[Date] 
[Name] 
[Title] 
[Bank Name] 
[Street Address] 
[City, State, Zip] 
Dear [Name]: 
Thank you for meeting with me on [date], and for 
taking the time to respond to my questionnaire on ATM 
crime. 
As I mentioned during our meeting, neither your 
specific responses nor the identity of your financial 
institution will appear in writing in my dissertation. 
Instead, your responses to the questionnaire items will 
be statistically analyzed along with those from the other 
respondents in order to obtain a better understanding of 
ATM fraud. The data analysis should be completed by late 
summer, and I will contact you at that time in order to 
share my findings with you. 
Thank you again for your help. 
Sincerely, 
Marie Wright 
APPENDIX E 
Rankings of the ATM Problems 
Raw Data 
ATM Problem 
Rank 
3 
Card reported stolen 549 
Card reported lost 442 
Card counterfeiting operations 000 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 7 11 4 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 131 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 3 4 10 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 432 
Off-line overdraft 12 4 2 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 003 
ATM vandalized 013 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 000 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 001 
Manipulation of ATM software 100 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 020 
Other 010 
APPENDIX F 
Calculations for the Average of the Weighted Ranks 
for the ATM Problems 
The weighted ranks for each problem were calculated 
in the following manner. First, the scale was reflected 
(i.e., a respondent rank of 1 was given a corresponding 
weight of 5; a respondent rank of 2 was given a 
corresponding weight of 4; a respondent rank of 3 was 
given a corresponding weight of 3; a respondent rank of 4 
was given a corresponding weight of 2; and a respondent 
rank of 5 was given a corresponding weight of 1). Next, 
the weight assigned to each rank was multiplied by the 
corresponding number of respondents who assigned the rank 
to a given problem, and the values obtained for each 
problem were summed. Finally, each summed value was 
divided by the total number of respondents (37). 
Example 
ATM Problem: Card reported stolen 
5(5)+4(4)+3(9)+2(3)+1(4) 
Average weighted rank = 37 
= 2.11 
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APPENDIX G 
Calculations for the Median and Quartile Deviation 
for the ATM Problems 
The following intervals were established to 
correspond with the ranks assigned by the respondents 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Interval 
0.5 - 1.5 
1.5 - 2.5 
2.5 - 3.5 
3.5 - 4.5 
4.5 - 5.5 
Card reported stolen 
Mdn = 2.5+(4/9)(1) = 2.94 Q-L = 1.5+ (1/4) (1) = 1 
Q3 = 3.5+(1/3)(1) = 3 
Q = (3.83-1.75)/2 = 1.04 
Card reported lost 
Mdn = 3.5+(2/9)(1) = 3.72 
Q = (4.38-2)/? = 1.19 
Qx = 1.5+(2/4)(1) = 2 
Q3 = 3.5+(8/9)(1) = 4 
.75 
.83 
. 38 
149 
Unauthorized use by family, friend, or acquaintance 
Mdn = 1.5+(8/11)(1) = 2.23 
Q = (3.5-1.5)/2 = 1.00 
Qx = 1.5 
q3 = 3-5 
Misrepresentations of ATM transactions 
Mdn = 4.5+(1/7)(1) = 4.64 Q± = 1.5+(2/3)(l) = 2.17 
Q3 = 4.5+(4/7)(1) = 5.07 
Q = (5.07-2.17)/2 = 1.45 
Overdraft resulting from empty envelope deposits 
Mdn = 2.5+(7/10)(1) = 3.20 Q± = 2.5 
Q3 = 4*5 
Q = (4.5-2.5)/2 = 1.00 
Stolen/fraudulent check deposited in ATM followed by 
withdrawal againstinsufficient funds 
Mdn =2.50 
Q = (3.83-1.25)/2 = 1.29 
Off-line overdraft 
Mdn = 1.5+(2/4)(1) = 2.00 
Q = (4.63-1.08)/2 = 1.77 
1.25 
3.83 
Qx = 0.5+(7/12)(1) = 1.08 
Qo = 4.5+(1/8)(1) =4.63 
Q± = 0.5+(3/4)(1) = 
Q3 = 3.5+(1/3)(1) = 
150 
False reporting that ATM dispensed incorrect funds 
Mdn = 3.5+(1/3)(1) = 3.83 Qx = 2.5+(2/3)(1) =3.17 
Q3 = 4.5 
Q = (4.5-3.17)/2 = 0.67 
ATM vandalized 
Mdn =3.50 Q± = 2.5+(1/3)(1) =2.83 
Q3 = 4.5 
Q = (4.5-2.83J/2 = 0.83 
Electronic attack on data communication lines 
Mdn = 3.5+(1/2)(1) =4.00 Q± = 3.5 
Q = (4-3.5)/2 = 0.25 
Q3 = 3.5+(1/2)(1) = 4 
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APPENDIX H 
Chi-Square Tests for the ATM Problem Ranks 
Five chi-square tests were performed in order to 
determine whether the differences in the assignment of 
each of the five ranks to the fifteen ATM problems were 
significant. In each of these tests, the observed 
frequency consisted of the number of respondents who 
assigned a given rank to a given problem, and the 
expected frequency was determined by dividing the total 
number of respondents (37) by the number of ATM problems 
(15). These tests are shown on the following pages. 
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RANK: 1 
ATM Problem 
Observed 
tm 
Expected 
m 
(O-E)— 
Card reported stolen 5 
Card reported lost 4 
Card counterfeiting operations 0 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 7 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 1 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 3 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 4 
Off-line overdraft 12 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 0 
ATM vandalized 0 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 0 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 0 
Manipulation of ATM software 1 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 0 
Other 0 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.602 
0.953 
2.467 
8.332 
0.872 
0.115 
0.953 
36.845 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
0.872 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
Chi-Square: 68.811 
df: 14 
prob: 0 
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RANK: 2 
Observed Expected 
ATM Problem(OJ(E) 
Card reported stolen 4 2.467 
Card reported lost 4 2.467 
Card counterfeiting operations 0 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 11 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 3 
2.467 
2.467- 
2.467 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 4 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 3 
2.467 
2.467 
Off-line overdraft 4 2.467 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 0 2.467 
ATM vandalized 1 2.467 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 0 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 0 
2.467 
2.467 
Manipulation of ATM software 0 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw 'cash from another 
account 2 
2.467 
2.467 
Other 1 2.467 
(0-E)— 
E 
0.953 
0.953 
2.467 
29.521 
0.115 
0.953 
0.115 
0.953 
2.467 
0.872 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
0.088 
0.872 
Chi-Sauare: 47.730 
df: 14 
prob: 0 
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RANK: 3 
ATM Problem 
Observed 
COJ 
Expected 
m 
(0-E)— 
Card reported stolen 9 
Card reported lost 2 
Card counterfeiting operations 0 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 4 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 1 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 10 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 2 
Off-line overdraft 2 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 3 
ATM vandalized 3 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 0 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 1 
Manipulation of ATM software 0 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 0 
Other 0 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
17.305 
0.088 
2.467 
0.953 
0.872 
23.007 
0.088 
0.088 
0.115 
0.115 
2.467 
0.872 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
Chi-Souare: 55.838 
df: 14 
prob: 0 
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RANK: 4 
ATM Problem 
Observed Expected 
COj(Ej 
Card reported stolen 3 
Card reported lost 9 
Card counterfeiting operations 0 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 7 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 1 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 4 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 3 
2.467 
2.467 
Off-line overdraft 2 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 3 
ATM vandalized 1 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 2 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 2 
2.467 
2.467 
Manipulation of ATM software 0 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 0 
2.467 
2.467 
Other 0 2.467 
Chi-Square: 
df: 
prob: 
(0-E1— 
E 
0.115 
17.305 
2.467 
8.332 
0.872 
0.953 
0.115 
0.088 
0.115 
0.872 
0.088 
0.088 
2.467 
2.467 
2.467 
38.811 
14 
. 0004 
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RANK: 5 
ATM Problem 
Observed Expected (O-E)- 
CO) JU_E 
Card reported stolen 4 
Card reported lost 5 
Card counterfeiting operations 1 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 0 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 7 
2.467 0.953 
2.467 2.602 
2.467 0.872 
2.467 2.467 
2.467 8.332 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 
Off-line overdraft 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 
ATM vandalized 
7 2.467 8.332 
1 2.467 0.872 
8 2.467 12.413 
2 2.467 0.088 
2 2.467 0.088 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 0 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 0 
Manipulation of ATM software 0 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 0 
2.467 2.467 
2.467 2.467 
2.467 2.467 
2.467 2.467 
Other 0 2.467 2.467 
Chi-Sauare: 49.351 
df: 14 
prob: 0 
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APPENDIX I 
Percentage of Fraud per ATM Problem 
Raw Data 
ATM Problem: Card reported stolen 
% Fraud Assigned 
4.00% 
5.00% 
5.26% 
8.33% 
9.76% 
10.00% 
10.87% 
15.00% 
20.00% 
25.00% 
32.26% 
34.25% 
35.00% 
65.00% 
70.00% 
Number of Respondents 
2 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 . 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: Card reported lost 
% Fraud Assigned 
1.00% 
2.00% 
4.00% 
5.00% 
9.09% 
10.00% 
10.53% 
12.90% 
25.00% 
34.25% 
35.00% 
43.48% 
55.00% 
Number of Respondents 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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ATM Problem: Card counterfeiting operations 
% Fraud Assigned 
6.45% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
ATM Problem: Unauthorized use by family, friend, or 
acquaintance 
% Fraud Assigned 
1.00% 
2.17% 
5.00% 
5.26% 
7.00% 
8.33% 
10.00% 
15.00% 
18.18% 
25.00% 
30.00% 
32.26% 
40.00% 
50.00% 
60.00% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
5 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
ATM Problem: Misrepresentations of ATM transactions 
% Fraud Assigned 
2.00% 
4.54% 
5.00% 
9.00% 
10.00% 
13.00% 
13.70% 
16.13% 
45.00% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: Overdraft resulting from empty envelope 
deposits 
% Fraud Assigned 
2.44% 
3.00% 
5.00% 
5.26% 
7.00% 
9.09 
10.00% 
10.87% 
15.00% 
16.67% 
20.00% 
22.73% 
25.00% 
40.00% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
4 
2 
ATM Problem: Stolen/fraudulent check deposited in ATM 
followed by withdrawal against insufficient 
funds 
% Fraud Assigned 
3.00% 
5.00% 
15.00% 
27.27% 
30.00% 
33.33% 
41.67% 
65.00% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
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ATM Problem: Off-line overdraft 
% Fraud Assigned 
4.00% 
5.00% 
8.33% 
10.00% 
13.70% 
15.00% 
20.00% 
25.00% 
32.61% 
35.00% 
36.37% 
50.00% 
54.55% 
69.51% 
70.00% 
73.69% 
85.00% 
98.00% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
4 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
ATM Problem: False reporting that ATM dispensed 
incorrect funds 
% Fraud Assigned 
2.00% 
5.00% 
6.10% 
9.09% 
20.00% 
25.00% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM vandalized ATM Problem 
% Fraud Assigned 
6.00% 
9.09% 
10.00% 
16.67% 
25.00% 
30.00% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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ATM Problem: Replenishment cash stolen by service team 
individuals 
% Fraud Assigned Number of Respondents 
5.00% 1 
10.00% 1 
ATM Problem: Electronic attack on data communication 
lines 
% Fraud Assigned Number of Respondents 
4.00% 1 
5.00% 2 
ATM Problem: Manipulation of ATM software 
% Fraud Assigned Number of Respondents 
60.00% 1 
ATM Problem: Flaws in system procedures which allow one 
customer to withdraw cash from another 
account 
% Fraud Assigned Number of Respondents 
4.10% 1 
10.00% 1 
ATM Problem: Other 
% Fraud Assigned 
12.90% 
Number of Respondents 
1 
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APPENDIX J 
Reported Dollar Losses per Bank for Each ATM Problem 
Raw Data 
ATM Problem: Card reported stolen 
$ Loss Assigned 
100.00 
250.00 
400.00 
1,000.00 
1,100.00 
2,500.00 
10,000.00 
15,000.00 
20,000.00 
40,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
ATM Problem: Card reported lost 
$ Loss Assigned 
100.00 
500.00 
1,000.00 
1,100.00 
10,000.00 
15,000.00 
25,000.00 
40,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: Card counterfeiting operations 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
10,000.00 1 
163 
ATM Problem: Unauthorized use by family, friend, or 
acquaintance 
$ Loss Assigned 
100.00 
975.00 
1,000.00 
2,000.00 
5,000.00 
11,500.00 
12,000.00 
20,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
ATM Problem: Misrepresentations of ATM transactions 
$ Loss Assigned 
‘500.00 
975.00 
30,000.00 
35,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: Overdraft resulting from empty envelope 
deposits 
$ Loss Assigned 
50.00 
300.00 
500.00 
1,000.00 
1,200.00 
2,000.00 
3,900.00 
5,000.00 
6,000.00 
10,000.00 
25,000.00 
50,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
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ATM Problem; Stolen/fraudulent check deposited in ATM 
followed by withdrawal against insufficient 
funds 
$ Loss Assigned 
400.00 
1,462.50 
15,000.00 
25,000.00 
50,000.00 
77,500.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem; Off-line overdraft 
$ Loss Assigned 
200.00 
500.00 
1,000.00 
1,713.00 
2,437.50 
2,800.00 
5,000.00 
7,000.00 
10,000.00 
15,000.00 
50,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: False reporting that ATM dispensed 
incorrect funds 
$ Loss Assigned 
150.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
ATM Problem: ATM vandalized 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
30,000.00 2 
75,000.00 1 
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ATM Problem; Replenishment cash stolen by service team 
individuals 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
800.00 1 
ATM Problem: Electronic attack on data communication 
. lines 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
2,000.00 1 
ATM Problem; Manipulation of ATM software 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
0.00 0 
ATM Problem: Flaws in system procedures which allow one 
customer to withdraw cash from another 
account 
$ Loss Assigned 
500.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
ATM Problem: Other 
$ Loss Assigned 
300.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 . 
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APPENDIX K 
Reported Dollar Losses per ATM for Each Problem Area 
Raw Data 
ATM Problem: Card reported stolen 
$ Loss Assigned 
16.67 
17.39 
50.00 
80.00 
100.00 
156.25 
220.00 
277.78 
333.33 
476.19 
5,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
ATM Problem: Card reported lost 
$ Loss Assigned 
16.67 
20.00 
31.25 
220.00 
333.33 
462.96 
476.19 
1,875.00 
'5,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: Card counterfeiting operations 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
1,250.00 1 
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ATM Problem: Unauthorized use by family, friend, or 
acquaintance 
$ Loss Assigned 
14.29 
16.67 
20.00 
25.00 
86.96 
92.59 
97.50 
200.00 
312.50 
676.47 
1,200.00 
2,500.00 
10,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
' 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: Misrepresentations of ATM transactions 
$ Loss Assigned 
97.50 
166.67 
2,058.82 
3,750.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: Overdraft resulting from empty envelope 
deposits 
$ Loss Assigned 
2.82 
10.00 
25.00 
31.25 
50.00 
86.96 
100.00 
119.05 
142.86 
352.94 
390.00 
462.96 
1,000.00 
25,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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ATM Problem; Stolen/fraudulent check deposited in ATM 
followed by withdrawal against insufficient 
funds 
$ Loss Assigned 
66.67 
146.25 
297.62 
1,500.00 
4,558.82 
25,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem; Off-line 
$ Loss Assigned 
28.57 
100.00 
119.05 
121.74 
200.00 
243.75 
342.60 
437.50 
500.00 
882.35 
925.93 
1,667.67 
overdraft 
Number of Respondents 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATM Problem: False reporting that ATM dispensed 
incorrect funds 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
30.00 1 
ATM Problem; ATM vandalized 
$ Loss Assigned 
150.00 
176.47 
3,000.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
1 
1 
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ATM Problem: Replenishment cash stolen by service team 
individuals 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
34.78 1 
ATM Problem; Electronic attack on data communication 
lines 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
10.00 1 
ATM Problem: Manipulation of ATM software 
$ Loss Assigned Number of Respondents 
0.00 0 
ATM Problem: Flaws in system procedures which allow one 
customer to withdraw cash from another 
account 
$ Loss Assigned 
166.67 
Number of Respondents 
1 
ATM Problem: Other 
$ Loss Assigned 
60.00 
Number of Respondents 
1 
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APPENDIX L 
Rankings of the Locations 
Raw Data 
Location 1 
Rank 
2 3 N 
Main office of the bank ’ 5 6 3 14 
Branch offices of the bank 10 7 6 23 
Shopping centers 9 8 7 24 
Supermarkets 4 6 11 21 
Transportation terminals 4 4 3 11 
Hospitals 0 0 0 0 
Office building lobbies 0 1 2 3 
Residential neighborhoods 3 1 3 7 
Other 0 2 0 2 
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APPENDIX M 
Calculations for the Average of the Weighted Ranks 
for the Locations 
The weighted ranks for each location were calculated 
in the following manner. First, the scale was reflected 
(i.e., a respondent rank of 1 was given a corresponding 
weight of 3; a respondent rank of 2 was given a 
corresponding weight of 2; a respondent rank of 3 was 
given a corresponding weight of 1). Next, the weight 
assigned to each rank was multiplied by the corresponding 
number of respondents who assigned the rank to a given 
location, and the values obtained for each location were 
summed. Finally, each summed value was divided by the 
total number of respondents (35). 
Example 
Location: Main office of the bank 
3 (5)+2(6)+1(3) 
Average weighted rank = 35 
= 0.86 
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APPENDIX N 
Calculations for the Median and Quartile Deviation 
for the Locations 
The following intervals were established to 
correspond with the ranks assigned by the respondents: 
Rank Interval 
1 0.5 - 1.5 
2 1.5 
3 2.5 
Main office of the bank 
Mdn = 1.5+(2/6)(1) = 1.83 
Q = (2.5-1.3)/2 = 0.60 
Branch offices of the bank 
Mdn = 1.5+(2/7)(1) = 1.79 
Q = (2.5-1.1)/2 = 0.70 
Shopping centers 
Mdn = 1.5+(3/8)(1) = 1.88 
Q = (2.64-1.17)/2 = 0.74 
2.5 
3.5 
Qx = 0.5+(4/5)(1) =1.3 
Q3 = 2.5 
Qx = 0.5+(6/10)(1) =1.1 
Q3 = 2.5 
Q1 = 0.5+(6/9)(1) = 1.17 
Q. = 2.5+(1/7)(1) = 2.64 
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1.67 
Supermarkets 
Mdn = 2.5+(1/11)(1) = 2.59 
Q = (3.05-1.67)/2 = 0.69 
Transportation terminals 
Mdn = 1.5+(2/4)(1) = 2.00 
Q = (2.5-1.25)/2 = 0.63 
Office building lobbies 
Mdn = 2.5+(1/2)(1) = 3.00 
Q = (3-2.5)/2 = 0.25 
Residential neighborhoods 
Mdn =2.50 
Q = (2.83-1.17)/2 = 0.83 
Other 
Mdn = 1.5+(1/2)(1) = 2.00 
Q = (2.5-2)/2 = 0.25 
Qi = 1.5+(l/6)(1) 
Q3 = 2.5+(6/11)(1) = 3.05 
Qx = 0.5+(3/4)(1) = 1.25 
Q3 = 2.5 
Qx = 2.5 
Q3 = 2.5+(1/2)(1) = 3 
Qx = 0.5+(2/3)(1) = 1.17 
Q3 = 2.5+(1/3)(1) =2.83 
Q1 = 1.5+(1/2)(1) = 2 
Q3 2.5 
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APPENDIX O 
Chi-Square Tests for the Location Ranks 
Three chi-square tests were performed in order to 
determine whether the differences in the assignment of 
each of the three ranks to the nine locations were 
significant. In each of these tests, the observed 
frequency consisted of the number of respondents who 
assigned a given rank to a given location, and the 
expected frequency was determined by dividing the total 
number of respondents (35) by the number of locations 
(9). These tests are shown on the following pages. 
175 
RANK: 1 
Location 
Main office of the bank 
Branch offices of the bank 
Shopping centers 
Supermarkets 
Transportation terminals 
Hospitals 
Office building lobbies 
Residential neighborhoods 
Other 
Observed 
(0) 
Expected 
(E) 
f 0-E) — 
E 
5 3.889 0.317 
10 3.889 9.603 
9 3.889 6.717 
4 3.889 0.003 
4 3.889 0.003 
0 3.889 3.889 
0 3.889 3.889 
3 3.889 0.203 
0 3.889 3.889 
Chi-Scruare: 
df: 
prob: 
28.514 
8 
. 0004 
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RANK: 2 
Location 
Observed 
(0) 
Expected 
(E) 
(0-E}— 
E 
Main office of the bank 6 3.889 1.146 
Branch offices of the bank 7 3.889 2.489 
Shopping centers 8 3.889 4.346 
Supermarkets 6 3.889 1.146 
Transportation terminals 4 3.889 0.003 
Hospitals 0 3.889 3.889 
Office building lobbies 1 3.889 2.146 
Residential neighborhoods 1 3.889 2.146 
Other 2 3.889 0.917 
Chi-Scruare: 
df: 
prob: 
18.229 
8 
.0196 
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RANK 3 
Location 
Observed 
(0) 
Expected 
(E) 
(O-E}— 
E 
Main office of the bank 3 3.889 0. , 203 
Branch offices of the bank 6 3.889 1. , 146 
Shopping centers 7 3.889 2. .489 
Supermarkets 11 3.889 13 . . 003 
Transportation terminals 3 3.889 0. . 203 
Hospitals 0 3.889 3 . . 889 
Office building lobbies 2 3.889 0. .917 
Residential neighborhoods 3 3.889 0, .203 
Other 0 3.889 3 , .889 
Chi-Sauare: 25.943 
df: 8 
prob: .0011 
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APPENDIX P 
Rankings of Countermeasure Effectiveness 
Raw Data 
Countermeasure 
Rank 
12 3 4 
Increase level of security- 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
2 3 4 1 
5 7 8 6 
10 11 4 3 
3 9 5 6 
0 0 3 3 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 10 3 4 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 0114 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 0010 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 2 1 .2 2 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 4014 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 0124 
Other 0 0 10 
5 
1 
1 
5 
1 
2 
6 
1 
2 
5 
5 
7 
0 
N 
11 
27 
33 
24 
8 
26 
7 
3 
12 
14 
14 
1 
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APPENDIX Q 
Calculations for the Average of the Weighted Ranks 
for Countermeasure Effectiveness 
The weighted ranks for the effectiveness of each 
countermeasure were calculated in the following manner. 
First, the scale was reflected (i.e., a respondent rank 
of 1 was given a corresponding weight of 5; a respondent 
rank of 2 was given a corresponding weight of 4; a 
respondent rank of 3 was given a corresponding weight of 
3; a respondent rank of 4 was given a corresponding 
weight of 2; and a respondent rank of 5 was given a 
corresponding weight of 1). Next, the weight assigned to 
each rank was multiplied by the corresponding number of 
respondents who assigned the rank to a given 
countermeasure, and the values obtained for each 
countermeasure were summed. Finally, each summed value 
was divided by the total number of respondents (36). 
Example 
Countermeasure: Increase level of security awareness 
among bank employees through meetings, 
seminars, etc. 
sm+4 f3)+3 m+2 m+im 
Average weighted rank = 36 
= 1.03 
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APPENDIX R 
Calculations for the Median and Quartile Deviation 
for Countermeasure Effectiveness 
The following intervals were established to 
correspond with the ranks assigned by the respondents: 
Rank Interval 
1 0.5 - 1.5 
2 1.5 - 2.5 
3 2.5 - 3.5 
4 3.5 - 4.5 
5 4.5 - 5.5 
Increase level of security awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Mdn = 2.5+ (1/4) (1) = 2.75 Q± = 1.5+(1/3)(1) = 1.83 
Q3 = 2.5+(3/4)(1) =3.25 
Q = (3.25-1.83)/2 = 0.71 
Increase level of security awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the importance of 
nondisclosure of PINs and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Mdn = 2.5+(2/8)(1) = 2.75 Q± = 1.5+(2/7)(l) = 1.79 
Q3 = 3.5 
Q = (3.5—1.79)/2 = 0.86 
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Have 90% - 100% of ATMs camera-equipped 
Mdn = 1.5+(7/11)(1) = 2.14 
Q = (3•5-1.3)/2 = 1.10 
Q-L = 0.5+ (8/10) (1) =1.3 
Q3 = 3.5 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcardinq faction which captures an 
ATM card the next time it is used 
Mdn = 2.50 Qx = 1.5+(3/9)(1) = 1.83 
Q3 = 3.5+(1/6)(1) =3.67 
Q = (3.67-1.83)/2 = 0.92 
Reduce the number of incorrect PIN tries allowed 
Mdn = 3.5+(1/3)(1) = 3.83 =.2.5+(2/3)(1) = 3.17 
Q3 = 4’5 
Q = (4.5-3.17J/2 = 0.67 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal capabilities 
Mdn = 2.50 Q± = 0.5+(7/10)(1) 
Q3 = 4.5 
Q = (4.5-1.2)/2 = 1.65 
1.2 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 
Mdn = 3.5+ (2/4) (1) = 4.00 = 3.5 
Q3 = 3.5+(3/4)(1) =4.25 
Q = (4.25-3.5)/2 = 0.38 
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Increase the number of unannounced internal audits 
Mdn = 4.5+(1/2)(1) = 5.00 
Q = (5-3.5)/2 = 0.75 
Qx = 3.5 
Q3 = 4.5+(1/2)(1) = 5 
Improve the level of communication between banking 
institutions on security-related issues 
Mdn = 3.5+(1/2)(1) = 4.00 Q1 = 2.5 
Q3 = 4.5+(2/5)(1) =4.9 
Q = (4.9-2.5)/2 = 1.20 
Substitute the use of PINs with other methods of 
confirming the customer's identity fi.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 
Mdn = 3.5+(2/4)(1) = 4.00 Q± = 1.5 
Q3 = 4.5+(2/5)(1) =4.9 
Q = (4.9-1.5J/2 = 1.70 
Enact stricter legislation for the prosecution of 
ATM fraud perpetrators 
Mdn = 4.50 Q± = 3.5+(l/4)(l) = 3.75 
Q3 = 4.5+(4/7)(1) = 5.07 
Q = (5.07-3.75)/2 = 0.66 
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APPENDIX S 
Chi-Square Tests for Countermeasure Effectiveness Ranks 
Five chi-square tests were performed in order to 
determine whether the differences in the assignment of 
each of the five ranks to the twelve countermeasures were 
significant. In each of these tests, the observed 
frequency consisted of the number of respondents who 
assigned a given rank to a given countermeasure, and the 
expected frequency was determined by dividing the total 
number of respondents (36) by the number of 
countermeasures (12). These tests are shown on the 
following pages. 
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RANK: 1 
Observed 
m Countermeasure 
Expected (O-E)— 
CEJ_E 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 2 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 5 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-eguipped 10 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 3 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 0 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 10 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 0 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 0 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 2 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 4 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 0 
Other 0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0.333 
1.333 
16.333 
0.000 
3.000 
16.333 
3.000 
3.000 
3 0.333 
3 0.333 
3 3.000 
3 3.000 
Chi-Scruare: 
df: 
prob: 
50.000 
11 
0 
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RANK: 2 
Observed Expected 
Countermeasure£OJ(E) 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 3 3 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 7 3 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 11 - 3 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 9 3 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 0 3 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 3 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 1 3 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 0 3 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 1 3 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 0 3 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 1 3 
Other 0 3 
(O-E)— 
E 
0.000 
5.333 
21.333 
12.000 
3.000 
0.000 
1.333 
3.000 
1.333 
3.000 
1.333 
3.000 
Chi-Square: 
df: 
prob: 
54.667 
11 
0 
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RANK: 3 
Observed Expected 
Countermeasure (O)(E) 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 4 3 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 8 3 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 4 3 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 5 3 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 3 3 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 4 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 1 3 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 1 3 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 2 3 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 1 3 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 2 3 
Other 1 3 
(0-E)— 
E 
0.333 
8.333 
0.333 
1.333 
0.000 
0.333 
1.333 
1.333 
0.333 
1.333 
0.333 
1.333 
Chi-Scruare: 
df: 
prob: 
16.667 
11 
. 1181 
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RANK: 4 
Observed Expected 
Countermeasure fp)Q3). 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 1 3 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 6 3 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 3 3 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 6 3 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 3 3 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 3 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 4 3 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 0 3 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 2 3 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 4 3 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 4 ' 3 
Other 0 3 
Chi-Square: 
df: 
prob: 
(O-E)— 
E 
1.333 
3.000 
0.000 
3.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.333 
3.000 
0.333 
0.333 
0.333 
3.000 
14.667 
11 
. 1983 
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RANK: 5 
Countermeasure 
Observed 
COj 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 1 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 1 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 5 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 1 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 2 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 6 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 1 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 2 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 5 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 5 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 7 
Other 0 
Expected 
CEj 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Chi-Souare: 
df: 
prob: 
(0-E)— 
E 
1.333 
1.333 
1.333 
1.333 
0.333 
3.000 
1.333 
0.333 
1.333 
1.333 
5.333 
3.000 
21.333 
11 
. 0301 
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APPENDIX T 
Rankings of Countermeasure Cost 
Raw Data 
Countermeasure 
Rank 
1 2 3 4_5 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
2 12 15 
2 9 8 5 3 
15 9 6 1 2 
2 7 10 4 1 
0 0 0 6 2 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 1 5 2 6 12 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 00142 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 02010 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 11334 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 13 0 1 0 0 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 01355 
Other 0 10 0 0 
N 
11 
27 
33 
24 
8 
26 
7 
3 
12 
14 
14 
1 
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APPENDIX U 
Calculations for the Average of the Weighted Ranks 
for Countermeasure Cost 
The weighted ranks for the cost of each 
countermeasure were calculated in the following manner. 
First, the scale was reflected (i.e., a respondent rank 
of 1 was given a corresponding weight of 5; a respondent 
rank of 2 was given a corresponding weight of 4; a 
respondent rank of 3 was given a corresponding weight of 
3; a respondent rank of 4 was given a corresponding 
weight of 2; and a respondent rank of 5 was given a 
corresponding weight of 1). Next, the weight assigned to 
each rank was multiplied by the corresponding number of 
respondents who assigned the rank to a given 
countermeasure, and the values obtained for each 
countermeasure were summed. Finally, each summed value 
was divided by the total number of respondents (36). 
Example 
Countermeasure: Increase level of security awareness 
among bank employees through meetings, 
seminars, etc. 
5(2)+4 (l)+3 (2)+2 m+l(5) 
Average weighted rank = 36 
= 0.75 
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APPENDIX V 
Calculations for the Median and Quartile Deviation 
for Countermeasure Cost 
The following intervals were established to 
correspond with the ranks assigned by the respondents: 
Rank Interval' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0.5 - 1.5 
1.5 - 2.5 
2.5 - 3.5 
3.5 - 4.5 
4.5 - 5.5 
Increase level of security awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Mdn =4.50 Qx = 2.5 
Q3 = 4.5+(2/5)(1) =4.9 
Q = (4.9-2.5)/2 = 1.20 
Increase level of security awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the importance of 
nondisclosure of PINs and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Mdn = 2.5+(3/8)(1) = 2.88 Q± = 1.5+(5/9)(l) = 2.06 
Q3 = 3.5+(1/5)(1) = 3.7 
Q = (3.7-2.06)/2 = 0.82 
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Have 90% - 100% of ATMs camera-equipped 
Mdn = 1.5+(2/9)(1) = 1.72 Q± = 0.5+(8/15)(1) = 1.03 
Q3 = 2.5+(1/6)(1) =2.67 
Q = (2.67-1.03)/2 = 0.82 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding (action which captures an 
ATM card the next time it is used 
Mdn = 2.5+(3/10)(1) = 2.80 = 1.5+(4/7)(l) = 2.07 
Q3 = 2.5+(9/10)(1) = 3.4 
Q = (3.4-2.07)/2 = 0.66 
Reduce the number of incorrect PIN tries allowed 
Mdn = 3.5+(4/6)(1) = 4.17 Q± = 3.5+(2/6)(l) = 3.83 
Q3 = 4.5 
Q = (4.5-3.83)/2 = 0.33 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal capabilities 
Mdn = 3.5+(5/6)(1) = 4.33 Q± = 2.5+(l/2)(l) = 3 
Q3 = 4.5+ (6/12 ) (1) = 5 
Q = (5-3)/2 = 1.00 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 
Mdn = 3.5+(3/4)(1) = 4.25 Q± = 3.5+(l/4)(l) = 3.75 
Q3 = 4.5 
Q = (4.5-3.75)/2 = 0.38 
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Increase the number of unannounced internal audits 
Mdn = 2.50 Q-L = 1.5+ (1/2) (1) = 2 
Q3 = 2.5 
Q = (2.5-2)/2 = 0.25 
Improve the level of communication between banking 
institutions on security-related issues 
Mdn = 3.5+(1/3)(1) = 3.83 Q± = 2.5+(l/3)(l) = 2.83 
Q3 = 4.5+(1/4)(1) = 4.75 
Q = (4.75-2.83)/2 = 0.96 
Substitute the use of PINs with other methods of 
confirming the customer's identity (i.e.. fingerprint 
recognition) 
Mdn = 0.5+(7/13)(1) = 1.04 Q± = 0.5+(4/13)(1) = 0.81 
Q3 = 0.5+(11/13)(1) = 1.35 
Q = (1.35-0.81)/2 = 0.27 
Enact stricter legislation for the prosecution of 
ATM fraud perpetrators 
Mdn = 3.5+(3/5)(1) = 4.10 Q± = 3.5 
Q3 = 4.5+(2/5)(1) =4.9 
Q = (4.9-3.5)/2 = 0.70 
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APPENDIX W 
Chi-Square Tests for Countermeasure Cost Ranks 
Five chi-square tests were performed in order to 
determine whether the differences in the assiqnment of 
each of the five ranks to the twelve countermeasures were 
siqnificant. In each of these tests, the observed 
frequency consisted of the number of respondents who 
assigned a given rank to a given countermeasure, and the 
expected frequency was determined by dividing the total 
number of respondents (36) by the number of 
countermeasures (12). These tests are shown on the 
following pages. 
RANK; 1 
Observed 
m Countermeasure 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 2 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 2 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 15 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 2 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 0 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 1 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 0 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 0 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 1 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 13 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 0 
Expected 
CEJ 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
(0-E)— 
E 
0.333 
0.333 
48.000 
0.333 
3.000 
1.333 
3.000 
3.000 
1.333 
33.333 
3.000 
3.000' 
Chi-Scruare: 
df; 
prob: 
Other 0 
100.000 
11 
0 
RANK: 2 
Observed Expected 
Countermeasure(OJ(E) 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 1 3 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 9 3 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 9 3 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 7 3 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 0 3 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 5 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 0 3 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 2 3 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 1 3 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 0 3 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 1 3 
Other 1 3 
Chi-Scruare: 
df: 
prob: 
(0-E)— 
E 
1.333 
12.000 
12.000 
5.333 
3.000 
1.333 
3.000 
0.333 
1.333 
3.000 
1.333 
1.333 
45.333 
11 
0 
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RANK: 3 
Observed 
CO) Countermeasure 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 2 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 8 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 6 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 10 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 0 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 2 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 1 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 0 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 3 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 1 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 3 
Other 0 
Expected 
m 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
(0-E)— 
E 
0.333 
8.333 
3.000 
16.333 
3.000 
0.333 
1.333 
3.000 
3 0.000 
3 1.333 
3 0.000 
3 3.000 
Chi-Square: 40.000 
df: 11 
prob: 0 
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RANK: 4 
Observed Expected 
Countermeasure(OJ(E) 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 1 3 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 5 3 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 1 3 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 4 3 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 6 3 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 6 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 4 3 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 1 3 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 3 3 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 0 3 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 5 3 
Other 0 3 
Chi-Square: 
df: 
prob: 
(0-E)— 
E 
1.333 
1.333 
1.333 
0.333 
3.000 
3.000 
0.333 
1.333 
0.000 
3.000 
1.333 
3.000 
19.333 
11 
. 0554 
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RANK; 5 
Observed Expected 
Countermeasure(OJ£EJ 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 5 3 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers 3 3 
Have 90% - 100% ATMs 
camera-equipped 2 3 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 1 3 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 2 3 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 12 
Generate a fraud suspect list 
each day 2 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal audits 0 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 4 3 
Substitute the use of PINs with 
other methods of confirming the 
customer's identity 0 3 
Enact stricter legislation for 
the prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 5 3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
(Q-E)— 
E 
1.333 
0.000 
0.333 
1.333 
0.333 
27.000 
0.333 
3.000 
0.333 
3.000 
1.333 
3.000 
Chi-Sauare; 
df; 
prob; 
Other 0 
41.333 
11 
0 
APPENDIX X 
Male/Female Rankings of the ATM Problems 
Raw Data 
ATM Problem 
Card reported stolen 
Card reported lost 
Card counterfeiting operations 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 
Off-line overdraft 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 
ATM vandalized 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 
Manipulation of ATM software 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 
Other 
Male Rankings 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
2 
0 
1 
8 
0 
0 
0 
4 
2 
0 
2 
2 
0 
1 
6 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
6 
0 
3 
0 
3 
1 
0 0 0 
3 
4 
1 
0 
0 
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
N 
16 
15 
1 
15 
13 
7 
16 
5 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
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ATM Problem 
Female Rankings 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Card reported stolen 
Card reported lost 
Card counterfeiting operations 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
3 
1 
0 
2 
3 
0 
1 
1 
0 
9 
9 
0 
14 
7 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by* withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 
2 2 3 4 4 15 
3 110 1 6 
Off-line overdraft 4 2 12 3 12 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 00201 
ATM vandalized 0 0 2 0 2 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
3 
4 
0 
1 
Manipulation of ATM software 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 
0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX Y 
Calculations for the Mann-Whitney U Test 
Rankings of the ATM Problems 
by Male and Female Respondents 
For both male and female respondents, the weighted 
ranks for each problem were calculated in the following 
manner. First, the scale was reflected (i.e., a 
respondent rank of 1 was given a corresponding weight of 
5; a respondent rank of 2 was given a corresponding 
weight of 4 ? a respondent rank of 3 was given a 
corresponding weight of 3 ? a respondent rank of 4 was 
given a corresponding weight of 2; and a respondent rank 
of 5 was given a corresponding weight of 1). Next, the 
weight assigned to each rank was multiplied by the 
corresponding number of respondents who assigned the rank 
to a given problem, and the values obtained for each 
problem were summed. Then, each summed value was divided 
by the number of respondents within each category. Since 
there were twenty-one male and sixteen female respondents 
who ranked the ATM problems according to the directions 
given in Part I of the questionnaire (Appendix C), the 
denominator used to compute the average of the weighted 
ranks for each problem for the male respondents was 21, 
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and the denominator used to compute the average of the 
weighted ranks for each problem for the female 
respondents was 16. 
The values obtained for the average of the weighted 
ranks were then ranked in one composite distribution in a 
descending order of size. The values of these overall 
ranks were summed, and used in the computations to obtain 
the values of U for both the male and female respondents. 
These calculations are shown on the following pages 
for both the male and female respondents. 
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Avg of Avg of 
Wtd 
Ranks 
ATM Problem Males 
Overall 
Rank 
Males 
Wtd 
Ranks 
Females 
Overall 
Rank 
Females 
Card reported stolen 2.33 6 1.81 7 
Card reported lost 1.76 8.5 1.75 10 
Card counterfeiting 
operations 0.05 25 0.00 28 
Unauthorized use by 
family, friend, or 
acquaintance 2.76 2 2.94 1 
Misrepresentations 
of ATM transactions 0.48 15.5 1.19 12 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 1.76 8.5 2.44 4 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 1.05 13 1.44 11 
Off-line overdraft 2.67 3 2.38 5 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 0.48 15.5 0.44 17 
ATM vandalized 0.43 18 0.50 14 
Replenishment cash 
stolen by service 
team individuals 0.19 22.5 0.00 28 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 0.24 20.5 0.13 24 
Manipulation of 
ATM software 0.24 20.5 0.00 28 
Flaws in system 
procedures which allow 
one customer to 
withdraw cash from 
another account 0.38 19 0.00 28 
Other 0.19 22.5 0.00 28 
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The sum of the fifteen overall ranks for the male 
respondents (RM) was 220. This value was used to obtain 
the U statistic for the males: 
% * N1N2 
15(16) 
= 15(15) +2 - 220 
= 225 + 120 - 220 
= 125 
The sum of the fifteen overall ranks for the female 
respondents (Rp) was 245. This value was used to obtain 
the U statistic for the females: 
N21N2.± ,1) 
Up — N1N2 t T" “ Rp 
15(16) 
= 15(15) +2 - 245 
= 225 + 120 - 245 
= 100 
The smaller of the two U values was used when reference 
was made to the table of critical values of U in the 
Mann-Whitney Test. With alpha equal to .01, no 
significant difference was found between the rankings of 
the ATM problems assigned by the male respondents, and 
those assigned by the female respondents. 
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APPENDIX Z 
Male/Female Rankings of Countermeasure Effectiveness 
Raw Data 
Countermeasure 
Male Rankings 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card ' 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
113 
3 4 2 
6 6 3 
0 5 4 
0 0 2 
117 
4 1 14 
0 3 18 
2 1 12 
3 16 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 6 2 1 3 3 15 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 0 10 3 0 4 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 00101 2 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 20124 9 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 20112 6 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 01113 6 
Other 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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Countermeasure 
Female Rankings 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
12 1 
2 3 6 
4 5 1 
3 4 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 4 
2 0 13 
3 2 15 
4 0 12 
0 12 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 4 1 3 0 3 11 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 0 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 01101 3 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 20033 8 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 00134 8 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX AA 
Calculations for the Mann-Whitney U Test 
Rankings of Countermeasure Effectiveness 
by Male and Female Respondents 
For both male and female respondents, the weighted 
ranks for the effectiveness of each countermeasure were 
calculated in the following manner. First, the scale was 
reflected (i.e., a respondent rank of 1 was given a 
corresponding weight of 5; a respondent rank of 2 was 
given a corresponding weight of 4; a respondent rank of 3 
was given a corresponding weight of 3 ? a respondent rank 
of 4 was given a corresponding weight of 2; and a 
respondent rank of 5 was given a corresponding weight of 
1). Next, the weight assigned to each rank was 
multiplied by the corresponding number of respondents who 
assigned the rank to a given countermeasure, and the 
values obtained for each countermeasure were summed. 
Then, each summed value was divided by the number of 
respondents within each category. Since there were 
twenty male and sixteen female respondents who ranked the 
effectiveness of the countermeasures according to the 
directions given in Part II of the questionnaire 
(Appendix C), the denominator used to compute the average 
of the weighted ranks for each countermeasure for the 
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male respondents was 20, and the denominator used to 
compute the average of the weighted ranks for each 
countermeasure for the female respondents was 16. 
The values obtained for the average of the weighted 
ranks were then ranked in one composite distribution in a 
descending order of size. The values of these overall 
ranks were summed, and used in the computations to obtain 
the values of U for both the male and female respondents. 
These calculations are shown on the following pages 
for both the male and female respondents. 
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Countermeasure 
Avg of Avg of 
Wtd Overall Wtd Overall 
Ranks Rank Ranks Rank 
Males Males Females Females 
Increase level of 
security awareness among 
bank employees 1.05 10.5 1.00 12 
Increase level of 
security awareness among 
customers 2.30 6 2.75 3 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 3.30 1 3.19 2 
Have 24-hour on-line 
hotcarding 1.85 8 2.63 4 
Reduce the number of 
incorrect PIN tries 
allowed 0.65 15 0.25 20 
Eliminate off-line 
withdrawal capabilities 2.50 5 2.25 7 
Generate a fraud suspect 
list each day 0.50 17.5 0.38 19 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal 
audits 0.20 21 0.06 23 
Improve the level of 
communication between 
banking institutions on 
security-related issues 1.05 10.5 0.50 17 
Substitute the use of PINs 
with other methods of 
confirming the customer's 
identity 0.85 13 1.19 9 
Enact stricter legislation 
for the prosecution of 
ATM fraud perpetrators 0.60 16 0.81 14 
Other 0.15 22 0.00 24 
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The sum of the twelve overall ranks for the male 
respondents (RM) was 145.5. This value was used to 
obtain the U statistic for the males: 
N-lINj. + 1) 
NxN2 + “ 2 “ % 
12(13) 
12(12) +2 - 145.5 
144 + 78 - 145.5 
76.5 
The sum of the twelve overall ranks for the female 
respondents (Rp) was 154.5. This value was used to 
obtain the U statistic for the females: 
N2IN2^_1)„ 
UF = NxN2 + ~ 2 - Rf 
12(13) 
= 12(12) +2 - 154.5 
= 144 + 78 - 154.5 
= 67.5 
The smaller of the two U values was used when reference 
was made to the table of critical values of U in the 
Mann-Whitney Test. With alpha equal to .01, no 
significant difference was found between the rankings of 
the effectiveness of the countermeasures assigned by the 
male respondents, and those assigned by the female 
respondents. 
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APPENDIX AB 
Senior/Middle/Lower Management Rankings of ATM Problems 
Raw Data 
ATM Problem 
Senior Mgmt Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Card reported stolen 113 11 7 
Card reported lost 2 0 1 4 2 
Card counterfeiting operations 0 0 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 
2 6 12 0 
0 2 0 0 3 
9 
0 
11 
5 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 
0 12 15 9 
3 110 1 6 
Off-line overdraft 5 12 11 10 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 00120 
ATM vandalized 0 12 10 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
3 
4 
1 
0 
Manipulation of ATM software 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 
0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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ATM Problem 
Middle Mgmt Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Card reported stolen 12 12 
Card reported lost 
Card counterfeiting operations 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 
2 
0 0 
0 2 
0 
0 0 
8 
8 
0 
7 
2 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 
1 0 5 2 1 9 
1112 0 5 
Off-line overdraft 4 2 0 0 5 11 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 0 0 0 1 1 2 
ATM vandalized 0 0 10 0 1 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 110 
1 
2 
Manipulation of ATM software 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 0 0 
1 
2 
Other 0 10 0 0 1 
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ATM Problem 
Lower Mgmt Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Card reported stolen 2 2 4 1 1 10 
Card reported lost 
Card counterfeiting operations 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 
0 
0 
0 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 11112 
7 
1 
11 
6 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 
2 3 3 1 1 10 
0 10 10 2 
Off-line overdraft 3 10 12 7 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 00201 3 
ATM vandalized 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 
Manipulation of ATM software 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX AC 
Calculations for the Chi-Square Approximation 
of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
Rankings of the ATM Problems 
by Senior/Middle/Lower Management 
For the senior, middle, and lower level managers, 
the weighted ranks for each problem were calculated in 
the following manner. First, the scale was reflected 
(i.e., a respondent rank of 1 was given a corresponding 
weight of 5? a respondent rank of 2 was given a 
corresponding weight of 4; a respondent rank of 3 was 
given a corresponding weight of 3; a respondent rank of 4 
was given a corresponding weight of 2; and a respondent 
rank of 5 was given a corresponding weight of 1). Next, 
the weight assigned to each rank was multiplied by the 
corresponding number of respondents who assigned the rank 
to a given problem, and the values obtained for each 
problem were summed. Then, each summed value was divided 
by the number of respondents within each category. Since 
there were thirteen senior level managers, twelve middle 
level managers, and twelve lower level managers who 
ranked the ATM problems according to the directions given 
in Part I of the questionnaire (Appendix C), the 
denominator used to compute the average of the weighted 
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ranks for each problem for the senior level managers was 
13, the denominator used to compute the average of the 
weighted ranks for each problem for the middle level 
managers was 12, and the denominator used to compute the 
average of the weighted ranks for each problem for the 
lower level managers was 12. 
The values obtained for the average of the weighted 
ranks were then ranked in one composite distribution in a 
descending order of size. The values of these overall 
ranks were summed, and used in the computations to obtain 
the value of H. 
These calculations are shown on the following pages 
for the three groups of respondents. 
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Avg Over- Avg Over- Avg Over 
Wtd all Wtd all Wtd all 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
ATM Problem Sr Sr Mid Mid Low Low 
Card reported stolen 1.62 14 2.00 9 2.75 5.5 
Card reported lost 1.77 12.5 2.25 7 1.25 18 
Card counterfeiting • 
operations 0.00 40.5 0.00 40.5 0.08 35 
Unauthorized use by 
family, friend, or 
acquaintance 3.15 2 1.92 10.5 3.42 1 
Misrepresentations 
of ATM transactions 0.85 20 0.17 31.5 1.33 15.5 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 1.31 17 2.08 8 2.83 4 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 1.77 12.5 1.33 15.5 0.50 24 
Off-line overdraft 2.92 3 2.75 5.5 1.92 10.5 
False reporting that 
ATM dispensed incorrect • 
funds 0.54 23 0.25 28.5 0.58 22 
ATM vandalized 0.92 19 0.25 28.5 0.17 31.5 
Replenishment cash 
stolen by service 
team individuals 0.15 34 0.17 31.5 0.00 40.5 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 0.00 40.5 0.42 25.5 0.17 31.5 
Manipulation of 
ATM software 0.00 40.5 0.42 25.5 0.00 40.5 
Flaws in system 
procedures which allow 
one customer to 
withdraw cash from 
another account 0.00 40.5 0.67 21 0.00 40.5 
• 
Other 0.00 40.5 0.33 27 0.00 40.5 
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The sums of the fifteen overall ranks for the senior 
level managers (Rs), middle level managers (RM), and 
lower level managers (RL) were 359.5, 315, and 360.5, 
respectively. These values were used to obtain the H 
statistic for the three groups: 
12 [ R 
H = N (N +1) [ N" 
[ 
2 p — p — 
S —L 
»S + Nm + Nl ] - 3 (N + 1) 
= 45(46) 
359.5— 
15 
315— 
15 
360.5— 1 
15 - 3(46) 
= .005797 (8616.0167 + 6615 + 8664.0167) - 138 
= 138.52193 - 138 
= .52193 
The H statistic is interpreted in the same manner as chi- 
square, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of categories minus 1. Here, the number of degrees of 
freedom is equal to 2. At the .01 level of significance, 
the value of H is not significant. 
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APPENDIX AD 
Senior/Middle/Lower Management Rankings of 
Countermeasure Effectiveness - Raw Data 
Countermeasure 
Senior Mgmt Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
112 10 
2 14 3 0 
3 6 0 1 2 
0 2 2 3 0 
0 0 2 1 1 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 5 10 0 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 0 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 00000 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 10122 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 10111 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 01014 
Other 0 0 10 0 
N 
5 
10 
12 
7 
4 
9 
1 
0 
6 
4 
6 
1 
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Countermeasure 
Middle Mgmt Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
1110 0 
2 4 2 1 1 
2 3 2 1 1 
2 2 2 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 3 112 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 0 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 10102 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 00012 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 00111 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
N 
3 
10 
9 
8 
1 
10 
3 
1 
4 
3 
3 
0 
221 
Countermeasure 
Lower Mgmt Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
0 110 1 3 
1 2 2 2 0 7 
5 2 2 1 2 12 
15 12 0 9 
0 0 111 3 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 21310 7 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 0 0 111 3 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 00002 2 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 01001 2 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 30022 7 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 00122 5 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX AE 
Calculations for the Chi-Square Approximation 
of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
Rankings of Countermeasure Effectiveness 
by Senior/Middle/Lower Management 
For the senior, middle, and lower level managers, 
the weighted ranks for the effectiveness of each 
countermeasure were calculated in the following manner. 
First, the scale was reflected (i.e., a respondent rank 
of 1 was given a corresponding weight of 5; a respondent 
rank of 2 was given a corresponding weight of 4; a 
respondent rank of 3 was given a corresponding weight of 
3; a respondent rank of 4 was given a corresponding 
weight of 2; and a respondent rank of 5 was given a 
corresponding weight of 1). Next, the weight assigned to 
each rank was multiplied by the corresponding number of 
respondents who assigned the rank to a given 
countermeasure, and the values obtained for each 
countermeasure were summed. Then, each summed value was 
divided by the number of respondents within each 
category. Since there were thirteen senior level 
managers, eleven middle level managers, and twelve lower 
level managers who ranked the effectiveness of the 
countermeasures according to the directions given in Part 
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II of the questionnaire (Appendix C), the denominator 
used to compute the average of the weighted ranks for 
each countermeasure for the senior level managers was 13, 
the denominator used to compute the average of the 
weighted ranks for each countermeasure for the middle 
level managers was 11, and the denominator used to 
compute the average of the weighted ranks for each 
countermeasure for the lower level managers was 12. 
The values obtained for the average of the weighted 
ranks were then ranked in one composite distribution in a 
descending order of size. The values of these overall 
ranks were summed, and used in the computations to obtain 
the H statistic for the senior, middle, and lower level 
managers. 
These calculations are shown on the following pages 
for the three groups of respondents. 
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Countermeasure 
Avg Over- Avg Over- Avg Over- 
Wtd all Wtd all Wtd all 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
Sr Sr_Mid Mid Low Low 
Increase level of 1.31 14 1.09 15 
security awareness 
among bank employees 
Increase level of 2.46 7.5 3.18 3 
security awareness 
among customers 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 3.31 2 2.82 4 
Have 24-hour on-line 
hotcarding 1.54 13 2.45 9 
Reduce the number of 
incorrect PIN tries 
allowed 0.69 21 0.18 32 
0.67 22 
1.92 11 
3.58 1 
2.67 5 
0.50 25.5 
Eliminate off-line 
withdrawal capabilities 2.46 7.5 2.64 6 2.08 10 
Generate a fraud suspect 
list each day 0.31 29 0.55 23.5 0.50 25.5 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal 
audits 0.00 35 0.27 30 0.17 33 
Improve the level of 
communication between 
banking institutions 1.08 16 0.91 17 0.42 27 
Substitute the use of 
PINs with other methods 
of confirming the 
customer's identity 0.85 18 0.36 28 1.75 12 
Enact stricter 
legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 0.77 19 0.55 23.5 0.75 20 
Other 0.23 31 0.00 35 0.00 35 
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The sums of the twelve overall ranks for the senior level 
managers (Rs), middle level managers (RM), and lower 
level managers (RL) were 213, 226, and 227, respectively. 
These values were used to obtain the H statistic for the 
three groups: 
12 
H = N (N + 1) 
12 
= 36(37) 
R — R — 
—M 
R — 
—L 
+ NS + Nl 
213— 
12 
226— 
12 
227— 
12 
] - 3(N + 1) 
] - 3(37) 
= .009 (3780.75 + 4256.33 + 4294.083) - 111 
= 111.09159 - 111 
= .09159 
The H statistic is interpreted in the same manner as chi- 
square, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of categories minus 1. Here, the number of degrees of 
freedom is equal to 2. At the .01 level of significance, 
the value of H is not significant. 
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APPENDIX AF 
Small/Medium/Large Bank Respondents' 
Rankings of ATM Problems - Raw Data 
ATM Problem 
Small Bank Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Card reported stolen 2 
Card reported lost 2 
Card counterfeiting operations 0 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 2 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 0 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 2 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 1 
Off-line overdraft 6 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 0 
ATM vandalized 0 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 0 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 0 
Manipulation of ATM software 1 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 0 
Other 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 0 
10 14 
112 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ATM Problem 
Medium Bank Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Card reported stolen 1 0 2 0 1 
Card reported lost 110 2 1 
Card counterfeiting operations 0 0 0 0 1 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acquaintance 3 5 0 3 0 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 1110 3 
4 
5 
1 
11 
6 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 
115 2 0 
2 112 0 
9 
6 
Off-line overdraft 2 2 0 0 3 7 
False, reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 0 0 0 1 2 
ATM vandalized 0 0 2 1 0 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
3 
3 
0 
0 
Manipulation of ATM software 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 O.o 0 0 
0 
0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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ATM Problem N 
Large Bank Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Card reported stolen 2 13 0 3 
Card reported lost 110 3 1 
Card counterfeiting operations 0 
Unauthorized use by family, 
friend, or acguaintance 
Misrepresentations of ATM 
transactions 
2 2 13 0 
0 10 0 0 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
deposited in ATM followed 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 
0 2 4 0 3 
11110 
Off-line overdraft 4 1111 
False reporting that ATM 
dispensed incorrect funds 00000 
ATM vandalized 0 10 0 2 
Replenishment cash stolen 
by service team individuals 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
Manipulation of ATM software 
Flaws in system procedures 
which allow one customer to 
withdraw cash from another 
account 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
9 
6 
0 
8 
1 
9 
4 
8 
0 
3 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
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APPENDIX AG 
Calculations for the Chi-Square Approximation 
of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
Rankings of the ATM Problems 
by Small/Medium/Large Bank Respondents 
For the respondents from small-, medium-, and large¬ 
sized financial institutions, the weighted ranks for each 
problem were calculated in the following manner. First, 
the scale was reflected (i.e., a respondent rank of 1 was 
given a corresponding weight of 5; a respondent rank of 2 
was given a corresponding weight of 4; a respondent rank 
of 3 was given a corresponding weight of 3; a respondent 
rank of 4 was given a corresponding weight of 2; and a 
respondent rank of 5 was given a corresponding weight of 
1). Next, the weight assigned to each rank was 
multiplied by the corresponding number of respondents who 
assigned the rank to a given problem, and the values 
obtained for each problem were summed. Then, each summed 
value was divided by the number of respondents within 
each category. Since there were sixteen respondents from 
small-sized banks, eleven respondents from medium-sized 
banks, and ten respondents from large-sized banks who 
ranked the ATM problems according to the directions given 
in Part I of the questionnaire (Appendix C), the 
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denominators used to compute the average of the weighted 
ranks for each problem for those from small-, medium-, 
and large-sized banks were 16, 11, and 10, respectively. 
The values obtained for the average of the weighted 
ranks were then ranked in one composite distribution in a 
descending order of size. The values of these overall 
ranks were summed, and used in the computations to obtain 
the value of H. 
These calculations are shown on the following pages 
for the three groups of respondents. 
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Avg Over- Avg Over- Avg Over 
Wtd all Wtd all Wtd all 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
ATM Problem Sm Sm Md Md Lcr Ld 
Card reported stolen 2.50 7 1.09 18 2.60 5 
Card reported lost 2.19 10 1.27 17 1.60 13 
Card counterfeiting 
operations 0.00 40 0.09 34 0.00 40 
Unauthorized use by 
family, friend, or 
acquaintance 2.31 8 3.73 1 2.70 3 
Misrepresentations 
of ATM transactions 0.63 21.5 1.36 16 0.40 25 
Overdraft resulting from 
empty envelope deposits 1.56 14 2.55 6 2.30 9 
Stolen/fraudulent check 
• 
deposited in ATM followed % 
by withdrawal against 
insufficient funds 0.63 21.5 1.91 11.5 1.40 15 
Off-line overdraft 2.69 4 1.91 11.5 3.00 2 
False reporting that 
ATM dispensed incorrect 
funds 0.81 19 0.36 26 0.00 40 
ATM vandalized 0.19 32 0.73 20 0.60 23 
Replenishment cash 
stolen by service 
team individuals 0.13 33 0.00 40 0.20 30.5 
Electronic attack on data 
communication lines 0.31 27.5 0.00 40 0.20 30.5 
Manipulation of 
ATM software 0.31 27.5 0.00 40 0.00 40 
Flaws in system 
procedures which allow 
one customer to 
withdraw cash from 
another account 0.50 24 0.00 40 0.00 40 
Other 0.25 29 0.00 40 0.00 40 
232 
The sums of the fifteen overall ranks for the respondents 
from small- (Rg), medium- (RM), and large-sized (RL) 
financial institutions were 318, 361, and 356, 
respectively. These values were used to obtain the H 
statistic for the three groups: 
-12- r BS“ Em2 Bit 1 
H = N(N + 1) L ^ + Nm + Nl J - 3(N + 1) 
' 12 [ 318— 361— 356— 1 
= 45(46) |_ 15 + 15 + 15 J - 3(46) 
= .005797 (6741.6 + 8688.0667 + 8449.0667) - 138 
= 138.42744 - 138 
= .42744 
The H statistic is interpreted in the same manner as chi- 
square, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of categories minus 1. Here, the number of degrees of 
freedom is equal to 2. At the .01 level of significance, 
the value of H is not significant. 
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APPENDIX AH 
Sma11/Medium/Large Bank Respondents' 
Rankings of Locations 
Raw Data 
Location 
Main office of the bank 
Branch offices of the bank 
Shopping centers 
Supermarkets 
Transportation terminals 
Hospitals 
Office building lobbies 
Residential neighborhoods 
Other 
Small 
1 
1 
2 
5 
1 
3 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Bank Ranks 
2_3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
4 
2 
4 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
N 
5 
8 
10 
7 
6 
0 
2 
1 
0 
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Location 
Main office of the bank 
Branch offices of the bank 
Shopping centers 
Supermarkets 
Transportation terminals 
Hospitals 
Office building lobbies 
Residential neighborhoods 
Other 
Medium Bank Ranks 
1 
3 
3 
4 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
l 
1 
3 
4 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
N 
7 
6 
9 
7 
4 
0 
0 
3 
0 
Location 
Main office of the bank 
Branch offices of the bank 
Shopping centers 
Supermarkets 
Transportation terminals 
Hospitals 
Office building lobbies 
Residential neighborhoods 
Other 
Large Bank Ranks 
1 
1 
5 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
3 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
N 
2 
9 
5 
7 
1 
0 
1 
3 
2 
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APPENDIX AI 
Calculations for the Chi-Square Approximation 
of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
Rankings of the Locations 
by Small/Medium/Large Bank Respondents 
For the respondents from small-, medium-, and large¬ 
sized financial institutions, the weighted ranks for each 
location were calculated in the following manner. First, 
the scale was reflected (i.e., a respondent rank of 1 was 
given a corresponding weight of 3; a respondent rank of 2 
was given a corresponding weight of 2; a respondent rank 
of 3 was given a corresponding weight of 1). Next, the 
weight assigned to each rank was multiplied by the 
corresponding number of respondents who assigned the rank 
to a given location, and the values obtained for each 
location were summed. Then, each summed value was 
divided by the number of respondents within each 
category. Since there were thirteen respondents from 
small-sized banks, twelve respondents from medium-sized 
banks, and ten respondents from large-sized banks who 
ranked the locations according to the directions given in 
Part III of the questionnaire (Appendix C), the 
denominators used to compute the average of the weighted 
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ranks for each location for those from small-, medium-, 
and large-sized banks were 13, 12, and 10, respectively. 
The values obtained for the average of the weighted 
ranks were then ranked in one composite distribution in a 
descending order of size. The values of these overall 
ranks were summed, and used in the computations to obtain 
the value of H. 
These calculations are shown on the following pages 
for the three groups of respondents. 
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Avg Over- Avg Over- Avg Over- 
Wtd all Wtd all Wtd all 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
Location Sm Sm Md Md La La 
Main office of the bank 0.77 12 1.33 4 0.40 16.5 
Branch offices of the 
bank 
1.08 7.5 1.17 6 2.20 1 
Shopping centers 1.77 2 1.58 3 0.80 11 
Supermarkets 0.85 10 0.92 9 1.30 5 
Transportation 
terminals 1.08 7.5 0.50 14 0.30 18 
Hospitals 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Office building lobbies 0.23 19.5 0.00 23 0.10 21 
Residential 
neighborhoods 0.23 19.5 0.50 14 0.50 14 
Other 0.00 23 0.00 23 0.40 16.5 
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The sums of the eight overall ranks for the respondents 
from small- (Rs), medium- (RM), and large-sized (RL) 
financial institutions were 101, 96, and 103, 
respectively. These values were used to obtain the H 
statistic for the three groups: 
12 
H = N (N + 1) 
12 
= 24(25) 
R — 
L ^ 
101^ 
8 
R — 
—M 
+ 
9 6— 
- 8 - 
R — 
—L 
+ Ni 
103— 
- 8 
- 3 (N + 1) 
- 3(25) 
= .02 (1275.125 + 1152 + 1326.125) - 75 
= 75.065 - 75 
= .065 
The H statistic is interpreted in the same manner as chi- 
square, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of categories minus 1. Here, the number of degrees of 
freedom is equal to 2. At the .01 level of significance, 
the value of H is not significant. 
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APPENDIX AJ 
- Small/Medium/Large Bank Respondents' Rankings of 
Countermeasure Effectiveness - Raw Data 
Countermeasure 
Small Bank Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
112 0 0 
1 4 4 2 1 
3 5 2 1 2 
13 14 1 
0 0 2 1 1 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 6 2 0 2 3 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 0 0 1 2 0 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 00101 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 10102 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 20112 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 00022 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 
Medium Bank Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
112 0 0 
1 3 3 2 0 
3 2 2 2 2 
2 3 110 
0 0 111 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 2 0 2 0 2 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 00000 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 10012 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 10011 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 0 1 0 2 2 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
N 
4 
9 
11 
7 
3 
6 
3 
0 
4 
3 
5 
0 
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Countermeasure 
Large Bank Ranks 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Increase level of security 
awareness among bank employees 
through meetings, seminars, etc. 
Increase level of security 
awareness among customers by 
distributing literature about the 
importance of nondisclosure of PINs 
and safekeeping of ATM cards 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line hotcarding 
(action which captures an ATM card 
the next time it is used) 
Reduce the number of incorrect 
PIN tries allowed 
0 10 11 3 
3 0 1 2 0 6 
4 4 0 0 1 9 
0 3 3 1 0 7 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
Eliminate off-line withdrawal 
capabilities 2 12 11 7 
Generate a fraud suspect list each day 00010 
Increase the number of unannounced 
internal audits 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Improve the level of communication 
between banking institutions on 
security-related issues 01111 4 
Substitute the use of PINs with other 
methods of confirming the customer's 
identity (i.e., fingerprint 
recognition) 10022 5 
Enact stricter legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud perpetrators 00203 5 
Other 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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APPENDIX AK 
Calculations for the Chi-Square Approximation 
of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
Rankings of Countermeasure Effectiveness 
by Small/Medium/Large Bank Respondents 
For the bank officials from small-, medium-, and 
large-sized financial institutions, the weighted ranks 
for the effectiveness of each countermeasure were 
calculated in the following manner. First, the scale was 
reflected (i.e., a respondent rank of 1 was given a 
corresponding weight of 5 ? a respondent rank of 2 was 
given a corresponding weight of 4; a respondent rank of 3 
was given a corresponding weight of 3; a respondent rank 
of 4 was given a corresponding weight of 2; and a 
respondent rank of 5 was given a corresponding weight of 
1). Next, the weight assigned to each rank was 
multiplied by the corresponding number of respondents who 
assigned the rank to a given countermeasure, and the 
values obtained for each countermeasure were summed. 
Then, each summed value was divided by the number of 
respondents within each category. Since there were 
fifteen respondents from small-sized banks, eleven 
respondents from medium-sized banks, and ten respondents 
from large-sized banks who ranked the effectiveness of 
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the countermeasures according to the directions given in 
Part II of the questionnaire (Appendix C), the 
denominators used to compute the average of the weighted 
ranks for each countermeasure for those from small-, 
medium-, and large-sized financial institutions were 15, 
11, and 10, respectively. 
The values obtained for the average of the weighted 
ranks were then ranked in one composite distribution in a 
descending order of size. The values of these overall 
ranks were summed, and used in the computations to obtain 
the H statistic. 
These calculations are shown on the following pages 
for the three groups of respondents. 
Countermeasure 
Increase level of 
security awareness 
among bank employees 
Increase level of 
security awareness 
among customers 
Have 90% - 100% of ATMs 
camera-equipped 
Have 24-hour on-line 
hotcarding 
Reduce the number of 
incorrect PIN tries 
allowed 
Eliminate off-line 
withdrawal capabilities 
Generate a fraud suspect 
list each day 
Increase the number of 
unannounced internal 
audits 
Improve the level of 
communication between 
banking institutions 
Substitute the use of 
PINs with other methods 
of confirming the 
customer's identity 
Enact stricter 
legislation for the 
prosecution of ATM fraud 
perpetrators 
Other 
Avg 
Wtd 
Rank 
Sm 
Over¬ 
all 
Rank 
Sm 
Avg 
Wtd 
Rank 
Md 
Over¬ 
all 
Rank 
Md 
Avg 
Wtd 
Rank 
Lq 
Over¬ 
all 
Rank 
La 
1.00 16.5 1.36 13 0.70 22 
2.53 6 2.73 5 2.20 10 
3.00 3.5 3.18 2 3.70 1 
1.93 11 2.45 7 2.30 8.5 
0.60 25 0.55 26 0.20 31.5 
3.00 3.5 1.64 12 2.30 8.5 
0.47 27 0.64 24 0.20 31.5 
0.27 30 0.00 35 0.10 33 
0.67 23 0.82 20 1.00 16.5 
1.13 14 0.73 21 1.10 15 
0.40 28 0.91 18 0.90 19 
0.00 35 0.00 35 0.30 29 
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The sums of the twelve overall ranks for the respondents 
from small- (Rg), medium- (RM), and large-sized (RL) 
financial institutions were 222.5, 218, and 225.5, 
respectively. These values were used to obtain the H 
statistic for the three groups: 
12 
H = "S 
• r e n(n + i) [ n; 
12 r 222. 
L 12 
2 R 2 
S % 
+ Nm 
+ 
Bit 1 
»l J " 3 (N + 1) 
5— 
= 36(37) 
218— 
12 
225.5— 1 
12 - 3(37) 
= .009 (4125.5208 + 3960.3333 + 4237.5208) - 111 
= 111.0214 - 111 
= .0214 
The H statistic is interpreted in the same manner as chi- 
square, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of categories minus 1. Here, the number of degrees of 
freedom is equal to 2. At the .01 level of significance, 
the value of H is not significant. 
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